Neighbouring the Uber conflicts: AG Wahl's Opinion on London's bus/taxi lanes as State aid (C-518/13)

The attention raised by recent complaints and strikes against Uber's intended revolution of the local ground transportation system in big cities has put the taxi sector on the spotlight. This is a sector where competition rules have always been difficult to enforce due to the heavy regulation to which it is subjected. Some claim that it is a sector ripe for proper deregulation and liberalisation. Others claim the opposite [for recent discussion, see L Eskenazi, 'The French Taxi Case: Where Competition Meets—and Overrides—Regulation' (2014) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice].
 
In the middle of this turmoil, there is now a new dimension to consider: whether any of the rules concerned with the taxi activities amount to State aid. With this background in mind, it is interesting to consider AG Wahl's Opinion in Eventech, C-518/13, EU:C:2014:2239, where the CJEU has been asked by the UK's Court of Appeal (England and Wales)
whether a contested London bus lane policy adopted by Transport for London comes within the concept of ‘aid’ under Article 107(1) TFEU. Under that policy, only black cabs (that is to say, London taxis) are allowed, during certain periods of the day, to use the lane reserved for public buses on public roads, to the exclusion of private hire vehicles (PHVs).
Given that this is a very common rule in many large cities (in Europe, and elsewhere), depending on the answer, the case is bound to create a new wave of shock in the taxi sector. Indeed, as AG Wahl consciously stresses, 'taxis and PHVs are engaged in fierce competition with each other across Europe, and London is not the only city where conflicts have arisen'. In my view, there are several points of AG Wahl's Eventech Opinion worth stressing.
 
(1) Firstly, even if it is probably common knowledge, AG Wahl stresses the fact that black cabs hold a partial monopoly on the provision of taxi services in the UK, which creates an assymetrical access to the market between them and PHVs. Indeed, 'black cabs have a partial legal monopoly. They alone may ‘ply for hire’, that is to say, be picked up at a cab rank or be hailed from the street. However, both black cabs and PHVs may provide their services in respect of pre-booked journeys. As to the extent to which black cabs operate on the market for pre-bookings, according to evidence submitted to the High Court of Justice, a 2009 survey showed that 8 % of black cab journeys were pre-booked' (para 19).
 
However, it is unclear how this can be relevant for the assessment from a State aid perspective (given the fact that everyone accepts that the 'bus lane' policy has a distortive effect on competition, see para 18), if not to tilt it towards a finding against the existence of State aid on the basis of a lack of selectivity based on the different 'legal standing' of both types of taxi undertakings. In my view, this is an important logic trap in AG Wahl's Opinion.
 
(2) Secondly, AG Wahl engages in a rather counterintuitive approach to the issue of the transfer of State resources. The AG decides to assess the question from the perspective of the regulatory powers of the Member State and fundamentally concludes that in the exercise of those regulatory powers, there is no obligation to impose a charge for access to public infrastructure (paras 24-35). However, in my view, this is a faulty approach for two reasons.
 
(a) Specifically, because the 'economic' argument that AG Wahl develops is truly unfocussed. Indeed, he considers that
If, for the sake of argument, the State aid rules were interpreted as generally requiring Member States to charge for access to public infrastructure or State-controlled resources, this might deter States from creating or opening up areas to which there has previously been no, or only limited access (sic). Equally, it might deter undertakings from participating in that process. For example, in the matter under consideration, if black cabs were required to pay for access to bus lanes, that might deter certain of them from requesting access, which might result in access being given only to the economically most resourceful, thus defeating the purpose of the policy (para 30, emphasis added).
The argument is not fully developed or particularly clear, but it goes against a consideration of economic efficiency (why wouldn't we generally prefer economically resourceful over other competitors, provided there is no predation?). More importantly, it also avoids the obvious issue that, given the limited number of black cab licences and the difficulty in obtaining one (not least, due to cost issues), a benefit is implicitly being recognised in favour of black cabs over PHVs, which can be exactly advantaging the economically most resourceful (ie, those that manage to have a black cab licence) over others. Hence, on top of the argument being economically flawed, it is also myopic and internally inconsistent.
 
(b) More generally, and perhaps more importantly, the test being applied by AG Wahl in Eventech deviates from the general test applicable under art 102 TFEU to access to essential facilities under private property. In my view, the CJEU's Judgment in IMS Health, C-418/01, EU:C:2004:257 must be taken into consideration. Importantly, under that line of case law, one of the paramount issues when assessing the withholding of access to an essential facility that results in the reserve of an activity to the owner of the facility is to consider whether there is (potential or unsatisfied) consumer demand for a service that is not being provided (or not in sufficient amounts) [see for instance, Geradin's remarks].
 
Moreover, under similar regulatory conditions (ie where there is a partial reserve of certain services but an open market for others), the CJEU's Judgment in Höfner and Elser v Macrotron, C-41/90, EU:C:1991:161 is also relevant. Here, the CJEU determined that it is unjustified to reserve the provision of a given service in favour of an undertaking (or an emanation of the State) that is unable to meet demand for that service--or, in the words of the Court, where the beneficiary of the reserved activity is 'manifestly incapable of satisfying demand prevailing on the market for such activities.'
 
In my view, the combined rationale of these lines of case law should have been taken into account in the Eventech Opinion. Given that only 8% of pre-booked taxi services are carried out by black cabs, it is plain to see that a rule that can potentially reserve to them a larger tranche of the market is bound to create problems of sufficient provision and consumer satisfaction. Moreover, at least as a matter of principle, consistency in the rules applicable to publicly and privately owned essential facilities should be pursued.
 
(3) Finally, it is clear that the whole of AG Wahl's Opinion is drafted in a way that intends to make it hinge on an assessment of 'equality' or 'comparability' of legal position between black cabs and PHVs--which basically kills the issue and passes the hot potato back to the Court of Appeal. AG Wahl makes this clear in his interim conclusion by stressing that 'I propose that the Court should answer Question 1 to the effect that, on a proper construction of Article 107(1) TFEU, where State authorities make a bus lane on a public road available to black cabs but not to PHVs during the hours of operation of that bus lane, that does not involve a transfer of ‘State resources’, provided that all comparable undertakings are granted access on equal terms, which falls to be verified by the referring court' (para 46, emphasis added). He then, at points reluctantly, goes on to sketch the conditions for that assessment of 'comparability' between black cabs and PHVs (remember the logic trap).
 
In order to delineate the framework for analysis, AG Wahl interprets (rectius, rephrases) the questions referred by the Court of Appeal and considers that it 'in reality wishes to know whether selectivity is to be assessed solely on the basis of the market on which both black cabs and PHVs compete (that is to say, the market for pre-bookings), or whether it ought to include the ‘ply for hire’ market. This is arguably a decisive issue in the case under consideration' (para 53). That is, AG Wahl restricts the issue to the relevance of the assymetrical competition between black cabs and PHVs.
 
Even if he will timidly stress the need for any differences of treatment to be justified and proportionate (paras 72-73, ie  the bus lane policy 'does not amount to ‘favouring certain undertakings’, provided that those authorities show (i) that taxis and private hire vehicles are not legally and factually comparable, owing to objective considerations relating to the safety and efficiency of the transport system, and (ii) that such a measure is suitable for achieving that objective and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve it', para 74), the AG very easily accepts that 'although I consider black cabs to be comparable to PHVs on the market for pre-bookings, they are not comparable in all respects. I can therefore accept, as a matter of principle, that, on the combined relevant markets, the objective consisting in the creation of a safe and efficient transport system may mean that black cabs are not comparable to PHVs' (para 70, emphasis in the original).
 
However, in my view, this derives from a logically flawed argument that derives from the weight given to the pre-existing regulation of the taxi market. Indeed, it is worth stressing that AG Wahl accepts the lack of comparability in principle on the basis of the following:
61. [...] taxis provide a service which supplements the existing methods of public transportation and which, in some ways, can arguably be assimilated to a universal public service. At a time when methods of communication were less developed, being able to hail a taxi from the street or to pick one up from a cab rank was an essential alternative to the other methods of transportation available. This is the reason why black cabs traditionally have a monopoly on ‘ply for hire’ journeys, and the same reason why taxis in many cities across Europe enjoy similar privileges, including the right to use bus lanes.
62. Moreover [...] a mere 8 % of black cab journeys are pre-booked. Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the pre-booked market is the only significant market on which black cabs operate. In this connection, although it does not appear self-evident to me, it has not escaped my attention that the High Court in its judgment found that ‘[i]t would clearly not be possible to legislate that … black cabs could not use the bus lane when carrying a pre-booked passenger’. With that in mind, there appears to be no justification for limiting the assessment to the market for pre-bookings alone. (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
What I think has escaped the AG's attention is that the relevant setting is not to determine where do black cabs operate, but where do they compete. If that is kept in mind, but for the anachronic and currently unjustified exclusive right to carry out 'ply for hire' journeys that black cabs retain, either all journeys would become pre-booked (if their right was simply erased and no taxi could be hailed on the streets, which is not plausible) or both black cabs and PHVs would compete for all services, which would erase the issue of comparability and assymetrical competition. Hence, making the whole analysis rely on the existence of a currently unjustified regulatory restriction makes the argument very weak and difficult to justify, particularly if a measure that distorts competition in the only market where PHVs can be present is being analysed, as is the case in Eventech.
 
(4) Consequently, for all the above, I would have preferred it if AG Wahl would have avoided the logic trap and more clearly emphasised that there is no good reason to provide discriminatory access to a public essential facility to black cabs over PHVs, which is plainly the conclusion that I think would derive from any other competition law assessment under a more general framework.
 
Implicitly, AG Wahl has been very deferential towards a sector that, as has been clear, is currently fighting to keep a monopoly that is increasingly difficult to justify (if possible at all). This is hardly a progressive Opinion. Consequently, I would like to see the CJEU deviate from his advice in Eventech and to finally rule that the State aid rules apply in this case and that the implicit extension of the reserved activities for black cabs that the bus lane rules create is contrary to the rules on State aid. I will most likely be disappointed, though.

New Book: G Racca & C Yukins (eds) "Integrity and Efficiency in Sustainable Public Contracts" (Brussels, Bruylant, 2014).


The new book on "Integrity and Efficiency in Sustainable Public Contracts. Balancing Corruption Concerns in Public Procurement Internationally" edited by Profs. Racca and Yukins is now available.

As the editors indicate

Ensuring efficiency and integrity throughout the public procurement cycle is essential to a sound allocation of taxpayers’ money. Yet public contracts are plagued by corruption, collusion, favoritism and conflicts of interest. This book addresses these problems from sophisticated, academic, institutional and practical perspectives.
The book’s ambition is to shape the public debate in the procurement community by highlighting how corruption implies violations of fundamental rights and undermines the fiduciary relationship between citizens and public institutions. The analysis underlines how corruption may stem from - and yet be resolved - through the exercise of discretion in the public procurement system. Focusing on the effects of public corruption and private collusion on procurement integrity, the book marks the features of misconduct and suggests needed counter-measures. The work also emphasizes that the pursuit of efficiency and integrity in public contracts must be rooted in professional skills, and in ethical regulations and training for public officers.
The research reflected in these pieces comes from sources around the world, and offers an excellent foundation for further development of these topics. Expanding on prior research, this volume builds on a more active transnational academic cooperation and exchanges of ideas on integrity in public contracts for the benefit of citizens.
This book is intended as both a textbook and an edited collection and it is available as an e-book too. The authors of the chapters are all specialists in their respective fields, and their different geographical and professional perspectives represent a valuable contribution to the scientific literature.
I have contributed a chapter on “Prevention and Deterrence of Bid Rigging: A Look from the New EU Directive on Public Procurement”, which SSRN version is available here.

CJEU continues reducing the scope of minimum wage laws when public contracts are subcontracted (C‑549/13)

In its Judgment in Bundesdruckerei, C-549/13, EU:C:2014:2235, the CJEU continued the development of its case law on the interaction between public procurement and labour law. In this area that was revolutionised by the Viking and Laval cases (although Viking was not about procurement), and then expanded in Rüffert and Luxembourg (idem), every decision of the CJEU is highly sensitive and likely to be received with as much praise as criticism [see, eg, Zimmer, 'Labour Market Politics through Jurisprudence' (2011) 7(1) German Policy Studies 211-234, or Bücker and Warneck, 'Viking-Laval-Rüffert: Consequences and policy perspectives' (2010) 11 European trade union institute report].
 
The Bundesdruckerei Judgment will surely be no exception, given that the CJEU has ruled that if a tenderer intends to carry out a public contract by having recourse exclusively to workers employed by a subcontractor established in a Member State other than that to which the contracting authority belongs, article 56 TFEU precludes the application of legislation of the contracting authority's Member State that requires the subcontractor to pay a minimum wage to its workers.
 
It specifically determines the incompatibility with EU law of the Law of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia on compliance with collective agreements, social norms and fair competition in the award of public contracts of 10 January 2012 and, particularly, its paragraph 4(3), which foresaw that:
Public service contracts which are not covered by [rules on posted workers, or on the public transportation of passengers by road and rail] may be awarded only to undertakings which, at the time of the submission of the tender, have agreed in writing, by means of a declaration made to the contracting authority, to pay their staff …, for the performance of the service, a minimum hourly wage of at least EUR 8.62. The undertakings shall, in their declarations, state the nature of the commitment adopted by their undertaking in the context of the collective agreement and the minimum hourly wage which will be paid to the staff engaged for the performance of the services. The amount of the minimum hourly wage may be adapted in accordance with Paragraph 21, by means of a regulation adopted by the Ministry of Labour.
 
Hence, Bundesdruckerei is different from previous cases because it does not involve posted workers, but exclusively the recourse to a fully-owned subsidiary in a different Member State by the main contractor. Hence, the relevant situation is that in which ‘the subcontractor is established in another EU Member State and the employees of the subcontractor carry out the services covered by the contract exclusively in the subcontractor’s home country’ (para 26).
 
Issues of abuse of internal market rules aside [for a very interesting discussion, see Sayde, Abuse of EU Law and Regulation of the Internal Market (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014)], the legal question was relatively straightforward: does 'Article 56 TFEU preclude the application of legislation of the Member State to which that contracting authority belongs which requires that subcontractor to pay those workers a minimum wage fixed by that legislation'? (para 29).
 
The CJEU had no doubt about the incompatibility of the minimum wage requirement, even if it could be considered a 'contract compliance clause' under article 26 of  Directive 2004/18, which foresaw that
Contracting authorities may lay down special conditions relating to the performance of a contract, provided that these are compatible with Community law and are indicated in the contract notice or in the specifications. The conditions governing the performance of a contract may, in particular, concern social and environmental considerations (emphasis added).
 
The CJEU hence focussed on the compatibility with EU law of the minimum wage requirement. In very clear terms, the CJEU has ruled that
By imposing, in such a situation, a fixed minimum wage corresponding to that required in order to ensure reasonable remuneration for employees in the Member State of the contracting authority in the light of the cost of living in that Member State, but which bears no relation to the cost of living in the Member State in which the services relating to the public contract at issue are performed and for that reason prevents subcontractors established in that Member State from deriving a competitive advantage from the differences between the respective rates of pay, that national legislation goes beyond what is necessary to ensure that the objective of employee protection is attained (C-549/13, at para 34, emphasis added).
 
This is bound to be a truly relevant case, as it can effectively deactivate all attempts by Member States to impose minimum wages being paid in public procurement settings, even under the revised rules for 'contract compliance clauses' in art 70 of Directive 2014/24. This provision has now substituted art 26 of dir 2004/18 and indicates that
Contracting authorities may lay down special conditions relating to the performance of a contract, provided that they are linked to the subject-matter of the contract within the meaning of Article 67(3) [ie linked to the specific process of production or a specific process in another stage of the life-cycle] and indicated in the call for competition or in the procurement documents. Those conditions may include economic, innovation-related, environmental, social or employment-related considerations (emphasis added).
There are two important changes to note in the Drafting of art 70 dir 2014/24 when compared to art 26 of dir 2004/18.
 
The first one is that art 70 dir 2014/24 attempts to swap the general criterion of compatibility with EU law with a requirement for the conditions to be linked to the subject-matter of the contract. Generally, this is simply laughable, as the general obligation to comply with EU law does not need to be written in a Directive, but derives generally from the supremacy of EU law and, in particular, of TFEU provisions (as art 56). However, in a more possibilistic reading, the requirement of link to object of the contract may be reinterpreted as establishing a tight proportionality test, in which case the change of drafting will not have any meaninguful legal consequences (either).
 
The second change is the explicit inclusion of employment-related considerations, as a specification of social issues. This change is also bound to be significantly ineffective, as the CJEU did not contend that employment-related considerations could be the object of contract compliance clauses.
 
Generally, I think that the case law of the CJEU is consistent and very clear in imposing restrictions to any deactivation of (labour) competitive advantages. And I think that it will be very difficult to avoid that approach under art 70 dir 2014/24, unless contracting authorities smarten up in the way they impose minimum wage conditions [for a general discussion on the likelihood of this, see Jaehrling, ‘The state as a “socially responsible customer”? Public procurement between market-making and market-embedding’ (2014) European Journal of Industrial Relations (forthc)]. More generally, this could put pressure on the development of a European minimum wage (see discussion here), but the analysis of the (undesirable) effects of such policy exceed our time and space.
 
However, as public procurement is concerned, the Judgment of the CJEU in Bundesdruckerei should be welcome, as it stresses that the main goal of public procurement rules are to ensure economic efficiency by a deepening of the internal market and a protection of undistorted competition (even by means of regulation). Some may like it (I do), and some may hate it (as Arrowsmith and, particularly, Kunzlik seem to do), but this is what it is.

GC pushes for overcompliance with EU public procurement rules in the provision of public services (T-309/12)

In its Judgment in Zweckverband Tierkörperbeseitigung v Commission, T-309/12, EU:T:2014:676, the GC has assessed the compatibility with EU State aid rules of a system of financial support to the maintenance of reserve animal disposal capacity in the case of epizootic. It is a very long and complicated Judgment and its reading is not easy, as the only available versions are in French and German. However, it is a case that should not go unnoticed. In my view, it raises two very fundamental questions where the position of the GC (and the Commission) is at least highly contentious and it will be good to see if a further appeal to the CJEU opens a door to some clarification in this area of EU economic law.
 
The first contentious issue is the economic or non-economic character of the activity at stake. In para 86 of the Judgment [and relying by analogy on the reasoning in FENIN, C-205/03, EU:C:2006:453 at para 26 and in Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle v Commission, C-288/11 P, EU:C:2012:821 at para 44 (but quoting its own argument in T-443/08 at para 95, which the CJEU later endorsed)] the GC concludes that "even if it is true that the applicant was required to maintain a reserve capacity in the event of an epidemic (rectius, epizootic), it does not mean that the implementation of this obligation by the applicant was related to the exercise of the prerogatives of public power" (emphasis added). In my view, and for reasons that I still need to articulate fully, this does not make good sense. However, this is a point I would like to reserve for the near future.
 
The second contentious issue is that, in the overall assessment of the GC, the fact that the arrangement between the affected German lander (and a multiplicity of regional and local authorities) and the public undertaking providing the reserve animal disposal capacity in the case of epizootic was covered by exceptions to the EU public procurement rules (either under the Teckal in-house exception or the Hamburg public-public cooperation exception, which is not entirely clear in the case) did not have any effect on the application of the Altmark criteria to the case. I know that this is an issue riddled with nuances and jargon stemming from public procurement rules, but I will try to disentangle it in a way that shows the difficulty created by the GC finding, as I see it.
 
Under the Altmark criteria (4th condition), compliance with applicable public procurement rules is a requirement for State aid granted to the provider of services of economic interest (acknowledgely, an issue related with the first point) to be compatible with Articles 107(1) and 106(2) SGEI (rectius, for State aid not to exist due to the lack of economic advantage) [for discussion, see A Sánchez Graells (2013), "The Commission’s Modernization Agenda for Procurement and SGEI" in E  Szyszczak & J van de Gronden (eds.), Financing SGEIs: State Aid Reform and Modernisation, Series Legal Issues of Services of General Interest (TMC Asser Press/Springer) 161-181]. In the absence of procurement procedures for the selection of the provider, the level of economic support needs to be "determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with [material means] so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations". This is a fiendish exercise and, generally speaking, procurement is a much easier road. Hence, structurally, there is a clear pressure on public authorities to resort to procurement procedures in order to be on the safe side re compliance with State aid rules.
 
At the same time, however, it should be highlighted that public authorities have no obligation to resort to the market in order to discharge their (public service) missions and they are fundamentally free to either cooperate with other public authorities (Hamburg) or entrust the execution of those activities in-house (Teckal). This is an area where the clash between EU Institutions and Member States has been evident and the recently approved Directive 2014/24 tries to provide a compromise solution in Art 12 by recognising that in those cases a public procurement procedure is not required (and allowing for the instrumental entities used to even carry out market activities up to a 20% of their average total turnover). 
 
In my view, the fact that public procurement rules allow for the avoidance of public tenders in the award of public contracts [including those for the provision of public services (broadly defined)] to public undertakings or other contracting authorities, creates a difficulty from a State aid/procurement interaction perspective. The basic difficulty derives from the fact that a perfectly legal decision to keep certain activities within the public sector creates very significant difficulties for the funding of that activity as soon as there is any (potential) interaction with the market--which, at least under the new rules in Art 12 of Dir 2014/24, is also a perfectly legal situation. This is a structural problem of coordination of both sets of rules that comes to put pressure on the viability of keeping the Altmark criteria untouched.
 
Indeed, following the general reasoning of the GC in Zweckverband Tierkörperbeseitigung, the absence of a procurement procedure (despite the fact that it was not required) excludes the possibility to benefit from the presumption set out in the 4th Altmark condition and creates a significant risk of breach of EU State aid rules. From the perspective of the consistency of the procurement system and the effectiveness of the general consensus that the procurement rules "should [not] deal with the liberalisation of services of general economic interest, reserved to public or private entities, or with the privatisation of public entities providing services" [Rec (6) Dir 2014/24] , this is problematic. The increased risks of infringement of State aid rules brings a very important limitation on the contracting authorities' actual freedom to resort to schemes covered by Art 12 of Directive 2014/24 and creates a clear incentive for overcompliance with public procurement rules.
 
Regardless of the benefits that more compliance with procurement rules and public tenders could bring about, the clear limits that EU constitutional rules (and the principle of neutrality of ownership in Art 345 TFEU in particular) create need to be respected and duly acknowldeged. Hence the difficulty in coordinating all these sets of provisions in a manner that is respectful with both the split of competences between Member States and the EU, and the effectiveness of EU State aid rules.
 
In my view, the CJEU should use the opportunity to clarify these complicated issues in case the GC's Zweckverband Tierkörperbeseitigung Judgment is further appealed. In the meantime, there are lots of issues that require further thought and, in particular, how to exactly reach the adequate balance in the coordination of both sets of rules.

GC uses principle of equality of treatment as "fix-for-all", despite flagrant procedural irregularities (T-48/12)

In its Judgment in Euroscript - Polska v Parliament, T-48/12, EU:T:2014:680, the General Court addressed an interesting point on the application of the principle of equal treatment when the public buyer decides to reassess the offers received and, as a consequence of the reassessment, adjudicates the contract to a tenderer other than the one initially granted the highest score.

In the case at hand, a contract for translation services into Polish had been tendered by several EU Institutions under the lead of the Parliament. The first evaluation of the offers produced a shortlist were Euroscript Polska was ranked first and Agencja MAart second.

The Parliament proposed to award the contract to Euroscript, subject to its furnishing of sufficient proof of not being affected by any applicable exclusion ground. The decision was communicated to all tenderers and a 14-day period for the request of further particulars on this decision, including their own evaluation reports and the relative advantages of the selected offer, started.
 
Almost a month after the expiry of the 14-day deadline, and without having requested the suspension of the procedure, MAart requested that the Parliament reassessed its offer. The Parliament did so and granted sufficient additional points to MAart as to make its offer top the shortlist. The Parliament communicated this reassessment to all tenderers, including Euroscript, and proceeded to sign the contract with MAart.Euroscript's challenge was based on two grounds, and the GC decides only on the basis of the general principles of transparency and equal treatment. There are two aspects of the Judgment that deserve comments.
Firstly, the GC is willing to assess the case on its grounds despite the obvious procedural fault derived from the Parliament having accepted MAart's request for a reassessment outside the applicable 14-day period. The GC reaches that position on the basis of Art 103 of the applicable Financial Regulation, which would have allowed the Parliament to suspend the contract if there was evidence that the award procedure had been vitiated by substantial errors or irregularities or by fraud (para 58).
 
In my view, there was no evidence of a substantial error in the initial assessment (the reassessment merely granted MAart 3.58/100 extra points, which does not seem substantial), and the generosity of the GC is troubling, given that it may result in a permanent reopening of the assessment phase of the tenders for contracts with the EU Institutions--which the GC expressly argues against in para 55, with reference to the CJEU Judgment in Strabag, C-314/09, EU:C:2010:567, para 37. Hence, a more detailed assessment of fumus boni iuris at this point would have been desirable and, arguably, should have killed the case.
 
Secondly, on top of finding an infringement of the principle of transparency derived from the lack of communication to tenderers that a second evaluation was being carried out (para 60), the GC considers that the principle of equal treatment was breached because the reassessment only covered MAart's offer, but not Euroscript's or any other tenderers' (para 61). Here, again, the GC seems to be too generous by hinting at the fact that a reassessment of all offers would have sufficed to uphold the principle of equal treatment.
 

In my view, if the reassessment was due to a sense that there may have been 'substantial errors or irregularities', a mere reevaluation would not have sufficed and the Parliament would have needed to carry out a more detailed investigation and to offer all tenderers (and particularly Euroscript) the possibility to present their views on MAart's allegations. Conversely, if the reassessment was merely due to the fact that MAart had complained (despite being time-barred), the fact that all offers would have been reevaluated should have made no difference whatsoever and the procedural irregularity should have tainted the whole of the second award.
 
Generally, I think that reliance on the principle of equal treatment is excessive and that its use as a panacea in procurement review creates significant shortcomings in the case law. Hence, where there are good technical reasons to quash an award, I would like to see the courts refraining from ellaboration on equality terms, so that such a 'tool' can be used where discrimination is at the core of improper procurement decisions. Otherwise, we will keep on cracking nuts with a sledgehammer, which may end up breaking it...

(Progressively formed) res iudicata all'italiana: or how EU law's supremacy can deactivate final judgments (C-213/13)

In its Judgment in Impresa Pizzarotti, C-213/13, EU:C:2014:2067 the CJEU followed the Opinion of AG Wahl (EU:C:2014:335, commented here) and determined that, on a proper construction of the applicable public procurement directives, where the main object of a contract is the execution of a work corresponding to the requirements expressed by the contracting authority (in the case at hand, the building of a new city of justice in Bari), that contract constitutes a public works contract and is not, therefore, covered by the exclusion applicable to public service contracts for the acquisition or rental, by whatever financial means, of land, existing buildings or other immovable property or concerning rights thereon, even if it contains an undertaking to let the work in question.
 
From the strict perspective of procurement law, the Impresa Pizzarotti Judgment is straightforward and clarifies the fact that a decisive influence of the contracting authority in the design of the works to be carried out suffices to trigger the application of the procurement rules (paras 39-52). Hence, in the case at hand, the lack of tender for the contract which implementation Pizzarotti intended rendered it illegal and, under the applicable remedies Directives, excluded any legal value to such contract for the future lease of buildings still to be constructed.
 
In my view, however, the case raises a second issue that may be much more relevant. As part of the convoluted litigation that led to the referral to the CJEU, the Italian Consiglio di Stato had recognised certain rights to Pizzarotti under the applicable Italian administrative law provisions. However, giving effect to those rights would result in a situation contrary to EU law, given the (unfulfilled) obligation to tender the contract for the lease of the buildings to be constructed. The difficulty of avoiding the breach of EU law derived from the fact that the previous ruling of the Consiglio di Stato had become final and had the force of res iudicata
 
In those circumstances, however, the Consiglio di Stato indicated to the CJEU that its own case-law made provision for an exceptional "progressively formed res iudicata" that would allow it to "supplement the original operative part of one of its judgments by an implementation decision" (para 27 or, rectius, disregard its finality?) and asked whether it was appropriate to do so under the circumstances of the case.
 
The CJEU reacted in the only possible manner and, after stressing the importance of the principle of res iudicata and its belonging to the procedural autonomy of Member States, did not let the opportunity of relishing a capriccio all'italiana in the form of progressively formed res iudicata.

Given the relatively surrealist reasoning to which the CJEU is forced by the naivety of the Consiglio di Stato's referral, it is worth reproducing it almost in full:
53      [...] the referring court asks, in essence, whether it may decide that a ruling which it has made which has led to a situation which is incompatible with the EU legislation on public works contracts is ineffective.
54      [...] in the absence of EU legislation in this area, the rules implementing the principle of res judicata are a matter for the national legal order, in accordance with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States, but must be consistent with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (see, to that effect, the judgment in Fallimento Olimpiclub, C‑2/08, EU:C:2009:506, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
55 In its request for a preliminary ruling, the referring court indicates that, according to its case-law, it may, under certain conditions, supplement the original operative part of one of its judgments by implementation decisions, that possibility giving rise to what it terms ‘progressively formed res judicata’.
56 If — and it is for the referring court to ascertain whether this is the case — the conditions for applying that procedure are met in respect of the decision in Judgment No 4267/2007, a decision which is mentioned in paragraph 15 of this judgment and which — according to the order for reference — alone has the force of res judicata in the present case, it is for that court, having regard to the principle of equivalence, to make use of that procedure, favouring, from among ‘the numerous different possibilities of implementation’ which it states may be used in respect of that decision, the solution which, in accordance with the principle of effectiveness, ensures compliance with the EU legislation on public works contracts.
57      [...]
58 On the other hand, if the referring court is led to the view that the correct application of that legislation conflicts, having regard to the applicable domestic rules of procedure, with its Judgment No 4267/2007 or with its decisions of 15 April and 3 December 2010 implementing that judgment, attention should be drawn to the importance, both in the legal order of the European Union and in national legal systems, of the principle of res judicata. In order to ensure both stability of the law and legal relations and the sound administration of justice, it is important that judicial decisions which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the time-limits provided for in that connection can no longer be called into question (judgments in Kapferer, C‑234/04, EU:C:2006:178, paragraph 20; Commission v Luxembourg, C‑526/08, EU:C:2010:379, paragraph 26; and ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission, C‑352/09 P, EU:C:2011:191, paragraph 123).
59 Therefore, EU law does not require a national court to disapply domestic rules of procedure conferring finality on a judgment, even if to do so would make it possible to remedy a domestic situation which is incompatible with EU law (see, to that effect, the judgments in Eco Swiss, C‑126/97, EU:C:1999:269, paragraphs 46 and 47; Kapferer, EU:C:2006:178, paragraphs 20 and 21; Fallimento Olimpiclub, EU:C:2009:506, paragraphs 22 and 23; Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, C‑40/08, EU:C:2009:615, paragraphs 35 to 37; and Commission v Slovakia, C‑507/08, EU:C:2010:802, paragraphs 59 and 60).
60 Accordingly, EU law does not require a judicial body automatically to go back on a judgment having the authority of res judicata in order to take into account the interpretation of a relevant provision of EU law adopted by the Court after delivery of that judgment.
61 That analysis cannot be undermined by the judgment in Lucchini (C‑199/05, EU:C:2007:434), cited by the referring court: it was in a highly specific situation, in which the matters at issue were principles governing the division of powers between the Member States and the European Union in the area of State aid, that the Court found, in essence, that EU law precludes the application of a provision of national law, such as Article 2909 of the Italian Civil Code, which seeks to lay down the principle of res judicata, in so far as the application of that provision would prevent the recovery of State aid which was granted in breach of EU law and which has been found to be incompatible with the common market in a decision of the European Commission which has become final (see, to that effect, the judgment in Fallimento Olimpiclub, EU:C:2009:506, paragraph 25). However, issues of that nature, relating to the division of powers, do not arise in the present case.
62 That said, if the applicable domestic rules of procedure provide the possibility, under certain conditions, for a national court to go back on a decision having the authority of res judicata in order to render the situation compatible with national law, that possibility must prevail if those conditions are met, in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, so that the situation at issue in the main proceedings is brought back into line with the EU legislation on public works contracts.
63 In that regard, it should be emphasised that that legislation contains fundamental rules of EU law in that it is intended to ensure the application of the principles of equal treatment of tenderers and of transparency in order to open up undistorted competition in all the Member States (see, to that effect, the judgments in Commission v Portugal, C‑70/06, EU:C:2008:3, paragraph 40; Michaniki, C‑213/07, EU:C:2008:731, paragraph 55; Commission v Cyprus, C‑251/09, EU:C:2011:84, paragraphs 37 to 39; and Manova, C‑336/12, EU:C:2013:647, paragraph 28).
64 In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the second question is that, to the extent that it is authorised to do so by the applicable domestic rules of procedure, a national court — such as the referring court — which has given a ruling at last instance, without a reference having first been made to the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU, that has led to a situation which is incompatible with the EU legislation on public works contracts must either supplement or go back on that definitive ruling so as to take into account any interpretation of that legislation provided by the Court subsequently (C-213/13 at paras 53-64, emphasis added).
In my view, given the consequences that an infringement of EU law by the domestic courts can have and the ensuing potential for State liability claims (see Traghetti del Mediterraneo, C-173/03, EU:C:2006:391], Member States would be quite foolish not to adopt the concept of (progressively formed) res iudicata all'italiana, at least for instances of subsequent violation of EU law. Unless they take legal certainty and predicatability seriously, that is!

CJEU fuels joint application of Arts 102 & 106(1) TFEU to suppress unequal conditions of competition (C-553/12P)

In its Judgment in Commission v DEI, C-553/12 P, EU:C:2014:2083, the CJEU has (further) clarified the threshold of competitive distortion required in the application of Arts 102 and 106(1) TFEU to State measures concerned with public undertakings or undertakings with special or exclusive rights.
 
This Judgment goes beyond the precedent in MOTOE, C-49/07, EU:C:2008:376 (and others cited therein) in the trend of lowering the threshold of competitive distortion required in the declaration of incompatibility of State regulation with EU competition rules. The step forward fundamentally consists in decoupling the issue of "unequal conditions of competition" from the push of the State towards abuse of a dominant position through regulation, and in recognising (not as an obiter dictum) that the creation of "unequal conditions of competition" in favour of public undertakings or undertakings with special or exclusive rights suffices to find an infringement of Articles 106(1) and 102 TFEU [provided, of course, that the "public mission exception" of Article 106(2) TFEU is not applicable, which was not considered in the case].
 
Such decoupling is particularly clear in the plea submitted by the Commission (which the CJEU will accept, bit by bit, in its Judgment), whereby it argued that
35 [...] when Article [102 TFEU] is applied in conjunction with Article [106(1) TFEU] to situations where there is inequality of opportunity between economic operators, and thus distorted competition which stems from a State measure, that State measure in itself constitutes an infringement [...] It is therefore sufficient to prove that the measure indeed created inequality of opportunity by favouring the privileged public undertaking and thereby affected the structure of the market by allowing that undertaking to maintain, strengthen or extend its dominant position to another, neighbouring or downstream market, for example by preventing new competitors from entering that market (C-553/12 P, at para 35).
There are some passages in the Commission v DEI Judgment that are worth highlighting:
46 [...] infringement of Article [106(1) TFEU] in conjunction with Article [102 TFEU] may be established irrespective of whether any abuse actually exists. All that is necessary is for the Commission to identify a potential or actual anti‑competitive consequence liable to result from the State measure at issue. Such an infringement may thus be established where the State measures at issue affect the structure of the market by creating unequal conditions of competition between companies, by allowing the public undertaking or the undertaking which was granted special or exclusive rights to maintain (for example by hindering new entrants to the market), strengthen or extend its dominant position over another market, thereby restricting competition, without it being necessary to prove the existence of actual abuse.
47 In those circumstances, it follows that [...] it is sufficient to show that that potential or actual anti-competitive consequence is liable to result from the State measure at issue; it is not necessary to identify an abuse other than that which results from the situation brought about by the State measure at issue (C-553/12 P, at paras 46-47, emphasis added).
These very clear statements of the sufficiency of identifying the creation (or perpetuation) of "unequal conditions of competition" are further developed later in the Judgment:
57 [...] if inequality of opportunity between economic operators, and thus distorted competition, is the result of a State measure, such a measure, be it legislative, regulatory or administrative, constitutes an infringement of Article [106(1) TFEU] read in combination with Article [102 TFEU] (C-553/12 P, at para 57, emphasis added).
In my view, by switching from a language concerned with potential abuses of a dominant position by the public undertaking or undertaking with special or exclusive rights, to a more clearly-spelled (and simple) focus on "unequal conditions of competition", the CJEU has fuelled the enforcement of these provisions against State action that perpetuates the dominant position of former monopolies and/or twarts the effectiveness of liberalisation measures. Hence, it should be welcome. In my view, this case can trigger much stronger enforcement in areas such as public procurement, where the continued award of contracts to a former monopoly on the basis of pre-existing rights surely ressembles the factual background of Commission v DEI.

Something to feel proud of

I just came back from my holidays and found my copy of V Kosta, N Skoutaris and V P Tzevelekos (eds), The EU Accession to the ECHR (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014). The book is the reworked compilation of some of the papers presented at a conference in Brussels in November 2012, plus other interesting contributions. I also contribute a chapter on corporate fair trial rights  and competition law enforcement that was already available through SSRN. In the words of the editors:
Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides that the EU will accede to the system of human rights protection of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Protocol No 9 in the Treaty of Lisbon opens the way for accession. This represents a major change in the relationship between two organisations that have co-operated closely in the past, though the ECHR has hitherto exercised only an indirect constitutional control over the EU legal order through scrutiny of EU Member States. The accession of the EU to the ECHR is expected to put an end to the informal dialogue, and allegedly also competition between the two regimes in Europe and to establish formal (both normative and institutional) hierarchies.

In this new era, some old problems will be solved and new ones will appear. Questions of autonomy and independence, of attribution and allocation of responsibility, of co-operation, and legal pluralism will all arise, with consequences for the protection of human rights in Europe.

This book seeks to understand how relations between the two organisations are likely to evolve after accession, and whether this new model will bring more coherence in European human rights protection. The book analyses from several different, yet interconnected, points of view and relevant practice the draft Accession Agreement, shedding light on future developments in the ECHR and beyond. Contributions in the book span classic public international law, EU law and the law of the ECHR, and are written by a mix of legal and non-legal experts from academia and practice.
Looking at the contents of the book, I am truly impressed. And it seems that I am not the only one:
"This book will be essential reading for all those interested in the future judicial and legal organisation of Europe. The editors, the contributors and the publishers are all to be warmly congratulated on a splendid achievement in legal scholarship" From the foreword by Francis G Jacobs.
This is definitely something to be proud of. I hope other research projects will be similarly succesful. 

Happy holidays!

I am closing the blog down for a while, as I am off for some holidays soon. Thank you for reading during this last semester and I hope you will stay in touch after the break. Happy Summer to everyone!

“Hanging Boy” (c) Robert Doisneau.
 

... and Cut! Lights Out for the €274mn Spanish "Ciudad de la Luz" Film Studios (T-319/12)

In its Judgment of 3 July 2014 in Spain v Commission (Ciudad de la Luz), joined cases T-319/12 and T-321/12, EU:T:2014:604 (not available in English), the General Court (GC) reviewed Commission's Decision (2012) 3025 final and assessed the compatibility of a Spanish support scheme for the development of the Ciudad de la Luz film studios (a project initially promoted by the late Luis Garcia Berlanga) with the rules on State aid in Articles 107-109 TFEU.
The GC found the aid to be incompatible with the internal market and confirmed the obligation of the Valencia Regional Government to divest its €274mn stake in the film studios, where it originally invested in 2000. The Judgment raises some interesting points on the application of the market investor test to the development of this sort of culture-related facilities.
 
Firstly, at paras 38 to 45, the GC rejects any obligation of the European Commission to take into consideration average returns in a given sector, particularly where they are affected by a lack of data or there are concerns about their reliability. The GC clarifies, following the Judgment in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Commission [joined cases T-228/99 and T-233/99, EU:T:2003:57] that the average return is one amongst many factors that the Commission may take into account when assessing the likelihood that a private investor would undertake a given publicly-sponsored project. 
 
Nonetheless, the Commission is not bound to use it and, in any case, its assessments could not be limited to such an average return analysis. Indeed, the "utilization of the average rate of return in the sector concerned does not relieve the Commission of the obligation to make a complete analysis of all relevant elements of the transaction and its context, including the situation of the company and the market, in trying to check whether the recipient undertaking has benefitted from an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions" (para 45, own translation from Spanish).
 
Secondly, at paras 48 to 50, the GC grants very low probative value to the existence of independent consulting studies and viability plans commissioned by the public authority prior to its investment. The GC acknowledges that the existence of independent reports may serve as an indication of the public investment having been made in comparable terms to those of a private transaction.

However, the GC also clarifies that the "jurisprudence does not in any way support that the existence of such reports is in itself sufficient to consider that the beneficiary of that measure has not benefited from an economic advantage within the meaning of Article 107, paragraph 1 (...) the Member State concerned can not rely on the findings of reports of independent consultancy firms without offering itself an adequate response to the issues that a prudent investor would have considered in the context of the case" (para 50, own translation from Spanish, emphasis added).
 
Thirdly, the GC clearly upholds the method followed by the European Commission to estimate the cost of capital and the expected internal rate of return. Strikingly, although maybe not suprising for a country and a region that undertook too many loss-making infrastructure projects in the last decade (shamefully, for instance, the Castellon Airport), the Commission rightly found that "the net present value was negative for any cost of capital of between 5% and 6%. For all costs of capital higher than 10%, the net present value was sharply negative and relatively stable. In view of the results [and the information available to the public authority], according to which the cost of capital was of 16.66% in 2000 and 14.9% in 2004, it could have effectively concluded with a high degree of certainty that the project was not profitable" (para 61, own translation from Spanish).
 
Fourthly and  in a rather colourful way, in paras 87 to 95, the GC engages in an assessment of the economic data included in the works of a Spanish university professor [not named by the GC, but the works are those of P Fernandez, and mainly its paper: The Equity Premium in 150 Textbooks (Date posted: September 14, 2009; Last revised: November 26, 2013)]. In my view, the detailed discussion that the GC entertains about the use of those equity premium estimates is an example of the degree of financial sofistication that the Court can reach--but, equally, of the possible excess in the detail of the review, if compared with the literal tenor of Art 263(2) TFEU.
 
Fifthly, the GC also engages in a largely useless exercise concerned with the incorporation or not of additional sources of revenue in the Commission's assessments. In its Decision, the Commission had only taken into account the revenue from film making activities. Spanish authorities wanted to add the expected revenue from hotel and commercial exploitation of the premises. The GC, in paras 125 to 139, sorts out the issue in a Solomonic way. First, it finds that the Commission should have incorporated the additional revenue in its assessment. However, it then rejects the arguments of the appellants on the basis that, even with those additional revenues, the project would not have been viable.
 
In my view, the important factual point to stress is that the public call for developers launched by the Spanish region in 2005 was deserted and the developments never took place (para 135). If listening to the market is of any value, it seems that the Commission made the right call by not including the expected additional revenue.

Anyway, the case law is now more open to the inclusion of alternative sources of revenue in the public investment in complex infrastructure projects as a result of the Ciudad de la Luz Judgment.
 
Finally, in paras 152 to 159, the GC assesses the requirements applicable to private investments and their continuity in order to make the infrastructure project that receives public finance susceptible of a declaration of compatibility under the applicable block exemption regulations. In short, the GC takes a pragmatic approach and clearly determines that an initial investment of 25% of the equity that, due to subsequent increases in capital in which the private investor does not participate, is reduced to around 1.6% in under a year falls short from the requirement of substantial private investment in the project (paras 155-156). In my view, this is a strong point in the Judgment and definitely one oriented to prevent circumvention strategies such as the one clearly seen in the Ciudad de la Luz case.
 
All in all, the case is interesting (or depressing...) if one reads it from the perspective of the massive legal and financial arguments that can be created to cover a simple and worrying truth: that certain infrastructure projects are anti-economical and a brutal waste of public resources, probably only driven by politicans' interests. In that regard, the insights of the study by Flyvbjerg, Garbuio and Lovallo "Delusion and Deception in Large Infrastructure Projects: Two Models for Explaining and Preventing Executive Disaster" (2009) California Management Review 51(2): 170-193 will be worth re-reading (over and over). Now, in the short-term, the difficulty will be in trying to find a private buyer for such inviable film studios...

CJEU protects discriminatory green energy schemes and keeps inconsistency in EU free movement of goods law (C-573/12)

In its Judgment of 1 July 2014 in Ålands Vindkraft, C-573/12, EU:C:2014:2037, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) departed from the previous Opinion of Advocate General Bot [EU:C:2014:37] and considered that the Swedish system of support of green energy is compatible with Article 34 TFEU despite the fact that it includes restrictions to trade in energy (and green electricity certificates) on the basis of nationality (rectius, on the basis of the place of production of that energy).
 
In my opinion, the case is important because: 1) the CJEU did not follow the more honest and transparent approach advocated for by AG Bot and has now perpetuated the doubts concerning the compatibility of environmental protection and internal market policies [particularly due to the conflation of Art 36 TFEU and 'Cassis de Dijon' mandatory requirements, as grounds for the exemption of restrictions to free movement], 2) it relies on economic assessments and the principle of legitimate investor expectations to a point that, in my view, exceeds the traditional balance or concern with pure economic aspects in the design of trade-restrictive policies (as well as only taking into consideration the economic burdens of some of the economic agents involved), and 3) the apparently pragmatic approach adopted by the CJEU actually restricts the potential ability of the EU as a whole to achieve its environmental protection commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Each of these points deserves some further comments.
 
0. Background
From the perspective of EU law on free movement of goods (art 34 TFEU), the Ålands Vindkraft Judgment is concerned with one of the classical 'conundrums' derived from every clash of policies and, more especifically, with the difficulties derived from the two-tier approach to the exemption of legislative measures that restrict trade in the pursuit of other goals.

The TFEU deals with those situations in a limited manner under Art 36 TFEU, which contains a restricted and exhaustive number of exceptions (numerus clausus) to the general prohibition of measures that restrict trade. The CJEU expanded the possibility to exempt other measures under the so-called 'mandatory requirements' theory as first established in Cassis de Dijon [Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 120/78,
EU:C:1979:42].
 
The main difference between the Art 36 TFEU exemptions and those based on Cassis mandatory requirements was, according to the canon, that the former applied to both directly and indirectly discriminatory measures, whereas the latter could only exempt non-discriminatory (or equally applicable) measures. In the specific case of environmental protection, given its non-inclusion in the exhaustive list of Art 36 TFEU, the canon implied that it could only be used to exempt non-discriminatory measures. However, ever since the 2003 Judgment in EVN and Wienstrom [C-448/01, EU:C:2003:651], there has been intense debate as to whether environmental protection could be subsumed or conflated with one of Art 36 TFEU heads of exemption (ie 'the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants') and, consequently, also be used to exempt directly discriminatory measures [for discussion, see E Engle, 'Environmental Protection as an Obstacle to Free Movement of Goods: Realist Jurisprudence in Articles 28 and 30 of the E.C. Treaty' (2008) Journal of Law and Commerce 37: 113]. This was precisely the legal point to be addressed in Ålands Vindkraft.
 
1. An obscure departure from the clear and honest approach advocated by AG Bot
In his Opinion of 28 January 2014, and building on the more detailed proposal that he submitted in the Opinion in Essent Belgium [C-204/12 to C-208/12, EU:C:2013:294, not available in English] AG Bot took a bold step and suggested that "national legislation constituting a measure having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions may be justified by the objective of environmental protection even if it is discriminatory, provided, however, that it undergoes a particularly rigorous proportionality test, one which I have referred to as ‘reinforced’" (para 79, emphasis added).
 
His proposal was basically aimed at overcoming the problematic conflation of environmental protection as a Cassis mandatory requirement and an (indirect) measure for the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants. Moreover, the reinforced proportionality test (with all its problems), intended to reduce the margin of regulatory discretion that can be assigned to Member States under the Cassis doctrine.
 
However, the CJEU did not follow this bold, transparent and clear approach advocated for by AG Bot and, on the contrary and in an obscure manner, perpetuated the conflation in Ålands Vindkraft. Indeed, the CJEU considered that
77 According to settled case-law, national measures that are capable of hindering intra-Community trade may inter alia be justified by overriding requirements relating to protection of the environment (see, to that effect, Commission v Austria, EU:C:2008:717, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
78 In that regard, it should be noted that the use of renewable energy sources for the production of electricity, which legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings seeks to promote, is useful for the protection of the environment inasmuch as it contributes to the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, which are amongst the main causes of climate change that the European Union and its Member States have pledged to combat (see, to that effect, PreussenElektra, EU:C:2001:160, paragraph 73).
79 That being so, the increase in the use of renewable energy sources constitutes — as is explained, in particular, in recital 1 to Directive 2009/28 — one of the important components of the package of measures needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to comply with the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and with other Community and international greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments beyond the year 2012.
80 As the Court has pointed out, such an increase is also designed to protect the health and life of humans, animals and plants, which are among the public interest grounds listed in Article 36 TFEU (see, to that effect, PreussenElektra, EU:C:2001:160, paragraph 75). (C-573/12, paras 77 to 80, emphasis added).
From that point onwards, it is impossible to determine whether the CJEU bases its legal arguments in Art 36 TFEU as the protection of the health and life of humans, animals and plants is concerned or on the more general doctrine of mandatory or overriding requirements relating to the protection of the environment, or both. In my view, this is a lost opportunity for the clarification of this relevant point of EU law on free movement of goods. However, it may seem clear that (as Barnard justifies in The Substantive Law of the EU. The Four Freedoms, 4th edn, p. 172 and ff) the CJEU is not concerned with the legal basis used and that, currently, exemptions are fundamentally regulated under the principle of proportionality (but not necessarily under the 'reinforced' proportionality test advocated for by AG Bot). In itself, the perpetuation of this legal unclarity deserves some strong criticism. Not least, because of the flaws in the assessment of proportionality when it comes down to economic matters.
 
2. Unbalanced economic assessment and excessive reliance in (certain) legitimate expectations
The economic assessment of the measures that the CJEU carries out jeopardises the soundness of the proportionality test that it carries out in paras. 83 to 119 of the Ålands Vindkraft Judgment.
 
On the one hand, the CJEU follows recital 25 to Directive 2009/28 and stresses that "it is essential, in order to ensure the proper functioning of the national support schemes, that Member States be able to ‘control the effect and costs of their national support schemes according to their different potentials’, while maintaining investor confidence" (para. 99). Even further, it indicates that "the effectiveness of such a scheme requires by definition a measure of continuity sufficient, in particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the legitimate expectations of investors who have committed themselves to such projects, and the continued operation of those installations" (para. 103). In that regard, the CJEU adopts an approach to the protection of the budgetary planning and constraints that Member States unavoidably face (particularly in terms of avoiding claims for compensation) that ressembles, but goes further than its approach in the restrictions to free movement of persons when the viability of the healthcare system is concerned. However, this approach fails to take into consideration that the incentives to investors are not unidirectional when it comes to environmental protection.
 
In the case at hand, energy producers based in Sweden may well have a clear need for an avoidance of changes in the regulatory regime on the basis of which they invested in the creation of renewal energy production facilities. However, those same investors may also have a very strong financial interest in being able to benefit from lower production prices or lower prives for green energy certificates in other Member States (eg, by acquiring cheaper green energy (certificates) in cheaper markets and selling theirs is highly-priced markets, if they identify opportunities for arbitrage). Moreover, some of those investors may wish to follow EU-wide or, at least, regional policies. That was the case of the appellant, Ålands Vindkraft when it was seeking to have green energy produced in Finland recognised under the Swedish scheme. Hence, by imposing absolute territorial protection to the schemes in support of green energy, Member States and the CJEU may actually be crowding out investors that do not wish to remain purely local. And that is not taken into consideration in the Ålands Vindkraft Judgment.
 
The reasoning in para. 118 also seems economically faulty to me. The CJEU considers that
provided that there is a market for green certificates which meets the conditions set out in paragraphs 113 and 114 above [ie proper functioning market mechanisms that are capable of enabling traders (...) to obtain certificates effectively and under fair terms] and on which traders who have imported electricity from other Member States are genuinely able to obtain certificates under fair terms, the fact that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings does not prohibit producers of green electricity from selling (...) both the electricity and the certificates does not mean that the legislation goes beyond what is necessary to attain the objective of increasing the production of green electricity. The fact that such a possibility remains open appears to be an additional incentive for producers to increase their production of green electricity (emphasis added).
 
Effectively, what the CJEU affirms is that an importer that has already paid higher prices for green energy prices at origin (say, Finland) and that cannot use third country green certificates in Sweden, who then has to acquire (in fair terms, sic) additional green energy certificates in Sweden, has an increased incentive to produce green energy in Sweden. But that makes no sense unless this is complemented with the fact that such importer would have no incentive whatsoever to continue importing green energy into Sweden--hence reducing its production or demand for green energy elsewhere (say, Finland).
 
In my view, the proper considerations of these alternative (additional) economic effects may well have tilted the proportionality assessment in the other direction and forced the CJEU to conclude that the Swedish measure was not proportionate (as AG Bot proposed in his Opinion Ålands Vindkraft, para. 110).
 
3. A perpetuation of the difficulties that the EU faces to meet collective commitments under the Kyoto Protocol
As a final, functional point, it is worth stressing that the CJEU position in Ålands Vindkraft is squarely contrary to the fact that, as stressed by AG Bot in his Essent Belgium Opinion, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is just as effectively achieved through the use of foreign green electricity as domestic green electricity--which comes to undermine the global effectiveness of the EU's fight against climate change at the altar of the protection of domestic regulatory regimes and national budgets. The deference given by the CJEU to the political compromise achieved by the Member States in the passing of Directive 2009/28 (see paras. 53, 92, 94) can be actually self-defeating, given that the CJEU has completely given up on its role to push for a dynamic development of the internal market and for a clear support in the discharge of the EU's obligations vis-a-vis international partners. Indeed, it seems to me that the CJEU has sacrificed Art 194(1)(c) TFEU and, particularly, its "spirit of solidarity between Member States" in the altar of Member State finances. This may be a realist approach to the issue, but it definitely perpetuates the difficulties that the EU (as an international actor with separate legal personality) faces to act as one in the international arena and, particularly, to meet collective commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.
 
4. Conclusion
Overall, the Ålands Vindkraft Judgment deserves criticism from a strict legal perspective (due to the muddled situation in which it keeps environmental protection justifications to restrictions on free movement of goods), from an economic perspective (due to the partial and biased assessment of economic charges and incentives), and from a functional/political (international) perspective (as it diminishes the possibilities for the EU as a whole to comply with the Kyoto Protocol). Only Member States' Ministers of Finance can celebrate this situation...

Competition infringer: You don't want the EU Commission as your banker (T-564/10)

In its Judgment in Quimitécnica.com and de Mello v Commission, T-564/10, EU:T:2014:583, the General Court has addressed a rather strange issue concerning the interest rates applicable by the European Commission when undertakings that have breached competition law choose to (partially) defer the payment of their fines.

The main dispute derives from the fact that, under the 2002 Financial Regulation, unsecured outstanding amounts are subject to an interest rate of ECB+3.5%, whereas secured debts go down to ECB+1.5%. It is a rather important point to note that the Financial Regulation indicates that the deferral of payments is subject to the condition that
"the debtor lodges a financial guarantee covering the debt outstanding in both the principal sum and the interest, which is accepted by the institution's accounting officer" (emphasis added).
 
In the case at hand, Quimitecnica and JMS requested their fine to be payable in three annual instalments and offered to provide a bank guarantee by a given Portuguese bank. The Commission's accounting officer agreed to the deferred payment plan, subject to them providing a guarantee  issued "by a bank rated as long-term AA", which the proposed guarantor was not.
 
The undertakings failed to obtain such guarantee and challenged the "long-term AA" requirement before the GC (in the case that has now been decided). They did not provide any other bank guarantee. However, during the procedure, the undertakings met all deadlines in the agreed (but unsecured) financial plan and eventually settled all their debt with the Commission. However, at this stage, the Commission requested the payment of  additional interest in view of their failure to provide satisfactory guarantees for the credit (now effectively extinct).
 
There are may interesting passages in the Judgment, such as the attitude displayed by the Commission in its argument that the appeal had now become void of content (due to the debt having been paid in full) despite the dispute of over 36,000 Euro in interest being on the table. The arguments against the standing of the undertakings to challenge the measure on the basis that it could not change their legal situation simply do not hold water, regardless of the technicalities in which the Commission and the GC engage.
 
More importantly, the way in which the GC accepts the position of the Commission and does not engage in any significant assessment of the proportionality of the "long-term AA" rating is troubling. Indeed, the arguments raised by the undertakings on the inconsistency incurred by the Commission should have been given more weight. It is definitely irrational for the Commission to be criticising rating agencies and proposing their regulation, while at the same time stubbornly relying on their ratings and not being willing to negotiate the conditions of acceptability of guarantees issued by other banking institutions.
 
Furthermore, from a functional perspective, the case does not make much sense and there is an element of estoppel that I am finding difficult to pin down, but puzzles me. If the furniture of the bank guarantee was a condition for the acceptance of the payment plan, absent the guarantee, the Commission should have insisted on payment of the debt immediately and in full.

Reversely, by accepting partial payments according to the plan, and leaving its credit completely unsecured during the proceedings before the GC (could an interim measure not have been requested?), the behaviour of the European Commission could be seen as amounting to a waiver of the guarantee requirement. Somehow, I think that the Commission is having its cake and eating it too. And I am not sure that the same behaviour by a private creditor would be tolerable, which makes the findings of the GC all the more troubling.
 
In any case, it is very likely that the cost of this procedure far exceeds the 36,000 Euro at stake, which makes me wonder if this is the best possible use of the Commission's and the GC's resources.

It Won't Last Long? CJEU takes a functional, competition-based approach to in-house provision that questoins the criteria in the new EU procurement directives (C-574/12)

In its Judgment in Centro Hospitalar de Setúbal and SUCH, C-574/12, EU:C:2014:2004, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has issued a new decision concerned with the in-house exception to the application of the EU public procurement rules (for a previous summary of the doctrine, see here). The Judgment is concerned with Directive 2004/18, but the findings are already relevant for the interpretation of the revised in-house exception in Directive 2014/24.
 
In the case at hand, a Portuguese hospital awarded a services contract for the provision of meals to patients and staff to a non-profit organisation (SUCH) which membership included public entities (such as other hospitals) as well as private social solidarity institutions carrying out non-profit activities. The hospital considered it an in-house provision situation and, relying in the Teckal doctrine (recently revisited and affirmed by the CJEU, see here), did not comply with the transparency obligations of Directive 2004/18.

However, a competitor of SUCH challenged the award on the basis that the Hospital did not exercise a control over the non-profit organisation that qualified for such an exemption, particularly according to the requirements of Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau, C-26/03, EU:C:2005:5, according to which "the investment, however small, of a private undertaking in the capital of an undertaking of which the awarding authority also forms part prevents, in any event, the awarding authority from being able to exercise a control over it similar to that which it exercises over its own departments" (C-574/12, at para 13).
 
The main point of law for the CJEU to interpret was, consequently, whether only participation of private for profit undertakings excluded the in-house exception or if, on the contrary, participation of any other sort of non-profit entities triggered the same effect. Following a commendable functional approach to the in-house exception based on the avoidance of distortions of competition, the CJEU opted for the second solution. Indeed, according to the C. H. de Setúbal and SUCH Judgment,
35 […] it must be pointed out that the exception concerning the in-house awards is based on an approach according to which, in such cases, the awarding public authority can be regarded as using its own resources in order to accomplish its tasks in the public interest.
36 One of the reasons which led the Court to the findings established in the judgment in Stadt Halle [...] was based not on the legal form of the private entities forming part of the contractor or on their commercial purpose, but on the fact that those entities obeyed considerations particular to their private interests, which were different in nature from that of the objectives of public interest pursued by the awarding authority. For that reason, that authority could not exercise control over the contractor similar to that which it exercised over its own services (see, to that effect, Stadt Halle [...] paragraphs 49 and 50).
37 Having regard to the fact, pointed out by the referring court, that SUCH is a non-profit association and the private partners which formed part of that association at the time of the award of the contract at issue in the main proceedings were private social solidarity institutions, all of them also non-profit, it must be noted that the fact that the Court referred, in the judgment in Stadt Halle [...], to concepts such as that of ‘undertaking’ or ‘share capital’ is due to the specific facts of the case which gave rise to that judgment and does not mean that the Court intended to restrict its findings to those cases alone where commercial for-profit undertakings form part of the contractor.
38 Another reason which led the Court to the findings in the judgment in Stadt Halle [...] is that the direct award of a contract would offer a private undertaking with a capital presence in that contractor an advantage over its competitors (see, to that effect, Stadt Halle [...] paragraph 51).
39 In the main proceedings, SUCH’s private partners pursue interests and objectives which, however positive they may be from a social point of view, are different in nature from the public interest objectives pursued by the awarding authorities which are at the same time partners of SUCH.
40 In addition, as the Advocate General noted in point 37 of his Opinion, the private partners of SUCH, despite their status as social solidarity institutions carrying out non-profit activities, are not barred from engaging in economic activity in competition with other economic operators. In consequence, the direct award of a contract to SUCH is likely to offer an advantage for the private partners over their competitors (C-574/12, at paras 35-40, emphasis added).
In my view, the CJEU has applied good logic and has incorporated the likely distortions of competition in the market for the provision of meals that could result from non-profit partners of SUCH having preferential (direct) access to the supply to the public sector. This functional approach is economically sound and deserves all praise.

The only difficulty that the C. H. de Setúbal and SUCH Judgment creates is its compatibility/coordination with the new rules under Art 12(1)(c) and 12(3)(c) of Directive 2014/24, which recast the in-house provision exception but modify the Teckal/Stadt Halle doctrine by relaxing the requirement that there is no private participation whatsoever--so that, in the future, the in-house exception can be applied provided "there is no direct private capital participation in the controlled legal person with the exception of non-controlling and non-blocking forms of private capital participation required by national legislative provisions, in conformity with the Treaties, which do not exert a decisive influence on the controlled legal person" (emphasis added).
 
The explanation provided for such a change in recital (32) of Directive 2014/24 is as follows:
The exemption should not extend to situations where there is direct participation by a private economic operator in the capital of the controlled legal person since, in such circumstances, the award of a public contract without a competitive procedure would provide the private economic operator with a capital participation in the controlled legal person an undue advantage over its competitors. However, in view of the particular characteristics of public bodies with compulsory membership, such as organisations responsible for the management or exercise of certain public services, this should not apply in cases where the participation of specific private economic operators in the capital of the controlled legal person is made compulsory by a national legislative provision in conformity with the Treaties, provided that such participation is non-controlling and non-blocking and does not confer a decisive influence on the decisions of the controlled legal person. It should further be clarified that the decisive element is only the direct private participation in the controlled legal person. Therefore, where there is private capital participation in the controlling contracting authority or in the controlling contracting authorities, this does not preclude the award of public contracts to the controlled legal person, without applying the procedures provided for by this Directive as such participations do not adversely affect competition between private economic operators (emphasis added).
These two justifications for the relaxation of the Teckal/Stadt Halle/SUCH  absolute prohibition of private participation will prove controversial, given that they can give rise to situations where an effective market advantage is derived from the (apparent) in-house award. Indeed, the drafting of the condition in Art 12(1)(c) and 12(3)(c) of Directive 2014/24 seems quite open and it is possible to anticipate the need to conduct an assessment of proportionality between the objectives pursued by the national law imposing private participation and the carve-out that it creates in the application of the EU procurement rules. It will then be for the CJEU to either stick to its functional, competition-based approach to the in-house doctrine, or to defer to the quite express will of the EU legislator (fundamentally, in this case, the Member States). I would personally want it to tilt the balance in favour of the first option, but I can see the difficulties now that the text of the Directive is so clear.

Could Intel challenge its 1bn Euro fine on grounds of 'corporate human rights'?

After last week's General Court Judgment in Intel v Commission, T-286/09, EU:T:2014:475, the 2 month period for Intel to appeal the confirmation of its 1bn Euro fine before the Court of Justice of the EU on points of law is ticking. I guess that few doubts can be harboured as to the likelihood of such an appeal, given the very significant financial implications for the company. However, the more interesting question is whether Intel will eventually appeal the fine before the European Court of Human Rights on the basis that its 'corporate human rights' have been violated.
 
At first thought, the claims could be two-fold. On the one hand, Intel could argue procedural issues related to the enforcement and decision-making processes at the European Commission (art 6 ECHR, on fair trial). On the other hand, Intel could try to challenge the volume of the fine on the basis of the protection of its right to private property (art 1 protocol 1 ECHR, on property).
 
In my view, such an appeal would be undesirable, but it would at least offer the ultimate test case for the jurisdiction and actual ability of the Strasbourg court to deal with highly-complex (third) competition reviews. I have been arguing that due process rights in competition law enforcement against corporate defendants should be limited [“The EU’s Accession to the ECHR and Due Process Rights in EU Competition Law Matters: Nothing New Under the Sun?”, in Kosta, Skoutaris & Tzevelekos (eds), The Accession of the EU to the ECHR, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014, forthcoming] and, more generally, together with Francisco Marcos, that 'corporate human rights' should be limited if not totally abolished ["'Human Rights' Protection for Corporate Antitrust Defendants: Are We Not Going Overboard?" (February 2, 2014). University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 14-04]. For previous entries in this blog, see here and here.
 
In a very timely fashion, the June 14(1) Antitrust Chronicle of Competition Policy International [Spring 2014, Volume 6 Number 1] "highlights a number of recent developments adding fuel to the fire: the ECtHR's ruling in Menarini and other cases, whether the concept of a "corporate human rights" principle should be applicable [... and] conclude(s) with an insightful discussion of impartiality" (including a summary of our thoughts, for which Francisco and myself are honoured and grateful).
 
Also in good time, these issues will be soon discussed at ASCOLA's conference on "Procedural fairness in competition proceedings", where Francisco will be presenting our paper. Hopefully, these discussions will shed light on the problems that the (excessive) protection of 'corporate human rights' can create. In our view, a reduction in the effectiveness of both competition law enforcement and human rights protection (for humans) itself.
 
In my personal view, all these debates (and the eventual Intel case before Strasbourg) should result in a significant restriction of corporate human rights protection, if not their abolition. I know that this is not a 'popular' position, so I expect heated debate in the coming months...

GC sets burden of proof of conflicts of interest in procurement too high (T-4/13)

In its Judgment in Communicaid Group v Commission, T-4/13, EU:T:2014:431, the General Court (GC) decided another appeal against EU Institution's public procurement decisions. In this case, the procurement was for language training services for staff of the institutions, bodies and agencies of the European Union in Brussels, and the appellant challenged the rejection of its tender on several grounds, including violations of the principles of transparency and equal treatment.
 
The case raises a number of issues, but I think that it can be particularly interesting from the perspective of conflicts of interest in the evaluation of tenders, since the appellant submitted that "one of the seconded national experts who had been employed by the Commission in its Directorate-General (DG) for human resources (‘Commission unit B.3’) in the months prior to publication of the contract notice at issue and who had sat on a tender evaluation committee in a similar award procedure was now employed by the successful tenderer, and had played a role in the preparation of the latter’s tenders." In the appellants view, this situation resulted in a breach of the principle of equal treatment and, in the end, should be sufficient grounds for the annulment of the negotiated procedure for language training services framework contracts.

The GC framed the analysis of this situation in the following way:
53 [...] according to the case-law, the fact that a tenderer, even though he has no intention of doing so, is capable of influencing the conditions of a call for tenders in a manner favourable to himself constitutes a situation of a conflict of interests. In that regard, the conflict of interests constitutes a breach of the equal treatment of candidates and of equal opportunities for tenderers (Joined Cases C‑21/03 and C‑34/03 Fabricom [2005] ECR I‑1559, paragraphs 29 and 30, and Case T‑160/03 AFCon Management Consultants and Others v Commission [2005] ECR II‑981, paragraph 74).

 However, that situation is slightly different from the one at hand in Communicaid, given that the advantage that the tenderer would have had would not derive from the ability to influence the terms of the call (as was the issue in Fabricom), but from the fact that it had access to 'privileged'/'insider' information about how to respond to the tender. Hence, this creates a factually different scenario, which analysis will be interesting.
 
Before looking at the analysis that the GC carried out, and further to the precedent concerned with the prior involvement of consultants that then become tenderers in Fabricom, Joined cases C-21/03 and C-34/03, EU:C:2005:127 [for discussion see S Treumer, "Technical Dialogue and the Principle of Equal Treatment: Dealing with conflicts of Interests after Fabricom" (2007) Public Procurement Law Review, No. 2, 99-115]; it is worth noting that conflicts of interest are now regulated in Art 24 of Directive 2014/24 (not directly applicable to EU institutions procurement, but with a clear potential to work as guidance for the EU courts in the future). According to this new provision:
Member States shall ensure that contracting authorities take appropriate measures to effectively prevent, identify and remedy conflicts of interest arising in the conduct of procurement procedures so as to avoid any distortion of competition and to ensure equal treatment of all economic operators.
The concept of conflicts of interest shall at least cover any situation where staff members of the contracting authority or of a procurement service provider acting on behalf of the contracting authority who are involved in the conduct of the procurement procedure or may influence the outcome of that procedure have, directly or indirectly, a financial, economic or other personal interest which might be perceived to compromise their impartiality and independence in the context of the procurement procedure.
The new rules, then, seem to set out a rather demanding obligation to avoid conflicts of interest in the members of evaluation teams. Under the 'minimum' definition in the second paragraph of Art 24 dir 2014/24, it is clear that contracting authorities must avoid Fabricom-like conflicts of interest. However, the case of Communicaid was concerned with a 'bordeline' situation of potential conflict of interest, which subsumption under the 'minimum' definition of conflicts of interest will need to be tested. I would argue that they are caught by the general mandate of the first paragraph, but I am sure that there is scope for much discussion on the interpretation of this provision [and recital (16) dir 2014/24 does not shed any bright light: "Contracting authorities should make use of all possible means at their disposal under national law in order to prevent distortions in public procurement procedures stemming from conflicts of interest. This could include procedures to identify, prevent and remedy conflicts of interests."].
 
In my view, however, given the permissive treatment applied by the GC in Communicaid, these situations are unlikely to be effectively covered by Article 24 of Directive 2014/24--unless the CJEU develops a more stringent approach when it interprets that provision. Indeed, the GC considered that:
57 The applicant also argues that the successful tenderer enjoyed an unfair advantage because of the former seconded national expert’s participation in a previous call for tenders as a member of the evaluation committee.
58 In that respect, it must be pointed out that, according to the Commission, the applicant has not proved that the former seconded national expert participated in the drafting of the successful tenders for Lots 1 to 9. In order to prove that he did, the applicant has produced statements prepared by three of its employees, describing conversations they had with the former seconded national expert at the dinner on 13 November 2012 [...]. However, it must be noted that those statements do not show conclusively that the former seconded national expert participated in the drafting of the successful tenders for Lots 1 to 9, since the impressions of the applicant’s employees as to whether that was the case have been expressly contradicted by the person concerned himself. In any event, even if those statements did prove such participation by the former seconded national expert, it must be noted that their probative value is weak since they were made by the applicant’s employees, who have a particular interest in the contract being awarded to the applicant.
59 In the present case, even supposing that the former seconded national expert did participate in the drafting of the successful tenders, it must be pointed out that the applicant, by the evidence which it has submitted, has proved neither the participation of the former seconded national expert in the preparation of the call for tenders at issue, nor the unfair advantage that the successful tenderer allegedly enjoyed because its new employee was a member of a tender evaluation committee in a previous, similar procurement procedure. Furthermore, as the Commission rightly points out, the applicant has provided language training services to the EU institutions since 2008 and collaborated with the Commission in the context of the contract previous to the call for tenders at issue, with the result that it had information on the needs and requirements of the European institutions, notwithstanding the fact that the contract previous to the call for tenders at issue, contrary to the present call for tenders, did not include blended learning.
60 It follows from all the foregoing that the applicant has not proved that the fact that one of the successful tenderer’s employees worked at the Commission as a seconded national expert gave it an unfair advantage in the procurement procedure at issue of such a kind as to infringe the principles of non-discrimination and of equal treatment. Nor, moreover, has the applicant proved the infringement of the principle of transparency (T-4/13 at paras 57-60, emphasis added).
In my view, the GC has applied an excessively demanding burden of proof of not only the existence of a conflict of interest, but of its effects (ie of the existence of an actual de facto advantage derived from the existence of the conflict of interest). Such a high burden will result in a very weak effectiveness of the rules on conflicts of interest, given that they tend to involve the need to resort to indirect methods of proof and to indicia of advantage. Hence, this should not be welcome as a functional approach to adjudication of instances of (evident) conflict of interest and, at some point, it would have been necessary to resort to the techniques of presumption of advantage or, at least, reversal of the burden of proof. When conflicts of interest are concerned, it is worth remembering that Caesar's wife must be above suspicion...

Pervasive Legal Instrumentalism and Scholarly Herd Behaviour in Law: A Short Reflection on van Gestel & Micklitz (2014)

In their interesting paper "Why Methods Matter in European Legal Scholarship" (2014) European Law Journal 20(3): 292-316, which I read following Steven Vaughan's recommendation on twitter (@lawvaughan), Rob van Gestel and Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz write a compelling criticism against the instrumentalisation of law and legal research (ie the excessively policy-driven approach to legal research that mixes up normative and empirical questions), not least because:
"[it] decreases the attention for methodology, for theory building, and for keeping enough professional distance to one’s object of research. This threatens to result in a creeping process of herd behaviour, in copy pasting the methodology of judicial lawmaking to legal scholarship and in a lack of transparency and methodological justification in scholarly legal publications".
 
Indeed, the part of their paper that I find really interesting (and brave) is the discussion on the risk of herd behaviour in legal research, where they warn about the risks of uncritically focussing legal research on 'hot topics' and the items in the agenda of policymakers/regulators (such as the European Commission) or financing/sponsoring bodies, instead of pursuing an independent ranking of relevant topics with intrinsic research/doctrinal value (pp. 305-307)--and which I remain convinced definitely supports their argument in favour of raising the methodological awareness in European doctrinal legal research.
 
In short, they submit that "the best response to growing heterogeneity of legal sources should be matched with a strengthening of theoretical and methodological components, where possible drawn from the common European heritage in legal theory and spurred by transnational scholarly legal communities" (p. 312). Moreover, they formulate some broad implications of their proposal and launch some open questions, which they intend to focus future debates about (the specifics of legal methods), particularly in view of the Europeanisation of legal education (see some related comments here).
 
I agree with them in that methodological discussions about legal research are becoming of paramount importance and that it is fundamental to base any piece of legal research on a methodology that is not limited to the very narrow confines of (classical) black-letter legal analysis. This is particularly important if one is to embark into any sort of normative recommendation, which requires a benchmark of underlying values and evidence that law cannot provide.
 
Personally, I find the interaction between law and economics particularly important and I have some specific views as to what sort of methodology should be used in the study of European economic law [see A Sánchez Graells, "A Short Note on Methodology: An Eclectic and Heuristic Multi-Disciplinary and Functional Approach to EU Law" (2011)]. Ultimately, I praise and share the words of O Wendell Holmes in "The Path of the Law" (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457:
"I look forward to a time when the part played by history in the explanation of dogma shall be very small, and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our energy on a study of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring them. As a step toward that ideal it seems to me that every lawyer ought to seek an understanding of economics".
This is not to say that economics should drive, control or even dictate the objectives of legal research, nor that efficiency must necessarily be accepted as the ultimate normative value. However, legal research that disregards economic theory and its insights and (willingly or inadvertently) runs against them will have a very limited (if any) value. Moreover, the same is equally applicable to other social sciences and, as van Gestel & Micklitz stress
"this should not imply that we want to turn law students [or law scholars, for that matter] into amateur social or political scientists or economists, but they should at least be able to understand (some of) the language and methods that other (social) sciences apply in order to learn more about the value, validity and reliability of non-doctrinal research methods and techniques" (p. 315).

In any case, beyond the specifics of the methodology employed and the field of (other) science considered more relevant in order to achieve informed and sound outcomes-- which surely needs to be tailored to the specific research question that one attempts to answer--I could not stress enough the importance of having A sound  methodology when one undertakes legal research. In that regard, I fully share and welcome van Gestel & Micklitz's call for further discussion. As they say in their paper, to be continued...

State aid and (university) software licensing: who's interested? (T-488/11)

In its Judgment of 12 June 2014 in case Sarc v Commission, T-488/11, EU:T:2014:441, the General Court of the EU (GC) has assessed an interesting case concerned with the licensing of software developed at a Dutch university from a State aid perspective.
 
In the case at hand, staff of the Delft University had developed source code usable in the development of software for ship design and ship loading (a highly commercial application). Those members of staff then left university and created a start-up company 'Delftship' that entered into a licensing agreement with the Delft University. According to competitor Scheepsbouwkundig Advies- en Rekencentrum BV ('Sarc'), the terms of the licensing agreement where too advantageous and implied State aid. Crucially, Sarc claimed that the royalty payable by Delftship to the University was lower than the market price, which allowed it to offer software at a low rate.
 
However, after a preliminary examination under Article 108(2) TFEU, the Commission decided that the licence agreement for the use of the software source code did not constitute State aid, as the level of the royalties payable to the University had been negotiated intensely and ended up reflecting market prices--so that the licensing agreement did not grant Delftship an advantage within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. Sarc appealed the decision before the GC.
 
The appeal has been opposed by both the University and the Dutch state on several grounds. Remarkably, the active standing of Sarc to bring proceedings has been challenged. In its analysis of the applicant’s standing to bring proceedings, the GC focussed on the competitive position of the applicant--following the settled case-law under art 263(4) TFEU that an applicant can only challenge a (State aid) Decision addressed to another party if it is of direct and individual concern, which requires proof that its market position is significantly affected, see paras 31-35 [for discussion, see F Pastor Merchante, "On the Rules of Standing to Challenge State Aid Decisions Adopted at the End of the Preliminary Phase" (2012) European State Aid Law Quarterly 3: 601-610].
 
These considerations are extremely important, as they indicate a very restrictive test and impose a substantial burden of proof on any challengers of State aid decisions not addressed to them. In my view, it is worth stressing that the GC and has found that
43 [...] it should be noted, first, that the applicant has not provided the Court with the main information relating to the structure of the relevant market establishing its competitive position in that market. In particular, the applicant has not provided information about the relevant geographic market, its share of that market and the share of its competitors and any shift in market shares since the measure at issue was granted.

44 It should be pointed out, secondly, that the applicant has not provided the Court with any evidence which could lead to the conclusion that the grant of the measure at issue had significantly affected its competitive position given, in particular, the specific nature of that measure, the length of the period for which it was granted and any circumstances making it impossible to circumvent the adverse effects of that measure.

45 In those circumstances, it is to be found that the applicant has not established that its competitive position was significantly affected within the meaning of the case-law set out in paragraph 33 above.

46 The six arguments which the applicant raises in that regard cannot invalidate the finding set out in paragraph 45 above
.
The GC then goes on to discard each of the arguments, which were concerned with: 1) the lack of need to define the relevant market and the sufficiency to focus on competitive constraints, 2) the existence of a very close competitive relationship, given that the beneficiary of the aid and the claimant sell the same products/services to the same clients, 3)the fact that the applicant held 80% of the market share in the Netherlands (and, consequently, was bound to be affected by the entry of a new competitor that could undercut prices), 4) the fact that the value of the measure at issue was between 6 and 12 times above the de minimis threshold, 5) the specific loss of customers to the beneficiary of the aid, which was argued as proof of loss of market share, and 6) a price comparison that showed that the beneficiary was able to offer very low prices due to it not being required to recoup the costs of software development (which had been financed by the University prior to entering into the licensing agreement). 
 
In my view, most of the arguments and information supplied by the applicant and, if nothing else, taking them all into global consideration, should have led the GC to conclude that its competitive position was bound to be significantly affected by the measure at issue. However, adopting such a strict approach and imposing such a high (almost impossible to discharge) burden of proof of significant alteration of its competitive position, the GC only recognises the applicant's standing to protect its procedural rights, which fundamentally limits the possibility for competitors to challenge State aid decisions unless they were involved in the procedure leading to the Commission's Decision.
 
Hence, this is a decision bound to disincetivise competitors from challenging State aid decisions, unless they were involved in the procedure from the beginning--and always conditional upon any of their procedural rights having been breached. In my view, not a positive interpretation of the rules on active standing under Art 263(4) TFEU and one that is definitely difficult to square with the over-enthusiastic approach of the CJEU to the effectiveness of EU competition law rules in other areas (such as cartels...).

When the CJEU opens the umbrella, lawyers and economists get ready for a warm shower of damages claims (C-557/12)

In its Judgment in Kone, C-557/12, EU:C:2014:917, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has followed the highly controversial proposal of AG Kokott (see my criticism here) and has bought into the theory of 'umbrella damages', hence determining that "Article 101 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes the interpretation and application of domestic legislation enacted by a Member State which categorically excludes, for legal reasons, any civil liability of undertakings belonging to a cartel for loss resulting from the fact that an undertaking not party to the cartel, having regard to the practices of the cartel, set its prices higher than would otherwise have been expected under competitive conditions."

In my opinion, this Judgment must be strongly criticised and shows a very dangerous path of judicial activism that the CJEU is for some reason willing to engage with in the area of private law, but that it avoids in the area of public law and fundamental rights (see my remarks on the CJEU's total lack of will to effectively become EU's constitutional court here). Only on this asymmety of approach towards the development of EU rights in the public law / private law area (or, more bluntly, in the fundamental rights/economic rights divide) should give us all some food for thought about the role of the CJEU.
 
Further than the general criticism already spelled out against AG Kokott's Opinion, I think that the Judgment gives rise to even more specific arguments against the findings of the CJEU on the basis of the 'umbrella damages' theory of harm. I am lucky to have colleagues such as Dr Sebastian Peyer with whom to discuss these issues and, on this occassion, we clearly  coincide in our negative reading of the case. In this post, we put together our thoughts. Mine are slightly more general, so they will come first. Sebastian will then follow on with more specific and ellaborate points on the basis of his expertise in private enforcement of EU competition law.

My own criticism
From a general perspective of EU law and its effectiveness, the Kone Judgment really makes no sense and potentially impinges on the Member States' competences to regulate non-contractual liability and tort remedies [this point is common to previous criticisms against the EU's competence to regulate in the area of damages actions, as Francisco Marcos and myself stressed in “Towards a European Tort Law? Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules: Harmonising Tort Law through the Back Door?” (2008) 16(3) European Review Private Law 469-488].
 
 
Quite simply, in my view, Kone has carried the application of the principle of supremacy and effectiveness of EU law too far and the contrast between the findings in Kone and its original application to the competition law damages field in Courage and Crehan [C-453/99 EU:C:2001:465, paras. 23 and ff] is simply abysmal. Courage 'just' made the point clear that damages actions should not be impossible and that they were governed by the general principles of equivalence and effectiveness of remedies (para. 29). This general mantra has been repeated over and over but, in its repetition, the effectiveness part has been gaining relevance and, at least in Kone, the CJEU has completely disregarded the principle of equivalence (despite mentioning it in para. 25).
 
Given the split of competences between the EU and the Member States in many areas of the law and, in particular, in many areas that govern the remedies available for breaches of EU (and domestic) rules, the principle of equivalence needs to be understood as a functional tool to provide effectiveness to EU rights without altering the Member States' competences. In that regard, it seems uncontroversial that, as even an undergraduate student of law can clearly express in an effective way: "The principle of equivalence ensures that EU rights receive the same protection as domestic ones" [David Murray, "EU law rights and national remedies: an uneasy partnership?" (2010) Diffusion 6(1)]. There is no reason to suggest that, in the absence of EU regulatory competences or specific EU remedies, EU rights should receive more intense protection than domestic ones.
 
However, the CJEU disregards this plain understanding of the general requirements of EU law and its supremacy and goes on to state that:
32 [...] it is, in principle, for the domestic legal system of each Member State to lay down the detailed rules governing the application of the concept of the ‘causal link’. However,  [...] national legislation must ensure that European Union competition law is fully effective (see, to that effect, VEBIC EU:C:2010:739, paragraph 63). Those rules must therefore specifically take into account the objective pursued by Article 101 TFEU, which aims to guarantee effective and undistorted competition in the internal market, and, accordingly, prices set on the basis of free competition. In those circumstances [...] national legislation must recognise the right of any individual to claim compensation for loss sustained.
33 The full effectiveness of Article 101 TFEU would be put at risk if the right of any individual to claim compensation for harm suffered were subjected by national law, categorically and regardless of the particular circumstances of the case, to the existence of a direct causal link while excluding that right because the individual concerned had no contractual links with a member of the cartel, but with an undertaking not party thereto, whose pricing policy, however, is a result of the cartel that contributed to the distortion of price formation mechanisms governing competitive markets.
In my view, this is truly far away from a pondered and acceptable balancing of the competing demands of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness and amounts to a suppression of the equivalence element that is essential to the test for compliance by Member States with their duty to ensure the effet utile of EU law under Article 4(3) TFEU and the existing case law.

Moreover, it prevents Member States from adopting clear and streamlined rules that avoid the need to engage in very complicated and costly case by case assessments of every claim, regardless of any indication of remoteness or weakness of basic causality links. Hence, the Kone Judgment should clearly be rejected and its implications limited (ie undone) by the CJEU itself at the closest opportunity.

What Sebastian has to say
The Court's judgement does not only show some dangerous judicial activism, as my colleague and host Dr Albert Sanchez Graells has pointed out, it also raises more questions than it answers.

What do we talk about when we talk about umbrella pricing? In a standard cartel case the damages claimant, typically a direct customer of the cartel, has to show that the defendant overcharged him. For umbrella pricing the situation is different. The claimant has not purchased from the cartelist but from another firm in the affected market. Consequently, the claimant should demonstrate that the market price was inflated due to the cartel and that he suffered harm due to the higher market price. In European jurisdictions this is basically a question of causation and a question of the proof that is required by the courts whereas US courts deal with these issues under ‘antitrust injury’. In Kone, the Court has stated that national courts cannot categorically reject a causal link between the cartel and inflated market prices charged by non-cartelists (para. 34):

Consequently, the victim of umbrella pricing may obtain compensation for the loss caused by the members of a cartel […] where it is established that the cartel at issue was, in the circumstances of the case and, in particular, the specific aspects of the relevant market, liable to have the effect of umbrella pricing being applied by third parties acting independently, and that those circumstances and specific aspects could not be ignored by the members of that cartel.

The Court addresses the two issues related to umbrella pricing (Was there an effect on the market? Did the market effect cause damage to the claimant?) in one sentence and merges them into one “be liable” test. It is left to the Member States to establish the rules and standards for proving these effects. The Court also seems to introduce some element of knowledge on part of the cartelist ("could not be ignored"). This may turn out to be impossible to prove.
 
Sadly, the ruling fits into the line of recent cases that appear to be claimant-friendly but may not contribute much to the effectiveness of enforcement. On the face of it, cases such as Pfleiderer [C-360/09, EU:C:2011:389] or Donau Chemie [C-536/11, EU:C:2013:366] have opened the gates to private damages claims, allegedly improving the effectiveness of competition law enforcement through access to documents. But I think this does not hold true. In those rulings the court replaced categorical rules with a case by case approach. So far, this has not really helped claimants but forced courts to justify why they have decided to, for example, deny access to leniency material (Pfleiderer). With regards to umbrella pricing, the CJEU has followed this approach replacing a 'fixed rule' with a case by case approach. We shall see if the claimants can get anything out of this apart from more complicated litigation.
 
Overall, the CJEU’s decision is extremely short for a ruling that could turn out to be expensive for both claimants and defendants. The cost associated with proving and calculating umbrella pricing could be prohibitive and adds to the generally high litigation costs of follow-on damages actions. I would expect most umbrella claimants to fail at the quantification stage, even if they have actually managed to master the causation hurdles.

The implications of this judgement for national causation rules are also worrying. Member States are supposedly able to govern causation and remoteness of damages under the procedural autonomy principle the Court stressed in the Kone ruling but also in Courage, Manfredi, Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie. However, in AG Kokott (see her opinion in Kone) and the Court disregard earlier statements that it is for the domestic legal system to regulate a causal relationship. So, what does this mean for the domestic legal systems?
 
Regarding the UK, I could imagine that the autonomous decision of a third party not to undercut the cartel is an intervening event breaking the chain of causation. It could also become a struggle to show that damages were foreseeable because they depend on the buyer's decision to contract with a non-cartelist and on the non-cartelist’s decision to charge an inflated price in the shadow of the cartel. However, the TheWagon Mound (No1) holds that only the kind of damage has to be foreseeable, not the extent of it. The CJEU’s decision in Kone has certainly created many more questions. Now, the ball is in the national courts.

Directive 2014/23 on concessions and the 'Frankenstein effect'

The more one analyses the content of Directive 2014/23 on concessions (the Concessions  Directive), the more one realises that it is full of unnecessary complexities and that it is (unfortunately) a horrible example of the 'Frankenstein effect' that the EU legislative procedure sometimes generates.
 
I am in particular puzzled by Arts 1(2), 6 and 7 of the Concessions Directive, which aim to determine its (personal) scope of application. The difficult exercise attempted in the Concessions Directive is to combine or merge the scope of application of both the Public Sector Directive (2014/24) and the Utilities Directive (2014/25) and, at first sight, looking at Article 1(2), it seems like it achieves that goal (as Richard Craven concludes in his piece on the Concessions Directive about to be published in the Public Procurement Law Review).
 
A cursory look at that provision indeed confirms that both 'contracting authorities' subjected to the Public Sector Directive and the 'contracting entities' covered by the Utilities Directive are within the scope of the Concessions Directive, as its Article 1(2) determines that: "This Directive applies to the award of works or services concessions, to economic operators by: (a) Contracting authorities; or (b) Contracting entities, provided that the works or services are intended for the pursuit of one of the activities referred to in Annex II".
 
However, that is not the end of the story, as Articles 6 and 7 define contracting authorities and contracting entities respectively and create an unnecessary split of the category of contracting authorities that I find unnecessary. The following is a draft comment on Article 6 of the Concessions Directive on which I am working and, as it will probably be evident, this keeps me quite confused...
 
On Article 6
6. Contracting authorities
01. With the exception of the excluded contracting authorities mentioned at the end of paragraph 1, this provision is identical to the Public Sector Directive Article 2(1) subparagraphs 1 and 4 and Article 2(2). For a commentary, see those provisions.
 
6.1. Excluded contracting authorities, which become contracting entities
01. One of the elements of the definition of the personal scope of application of the Concessions Directive with which it is difficult to come to terms is the treatment of certain contracting authorities (as per their classic definition in the Public Sector Directive) as contracting entities. More specifically, the exclusion is triggered when entities that would otherwise be contracting authorities engage in activities listed in Annex II (ie utilities activities except those related to water, see Article 12 and commentary to Article 1) and award a concession for the pursuit of one of those activities. The exclusion refers to the treatment of those ‘contracting authorities’ (by nature) as ‘contracting entities’ (by reason of their activity) under Article 7, which comes to mean that the carrying out of one of the activities in Annex II by means of a concession will only be subjected to the regime applicable to contracting entities, whereas the carrying out of any other concession-related activity (unless excluded from the Directive or subjected to a special regime) will be subjected to the rules applicable to contracting authorities. In case the contracting authority/contracting entity carries out both types of activities and awards a concession that covers both types of activities, the rules to determine the applicable legal regime will be those in Article 22 and, generally, will imply that the concession is subject to the rules applicable to the activity for which it is principally intended [Article 22(2)]. However, if it is objectively impossible to determine for which activity the contract is principally intended, the obscure provision in Article 22(3)(a) of the Concessions Directive will be applicable, which indicates that “the concession shall be awarded in accordance with the provisions of this Directive applicable to concessions awarded by contracting authorities, if one of the activities for which the contract is intended is subject to the provisions of this Directive applicable to concessions awarded by contracting authorities and the other is subject to the provisions of this Directive applicable to concessions awarded by contracting entities”. Hence, in case of significant difficulty (rectius, objective impossibility) in determining the applicable legal regime, the one corresponding to contracting authorities will be preferred.

02. However, the exclusion in Article 6 and inclusion in Article 7 are superfluous in connection with most of the specific obligations and duties regulated in the Concessions Directive, which establishes a regime that is fundamentally homogeneous to concessions awarded by contracting authorities and those awarded by contracting entities. At least in the case of contracting authorities ‘by nature’, the justification for the creation of the dual legal regime on the basis of the activity they pursue is difficult to understand and is likely to have a very limited effect in practice that can hardly justify the complexity it brings about (think exclusively of the convoluted drafting that the Concessions Directive has adopted in order to accommodate such minimal nuances). Indeed, comparing both regimes, it is only possible to identify a very limited number of discrepancies in legal regime (which are almost exclusively concerned with the potential exclusions of coverage from the directive) and primarily include the following rules:
·        Recital 66: only mentions contracting authorities when it indicates the possibility of including social requirements that directly characterise the product or service affected by a concession in the technical specifications. However, the omission of contracting entities seems to be an error, as there is no reason to prevent contracting entities from doing so, as long as they comply with the requirements imposed in the case law of the ECJ.
·         Article 10(1): covering an exclusion for concessions awarded to a contracting authority on the basis of an exclusive right, although the exclusion is extended to a contracting entity as referred to in point (a) of Article 7(1), which effectively nullifies the different in treatment for these purposes.
·         Article 11: covering a specific exclusion in the field of electronic communications whereby the Concessions Directive shall not apply to concessions for the principal purpose of permitting the contracting authorities to provide or exploit public communications networks, or to provide to the public one or more electronic communications services. However, the restriction of this exclusion to contracting authorities may have very limited effects in view of the alternative exclusion available for contracting entities when their activities are subject to competition (Article 16 below), given that most electronic communications exploited commercially are actually exposed to competition as a requirement of sectorial regulation.
·         Articles 13 and 14, and Article 17, which set out different rules for (quasi) in-house exclusions depending on whether they relate to contracting authorities or contracting entities. However, the functional requirements are rather similar, so there is no significant difference in the rules allowing for the award of concessions without compliance with competitive tendering requirements (effective control, 80% of turnover generated in the in-house sphere, etc; see commentary below).
·         Article 15, which creates an additional duty of information on contracting entities in favour of the Commission in case certain exclusions under Articles 13 and 14 apply.
·         Article 16: which restricts the exclusion available for activities directly exposed to competition to contracting entities—and that, in any case, would be very difficult to apply to contracting authorities because they do not tend to participate directly in the provision of services subjected to effective competition.
·         Article 23: on concessions including activities subjected to diverse legal regimes and that set out a preference for the regime applicable to contracting authorities over the one applicable to contracting entities as a residual rule.
·         Article 38(4) in fine: which sets higher evidentiary standards for contracting entities that are not (improper) contracting authorities wishing to exclude from participation any economic operators affected by the grounds of mandatory exclusion foreseen in Article 38(4) of the Concessions Directive (see that provision for commentary). This also applies to other aspects of Article 38, where the degree of compliance with rules on mandatory or discretionary compliance can be modulated differently by Member States depending on whether the concession is awarded by a contracting authority (or an improper contracting entity) or by a (proper) contracting entity. However, given the discretion left to Member States in this area, it is hard to foresee whether this will generate any meaningful differences in practice.
03. Moreover, the inclusion of contracting authorities as contracting entities by virtue of the activities in which they engage creates significant difficulty in the treatment of contracting entities in the Concessions Directive, as some provisions are addressed to all contracting entities and others are only addressed to ‘proper’ contracting entities (ie those that are not contracting authorities ‘by nature’) which forces the drafting to resort to convoluted expressions such as “contracting authorities and contracting entities as referred to in point (a) of Article 7(1)” or “contracting entities other than those referred to in point (a) of Article 7(1)”. Indeed, in most cases where there is any meaningful difference, contracting entities as referred to in point (a) of Article 7(1) receive the same legal treatment as contracting authorities under Article 6 (which seems like the logical thing to do). All in all, then, given the (very) minor differences in legal regime (which are almost non-existent other than in terms of coverage of the directive), a much more simplified regime for contracting authorities would definitely have been preferable.
* * * * *
 
More than ever, I wish that the 'Sanity clause' scene of the Marx Bros' A Night at the Opera was just a figment of a crazy imagination... 

The elusiveness of academic integrity and its value: some musings against any relaxation of standards

One of the most complicated and elusive elements in the day to day of a professional academic have to do with some form of academic integrity and, particularly, with the keeping of academic standards. This is a fundamental part of our role in two main dimensions: peer review and student assessment.

In the peer review area, this relates to editorial functions (such as the blind review of manuscripts before publication in academic journals, or the publication of book reviews) as well as to the active participation in research debates (such as conferences, seminars or, these days, twitter and blog platforms).

In student assessment, the array of activities is even broader, from marking (and second marking) of undergraduate work, to external examining in other institutions, to supervision of postgraduate students and, maybe with the highest significance, the examination of PhD theses. The indivisible connection between assessment and academic standards can hardly be overstated (
see The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education's position here).
 
In my view and (still limited) experience, all these processes feed into each other and the only sensible strategy for a professional academic concerned with academic integrity and the keeping of academic standards (which are the only value that universities should really protect above any other) is to try to remain actively involved in both dimensions (ie peer review and assessment) and to resist the permanent pressures to lower standards here and there. It may sound slightly self-important, but I think that professional academic need to perceive ourselfs as a gatekeepers and resist calls to open the doors too often or too easily.
 
 
It is also very important for us, as a community, to be able to communicate to society that this is the core, most fundamental function that we develop and the most significant value we add in return for the (always too limited, always too insecure) funding of our activities. Hence, when there are debates about the purpose and function of higher education institutions and their (core) employees, we should always make sure to stress that we uphold academic integrity and enforce academic standards. It may sound too vague, but this is the most important function we can possibly perform. And it is also the most distinctive.
 
Otherwise, if we fail to keep academic integrity, the ensuing dillution of academic standards will end up resulting in a scenario where academic qualifications are completely irrelevant because they no longer tell anyone how much of an expert somebody is, or how qualified to develop activities in a field that requires scientific knowledge. It will also be impossible to distinguish one university from another on the basis of any valuable merits-based metric and, in the end, academic excellency will fade away.
 
Of course, keeping academic integrity is difficult to do and usually comes (sooner or later) at a personal cost. Nobody likes to tell someone else that their work/research is not up to the applicable standard and we all tend to get upset when we hear it. Nobody likes rejection or failure. However, professional academics need to be able to swallow that bitter pill every now and then, and make sure that standards are kept despite colleagues, peers or students getting upset or frustrated. Hopefully, their (academic) maturity will make those feelings go away and the objectiveness of the academic assessment will be recognised sooner or later.
 
In this time of the year, with so many assessments going on and so many pressures coming from rakings based on student satisfaction as yesterday's Guardian 2015 University Guide tables, it is worth reminding ourselves of the value and long-term relevance of what we do. We cannot always please everyone if that means that academic integrity is jeopardised. And, most importantly, we must not do it. If we sacrifice academic standards in the altar of satisfaction, the importance and long-term viability of higher education institutions will be doomed. Clearly, a bitter pill to swallow.