In the middle of this turmoil, there is now a new dimension to consider: whether any of the rules concerned with the taxi activities amount to State aid. With this background in mind, it is interesting to consider AG Wahl's Opinion in Eventech, C-518/13, EU:C:2014:2239, where the CJEU has been asked by the UK's Court of Appeal (England and Wales)
whether a contested London bus lane policy adopted by Transport for London comes within the concept of ‘aid’ under Article 107(1) TFEU. Under that policy, only black cabs (that is to say, London taxis) are allowed, during certain periods of the day, to use the lane reserved for public buses on public roads, to the exclusion of private hire vehicles (PHVs).
Given that this is a very common rule in many large cities (in Europe, and elsewhere), depending on the answer, the case is bound to create a new wave of shock in the taxi sector. Indeed, as AG Wahl consciously stresses, 'taxis and PHVs are engaged in fierce competition with each other across Europe, and London is not the only city where conflicts have arisen'. In my view, there are several points of AG Wahl's Eventech Opinion worth stressing.
However, it is unclear how this can be relevant for the assessment from a State aid perspective (given the fact that everyone accepts that the 'bus lane' policy has a distortive effect on competition, see para 18), if not to tilt it towards a finding against the existence of State aid on the basis of a lack of selectivity based on the different 'legal standing' of both types of taxi undertakings. In my view, this is an important logic trap in AG Wahl's Opinion.
(a) Specifically, because the 'economic' argument that AG Wahl develops is truly unfocussed. Indeed, he considers that
If, for the sake of argument, the State aid rules were interpreted as generally requiring Member States to charge for access to public infrastructure or State-controlled resources, this might deter States from creating or opening up areas to which there has previously been no, or only limited access (sic). Equally, it might deter undertakings from participating in that process. For example, in the matter under consideration, if black cabs were required to pay for access to bus lanes, that might deter certain of them from requesting access, which might result in access being given only to the economically most resourceful, thus defeating the purpose of the policy (para 30, emphasis added).
The argument is not fully developed or particularly clear, but it goes against a consideration of economic efficiency (why wouldn't we generally prefer economically resourceful over other competitors, provided there is no predation?). More importantly, it also avoids the obvious issue that, given the limited number of black cab licences and the difficulty in obtaining one (not least, due to cost issues), a benefit is implicitly being recognised in favour of black cabs over PHVs, which can be exactly advantaging the economically most resourceful (ie, those that manage to have a black cab licence) over others. Hence, on top of the argument being economically flawed, it is also myopic and internally inconsistent.
Moreover, under similar regulatory conditions (ie where there is a partial reserve of certain services but an open market for others), the CJEU's Judgment in Höfner and Elser v Macrotron, C-41/90, EU:C:1991:161 is also relevant. Here, the CJEU determined that it is unjustified to reserve the provision of a given service in favour of an undertaking (or an emanation of the State) that is unable to meet demand for that service--or, in the words of the Court, where the beneficiary of the reserved activity is 'manifestly incapable of satisfying demand prevailing on the market for such activities.'
In my view, the combined rationale of these lines of case law should have been taken into account in the Eventech Opinion. Given that only 8% of pre-booked taxi services are carried out by black cabs, it is plain to see that a rule that can potentially reserve to them a larger tranche of the market is bound to create problems of sufficient provision and consumer satisfaction. Moreover, at least as a matter of principle, consistency in the rules applicable to publicly and privately owned essential facilities should be pursued.
In order to delineate the framework for analysis, AG Wahl interprets (rectius, rephrases) the questions referred by the Court of Appeal and considers that it 'in reality wishes to know whether selectivity is to be assessed solely on the basis of the market on which both black cabs and PHVs compete (that is to say, the market for pre-bookings), or whether it ought to include the ‘ply for hire’ market. This is arguably a decisive issue in the case under consideration' (para 53). That is, AG Wahl restricts the issue to the relevance of the assymetrical competition between black cabs and PHVs.
However, in my view, this derives from a logically flawed argument that derives from the weight given to the pre-existing regulation of the taxi market. Indeed, it is worth stressing that AG Wahl accepts the lack of comparability in principle on the basis of the following:
61. [...] taxis provide a service which supplements the existing methods of public transportation and which, in some ways, can arguably be assimilated to a universal public service. At a time when methods of communication were less developed, being able to hail a taxi from the street or to pick one up from a cab rank was an essential alternative to the other methods of transportation available. This is the reason why black cabs traditionally have a monopoly on ‘ply for hire’ journeys, and the same reason why taxis in many cities across Europe enjoy similar privileges, including the right to use bus lanes.
62. Moreover [...] a mere 8 % of black cab journeys are pre-booked. Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the pre-booked market is the only significant market on which black cabs operate. In this connection, although it does not appear self-evident to me, it has not escaped my attention that the High Court in its judgment found that ‘[i]t would clearly not be possible to legislate that … black cabs could not use the bus lane when carrying a pre-booked passenger’. With that in mind, there appears to be no justification for limiting the assessment to the market for pre-bookings alone. (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
What I think has escaped the AG's attention is that the relevant setting is not to determine where do black cabs operate, but where do they compete. If that is kept in mind, but for the anachronic and currently unjustified exclusive right to carry out 'ply for hire' journeys that black cabs retain, either all journeys would become pre-booked (if their right was simply erased and no taxi could be hailed on the streets, which is not plausible) or both black cabs and PHVs would compete for all services, which would erase the issue of comparability and assymetrical competition. Hence, making the whole analysis rely on the existence of a currently unjustified regulatory restriction makes the argument very weak and difficult to justify, particularly if a measure that distorts competition in the only market where PHVs can be present is being analysed, as is the case in Eventech.
Implicitly, AG Wahl has been very deferential towards a sector that, as has been clear, is currently fighting to keep a monopoly that is increasingly difficult to justify (if possible at all). This is hardly a progressive Opinion. Consequently, I would like to see the CJEU deviate from his advice in Eventech and to finally rule that the State aid rules apply in this case and that the implicit extension of the reserved activities for black cabs that the bus lane rules create is contrary to the rules on State aid. I will most likely be disappointed, though.