What an amazing year 2015 has been. Thank you [and hiatus]

2015 has been an amazing for the blogger and open access enthusiast in me. Thank you all for your over 160,000 visits to the blog, over 4,000 SSRN downloads, all comments and engagements. Thanks also to Dr Pedro Telles for our 6-month long procurement tennis, which represented our first incursion into endurance blogging (more on that project in the new year, thanks to the support of the Society of Legal Scholars).

It has also been quite an intense year for the academic in me, including the move from Leicester to Bristol, as well as the appointment to the European Commission's Stakeholder Expert Group on Public Procurement

Quite frankly, after all this and the work required to cover all these fronts, I need a bit of a break. First, to relax. And later to catch up with some projects that need some attention. 

Thus, the blog is going on hiatus until February 2016. I hope you will have some excellent holidays and a happy new year in the meantime.


CJEU: companies cannot mislead consumers under their 'freedom of expression' (C-157/14)

In its Judgment of 17 December 2015 in Neptune Distribution, C-157/14, EU:C:2015:823, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) addressed whether companies making potentially misleading claims about their products could be protected under a right to 'freedom of expression and information'. In short, the CJEU assessed whether companies could issue commercial statements apt to mislead consumers and still be protected under that type of 'corporate human right'. 

This is a global issue, and the relevance of this problem has been picked by mainstream media, such as John Oliver's piece on an episode of HBO's Last Week Tonight in 2014. Interestingly, the CJEU ended up rejecting the idea of affording protection to companies that potentially mislead consumers in breach of EU foodstuffs law, but only after assessing their claims under a strict proportionality test. Its reasoning, which falls quite short from resolving the issue once and for all, deserves some analysis.

In Neptune Distribution, the contested claims concerned the presentation of carbonated water as low or very low in salt or in sodium in a manner contrary to Art 9(1), 9(2) and Annex III of Directive 2009/54 on the exploitation and marketing of natural mineral waters, when read together with the annex to Regulation No 1924/2006 on nutrition and health claims made on foods. The main issue was that, in the way they were advertised (eg per comparison to milk, or by establishing claims as to the different effects of sodium chloride and sodium bicarbonate), the mineral water products sold by Neptune could be perceived by consumers as '(very) low salt/sodium' despite actually (significantly) exceeding the the limits for the amounts of sodium or the equivalent value for salt laid down by the relevant EU legislation.

Remarkably, Neptune claimed that its marketing statements were protected by freedom of expression and information under Art 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and corresponding rules under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, Art 10). The CJEU does not disagree with this general approach. The CJEU indeed recognises that there is significant scope for protection of corporate claims, including marketing claims, under their right to freedom of expression and information. As the CJEU stresses, the freedom of expression and information enshrined in Art 11 of the Charter 'applies, inter alia, as is clear from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, to the circulation by an entrepreneur of commercial information in particular in the form of an advertising slogan' (para 64). 

Therefore, Art 11 Charter protection can be claimed in relation to 'the use by a business, on packaging, labels and in advertising for natural mineral waters, of claims and indications referring to the sodium or salt content of such waters' (para 65). This results in the fact that '[t]he prohibition on the displaying on the packaging, labels and in the advertising for natural mineral waters of any claim or indication referring to the fact that such waters have a low sodium content which may mislead the consumer as to that content is an interference with the freedom of expression and information of the person carrying on that business and with his freedom to conduct that business' (para 67, emphasis added). 

Even if technically correct de lege data, I find this approach criticisable in itself because it recognises a type of strong 'corporate human right' to freedom of expression and information that seems unwarranted in view of the extremely weak (if not inexistent) link between the development of commercial activities and the exercise of (properly understood) civil and political liberties [see  the main arguments in A Sanchez-Graells and F Marcos, "'Human Rights' Protection for Corporate Antitrust Defendants: Are We Not Going Overboard?", in P Nihoul and T Skoczny (eds), Procedural Fairness in Competition Proceedings (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015) 84-107]. 

However, in a line of argument that clearly restricts the general approach outline above, the CJEU also recognises that such interference with corporate freedom of expression can be compatible with the applicable rules under the Charter and the ECHR if it serves a valid social purpose, not least because 'the freedom to conduct a business ... must be considered in relation to its social function' (para 66). In that regard, the CJEU considers that 'While those freedoms may nevertheless be limited, any limitation on their exercise must ... be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Furthermore ... subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others' (para 68).

In the assessment of the proportionality of the measure restricting Neptune's right to make any claims whatsoever about its products, the CJEU focusses on three aspects. First, that the restriction is created by law. Second, that 'the freedom of expression and information of the person carrying on the business is not affected by those provisions, since they merely make the information which may be communicated to the consumer regarding the sodium or salt content of natural mineral waters subject to certain conditions' (para 70). And, third, that 'far from prohibiting the production and marketing of natural mineral waters, the legislation at issue ... merely controls, in a very clearly defined area, the associated labelling and advertising. Thus, it does not affect in any way the actual content of the freedom to conduct a business' (para 71). This comes to establish that, provided that the restriction is not absolute and that it derives from a legal source, then a claim under Art 11 Charter is unlikely to prosper. However, this will not always be the case and, in particular for products other than foodstuffs, compliance with all these conditions may be difficult to achieve--particularly if the products are totally unregulated, which makes the first condition difficult to achieve unless general consumer protection or unfair competition rules fill that possible regulatory gap.

Further to these general considerations, the CJEU also assesses the purpose and proportionality of the restrictions. In that regard, it gives particular weight to several factors related to the fact that the 'limitations on the use of the claims and indications ... aim to ensure a high level of consumer protection, to guarantee adequate and transparent information for the consumer relating to the sodium content of drinking water, to ensure fair trading and to protect human health' (para 72), In particular,
75 ... the determination of the validity of the contested provisions must be carried out in accordance with the need to reconcile the requirements of the protection of those various fundamental rights protected by the EU legal order, and striking a fair balance between them ...
76 With regard to judicial review of the conditions of the implementation of the principle of proportionality, the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in an area such as that involved in the present case, which entails political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments ...
77 ... even if a claim or indication referring to the sodium content of natural mineral waters associated with chloride ions can be regarded as being substantively correct, the fact remains that it is incomplete if it suggests that the waters are low in sodium whereas, in reality, their total sodium content exceeds the limits provided for by EU legislation ... 
78 In such a situation, the information displayed on the packaging, labels and in advertising containing that claim or indication may mislead the consumer as to the sodium content of the mineral waters ... (C-157/14, paras 75-78, references omitted).
There is a final step in the analysis concerning certain claims of Neptune that EU legislation was unnecessarily restrictive, which the CJEU sorts out by deferring to the EU legislator's action under the precautionary principle. Thus, overall, the CJEU has no qualms in restricting the previously recognised corporate right to freedom of expression and information on the basis of a pretty straightforward analysis of the labelling requirements coupled with a high degree of deference on the basis of the precautionary principle.

Overall, the outcome of the case must be welcome (and follows some other positive developments in EU food law). However, in my view, the trouble is in the process that the CJEU had to follow before upholding the restrictions on labelling of mineral waters for consumer protection health-related reasons. It would seem to me that these issues would be better reconducted under a standard case of judicial review of the administrative action and the underpinning legal rules imposing labelling requirements. In that regard, it seems quite clear that Neptune would not have had legal standing to challenge the European rules on mineral water labelling. However, it managed to trigger the same level of judicial review through a claim of corporate human rights (certainly artificially overblown). Is it time to reconsider, once and seriously, a change in the rules for judicial review of EU acts, or are we better off by indulging endlessly in this ridiculous discussion on corporate human rights?

AG Mengozzi on price comparisons: buying cars is not like buying tomatoes ... So what? (C-476/14)

In his Opinion of 16 December 2015 in Citroën Commerce, C-476/14, EU:C:2015:814 (not available in English), Advocate General Mengozzi assessed whether EU consumer law allows for Member State rules that systematically ban car advertisements that mention separately the price of the car and additional mandatory transportation expenses that the consumers need to cover in order to buy the advertised car. Or, in other words, whether harmonised EU consumer law prevents Member States from retaining domestic rules that require car ads to indicate in a transparent and unmistakable manner the global, full and final price of the advertised vehicle. 

In his Opinion, AG Mengozzi concludes that EU law does not systematically prohibit this type of ads, but rather requires a case-by-case analysis of the content and circumstances of the advertisement. Thus, in his view, a domestic rule that imposes a blanket restriction on the way price and information on other (mandatory) expenses is provided--ie, which requires explicit disclosure of the global cost of acquisition of the car--runs contrary to EU law. This is a counter-intuitive Opinion on consumer protection and, in my view, deserves some closer analysis.

The dispute in Citroën Commerce concerns a German rule whereby the offeror of goods to final consumers must indicate prices including value added tax and any other integral parts of the final price to be paid. In the specific case of car ads, it is settled German law that 
in principle, what should be indicated in ads is the final price of the vehicle, ie the price including transportation expenses, because the public does not perceive these incidental expenses as additional, but rather as an integral part of the price. It is only possible to indicate separately the price if the consumer can choose between two options, namely, collecting the vehicle at the manufacturer's plant or ordering the vehicle to be transferred to the dealership where the sale took place; or when it is not possible to calculate in advance the amount of such expenses (Opinion in C-476/17, para 26, own translation from Spanish).
AG Mengozzi assesses the German rule and its interpretation by reference to EU rules on labelling of products (Directive 98/6) and on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices (Directive 2005/29). 

Assessment under Directive 98/6
From the outset, AG Mengozzi doubts the applicability of Dir 98/6 to the case. In his view, '[p]erhaps the advertisement ... constitutes an offer of products in the broad and common sense. However ... the concept of "products offered by traders to consumers" ​​in Article 1 of Directive 98/6 must be interpreted within the limits inherent to its scope' (Opinion in C-476/17, para 38, own translation from Spanish).

AG Mengozzi considers that Dir 98/6 on consumer protection in the indication of the prices of products offered to consumers, does not apply in the case of cars. In his view, '[a]lthough this obligation [to provide transparent prices for the purposes of comparison by consumers] is ... prima facie formulated regarding all "products offered", the analysis of the lexical scope of Directive 98/6 leads me to conclude that it was, however, essentially conceived for regular consumption products, it being understood that it may be both food and non-food products(Opinion in C-476/17, para 42, own translation from Spanish). 

The AG expands on the reasons for his assessment:
45 ... although Article 1 of the [then] proposed directive was drafted in the sense that the indication of the selling price and the price per unit of measure of "products offered by traders to final consumers" should be provided, the Commission added that this should be done where such dual pricing information was relevant. It thus acknowledged that "there [were] a number of situations where the comparison does not give the consumer determinant information, particularly when the products have very different characteristics or meet different needs of consumers. This is, for example, customized products, articles of clothing, automobiles, furniture and all products where indication of measurement [...] does not provide useful information to compare prices."
46. ​​Thus, given their own varied individual characteristics, vehicles are not products for which a price comparison through the labelling regulated by Directive 98/6 proves immediately relevant to the consumer. To be clear, just as Directive 98/6 is destined to facilitate comparison, for the consumer, of the price of a kilogram of tomatoes--because tomatoes are an easily comparable product and, in any case, are completely equivalent to tomatoes sold in another store--for products such as automobiles, the labelling of prices in the conditions prescribed by Directive 98/6 cannot serve this objective, given the degree of specificity of each vehicle (Opinion in C-476/17, paras 45-46, own translation from Spanish, emphasis added).
AG Mengozzi also stresses that AG Cruz Villalón and the CJEU indicated that 'the purpose of Directive 98/6 is not to protect consumers in relation to the indication of prices, in general or with regard to the economic reality of announcements of price reductions, but specifically in relation to the indication of the prices of products by reference to different units of quantity' (Commission v Belgium, C-421/12, EU:C:2014:2064, para 59; as referred to in Opinion in C-476/17, para 47, emphasis added).

All those arguments lead AG Mengozzi to conclude that 'Directive 98/6 does not constitute the European Union law benchmark for the indication of prices in general for all product offerings. Nor is it intended to regulate in general terms the conditions under which prices must appear in ads' (Opinion in C-476/17, para 49, own translation from Spanish, emphasis added).

In my view, the reasoning of AG Mengozzi is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, because it conflates whether dual pricing (ie including both the selling and the unit price) is necessary for consumers to assess the cost of a car [which it is not, as cars are bought by units; see Art 5(1) Dir 98/6] and whether transparent price comparisons are useful for consumers looking to buy cars (which they definitely are). I am particularly troubled by his "tomato-analogy" because it does not reflect the basic economic insight that consumers can benefit from competition in two dimensions: inter-brand and intra-brand competition.

Of course, inter-brand competition only benefits consumers willing to compare the price and characteristics of different (makes and models of) cars and, in that regard, pure price comparisons may not be (solely/primarily?) relevant. However, intra-brand competition benefits consumers willing to buy one specific make and model of car and looking for the best price available. This second type of consumer benefit derived from competition necessarily relies on transparent price comparisons. Thus, the exclusion from cars altogether from the scope of application of Dir 98/6 'because buying  cars is not like buying tomatoes' is simply ridiculous [by the way, buying tomatoes can be a less than straightforward exercise as well ... but let's leave the paradox of choice aside].

A functional understanding of the goal of Dir 98/6 should make it obvious that it aims at enabling easy and reliable price comparisons by consumers, or 'to stipulate indication of the selling price and the price per unit ... in order to improve consumer information and to facilitate comparison of prices' (Art 1, emphasis added)--ultimately because 'transparent operation of the market and correct information is of benefit to consumer protection and healthy competition between enterprises and products' [rec (1) Dir 98/6].

Therefore, it seems quite straightforward that Dir 98/6 aims to facilitate price comparisons and, in that regard, the rest of its provisions are relevant also for the offer of cars. Art 2(a) Dir 98/6 clearly establishes that 'selling price shall mean the final price for a unit of the product ... including VAT and all other taxes'. Therefore, the analysis of the Citroën Commerce case should have rested on whether offering a price and separately indicating that there are additional mandatory transportation expenses for the acquisition of a car meets this requirement. In that regard, even if it was considered that the indication of these two elements of the final prices in the same ad was not prohibited by the EU rule, it should be taken into account that Art 10 Dir 98/6 allows for Member States to adopt or maintain provisions which are more favourable as regards consumer information and comparison of prices, without prejudice to their obligations under the Treaty. Therefore, unless there was an infringement of the other obligations under EU law, the German rule should stand (see analysis re Dir 2005/29 below).

AG Mengozzi disagrees with such an approach and considers that 'transportation expenses ... are entirely outside the scope of Directive 98/6 for various reasons(Opinion in C-476/17, para 55, own translation from Spanish). His main reasons relate to the travaux preparatoires of the Directive and his argument that it solely applies to regular consumption products offered immediately by retailers to consumers (ie where no transportation costs are usually applicable). In my view, such approach goes against the objective of the Directive and seeks to create a restriction that can well render the requirements of the Directive completely moot. It should be clear that the Directive aimed to provide consumers a global, final price for the products they are offered (thus, the obligation to include applicable taxes). Any interpretation that allows for the exclusion of price components from the 'legal' concept of final price makes no functional sense.

In any case, what is clear is that, either on the basis of Art 10 Dir 98/6 or not, the last hurdle for the German rule to overcome is the regulation of unfair commercial practices under Dir 2005/29, which establishes maximum harmonisation measures and, consequently, does not allow Member States to provide a level of protection beyond the EU law standard.

Assessment under Directive 2005/29
Ultimately, then, the assessment of  compatibility of an interpretation of Dir 98/6 with Dir 2005/29 and the maximum harmonisation it imposes requires to determine whether a reading of Art 2(a) (and 10) Dir 98/6 as requiring the disclosure of a single final price that includes all mandatory costs and expenses payable for the acquisition of the car, is compatible with Art 7(1), 7(4)(c)  and 7(5) Dir 2005/29 as a standard of maximum harmonisation [Art 3(5)].

Art 7(1) Dir 2005/29 determines that a 'commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading if, in its factual context, taking account of all its features and circumstances and the limitations of the communication medium, it omits material information that the average consumer needs, according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision and thereby causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise'. Art 7(4)(c) Dir 2005/29 clarifies that '[i]n the case of an invitation to purchase, the following information shall be regarded as material, if not already apparent from the context: ... (c) the price inclusive of taxes ... as well as, where appropriate, all additional freight, delivery or postal charges ...'. Finally, Art 7(5) Dir 2005/29 determines that EU law requirements on pricing are to be considered material as well, which include Art 3(4) Dir 98/6 (not relevant for our purposes).

AG Mengozzi reasons as follows:
73 ... Article 7, paragraph 4, letter c) of Directive 2005/29 is not limited to mentioning the price, including taxes, but also refers to "... where appropriate, all additional freight, delivery or postal charges." From the structure of this provision, it is clear that it covers price with all of its components and that the text of Article 7, paragraph 4, letter c) of Directive 2005/29, read in its entirety, clearly seems to address differently the price or the manner in which it is determined, on the one hand, and the other price components such as transport costs, on the other. In any case, nothing indicates, in view of the interpretation of Article 7, paragraph 4, letter c), that the price must include transport costs and be subject to a global definitive indication
74 ... it must also be stated that the omission of material information, such as price as defined in Article 7, paragraph 4, letter c) of Directive 2005/29 is not, in any case and of itself, an unfair trade practice, since the impact of this omission on consumer behavior and the adoption of its decision on a transaction will always have to be analysed case-by-case. The terms of Directive 2005/29 show that this analysis should also take into account the context of the commercial practice in question, of all its features and circumstances and the limitations of the communication medium.
76 ... a national rule interpreted as systematically prohibiting invitations to buy that indicate separately the price of products and mandatory transportation costs would go beyond the level of protection afforded by Directive 2005/29 because that provision would have the effect of generally punishing the omission of material information--namely the price, including compulsory expenses--whereas the Directive requires a case-by-case analysis to appreciate the practical consequences of such a failure in the commercial behavior of such a consumer before it can qualify the commercial practice as "unfair" (Opinion in C-476/17, paras 73-74 and 76, own translation from Spanish, emphasis added).
In this instance, the reasoning of AG Mengozzi seems accurate. Indeed, it seems clear that Art 7(4)(c) Dir 2005/29 requires disclosure of all costs applicable to the purchase, but not necessarily the disclosure of a global, final price as a single figure. It also seems clear that Art 7 Dir 2005/29 excludes the use of presumptions of unfairness by Member States by requiring a case-by-case analysis [which may not be desirable from a broader perspective, particularly in terms of legal enforcement costs, but that is an issue intrinsic to Dir 2005/29 and its maximum harmonisation]. 

In the circumstances of the case Citroën Commerce, given that the mandatory transportation costs were disclosed (albeit in a different, smaller font...) it is hard to see a possibility to declare the practice "unfair" for the purposes of Dir 2005/29.

As a final point, it may be worth stressing that it also seems clear that Dir 2005/29 has (implicitly) severely limited, if not completely excluded, the possibility for Member States to adopt 'more stringent measures' under Art 10 Dir 98/6. If this implication is correct, it would be desirable for the CJEU to declare it as such in its final Judgment in Citroën Commerce.

Early Career Researcher Public Procurement Conference Announced (March 4th, 2016, London)

Showing his clear entrepreneurial approach to public procurement (and everything else), my colleague Dr Pedro Telles is pushing for a very interesting new project: the Early Career Researcher Public Procurement Conference (March 4th, London). I am honoured to be involved and certain that it will be a great opportunity to hear new ideas and bring new blood into public procurement research. I am reposting here his blog announcement. Please get involved!
We will be holding a one day conference for Early Career Researcher Public Procurement Conference at the Centre for Transnational Legal Studies in London on March 4th. 10 Early Career Researchers will have the opportunity to present their research on a non-threatening environment, benefiting from presenting at a leading international conference early in their career and getting expert commentary on their research. We are looking for promising researchers passionate about public procurement irrespective of disciplinae and interested in engaging with a non-specialist audience.
In addition, the conference will include a ‘speed-dating’ mentoring session in the afternoon, allowing for the beneficiaries to expand their personal networks and helping the development of their career plans. Participants are also invited to take part in the dinner that evening.
Thanks to the British Academy Rising Star Engagement award and the kind facilities offer by the Centre for Transnational Legal Studies it is be possible to reimburse travel costs (up to a maximum of £350), offer one night accommodation and also the dinner on the night of March 4th.
The call for proposals is open at the Public Procurement Podcast website until January 10th.
We already have some confirmed appearances. In addition to myself [Dr Pedro Telles], Dr. Albert Sanchez-Graells, Dr. Ama Eyo and Professor Roberto Caranta will also be taking part. [Pedro] will be confirming further names in the next few weeks.
In case you are not an Early Career Researcher and would like to attend the conference, drop us a line as we will have limited spaces available.

Lost in translation or games of semantics? CJEU deepens diverging protection for registered and reputed trade marks against translated 'identical' signs (C-603/14)

In its Judgment of 10 December 2015 in El Corte Inglés v OHIM, C-603/14 P, EU:C:2015:807, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided on a trademark case involving the Spanish commercial retailer El Corte Inglés (ECI) and its opposition to the registration of the trademark 'The English Cut'--which is the literal Spanish-to-English translation of ECI's trademark 'El Corte Inglés'.

ECI had opposed the registration of the trademark 'The English Cut' on the basis that it infringed Art 8(1)(b) of the Community Trademark Regulation (CTR), according to which a proprietor of an earlier trade mark can successfully oppose the registration of a new trademark 'if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected; the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark' (emphasis added). 

ECI also opposed the registration on the basis of Art 8(5) CTR, according to which 'the trade mark applied for shall not be registered where it is identical with, or similar to, the earlier trade mark and is to be registered for goods or services which are not similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is registered, where, in the case of an earlier Community trade mark, the trade mark has a reputation in the Community and, in the case of an earlier national trade mark, the trade mark has a reputation in the Member State concerned and where the use without due cause of the trade mark applied for would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark' (emphasis added).

It is important to stress that both grounds for opposition are based on the identity or similarity of the previous trade mark and the new trade mark applied for. Whether these two opposition grounds rely on the same or different tests of similarity has been heavily litigated and constituted the nub of the legal dispute in the El Corte Inglés v OHIM case. 

As immediate precedents, in Intra-Presse v Golden Balls (C-581/13 P, EU:C:2014:2387, discussed here) and, previously, in Ferrero v OHMI (C-552/09 P, EU:C:2011:177), it was stressed that
72 The Court has consistently held that the degree of similarity required under Article 8(1)(b) ..., on the one hand, and Article 8(5) ..., on the other, is different. Whereas the implementation of the protection provided for under Article 8(1)(b) ... is conditional upon a finding of a degree of similarity between the marks at issue so that there exists a likelihood of confusion between them on the part of the relevant section of the public, the existence of such a likelihood is not necessary for the protection conferred by Article 8(5) ... Accordingly, the types of injury referred to in Article 8(5) ... may be the consequence of a lesser degree of similarity between the earlier and the later marks, provided that it is sufficient for the relevant section of the public to make a connection between those marks, that is to say, to establish a link between them ...
73 According to the same case-law, Article 8(5) ..., like Article 8(1)(b), is manifestly inapplicable where the General Court rules out any similarity between the marks at issue. It is only if there is some similarity, even faint, between the marks at issue that the General Court must carry out an overall assessment in order to ascertain whether, notwithstanding the low degree of similarity between them, there is, on account of the presence of other relevant factors such as the reputation or recognition enjoyed by the earlier mark, a likelihood of confusion or a link made between those marks by the relevant public (C-581/13, paras 72-73, emphasis added, references omitted and emphasis added).
This seemed to point out to a single test for the existence or not of similarity. A negative answer to the test would exclude the analysis of whether the degree of similarity sufficed to engage either Art 8(1)(b) or Art 8(5) CTR protection. On the contrary, a positive answer to the test would require an assessment under both tests. The CJEU has now elaborated on this position and further clarified that
39 Given that it is not apparent either from the wording of paragraphs 1(b) and 5 of Article 8 ... or from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the concept of similarity has a different meaning in each of those paragraphs, it follows, inter alia, that, if, in examining the conditions for the application of Article 8(1)(b) of that regulation, the General Court concludes that there is no similarity between the signs at issue, paragraph 5 of Article 8 also necessarily does not apply to the case in point. Conversely, if the General Court takes the view, in the context of that same examination, that there is some similarity between the signs at issue, such a finding is equally valid with regard to the application of both Article 8(1)(b) and Article 8(5) ...
40 However, in a situation in which the degree of similarity in question does not prove to be sufficient to result in the application of Article 8(1)(b) ... it cannot be deduced from that that the application of paragraph 5 of that article is necessarily precluded.
41 The degree of similarity between the signs at issue required by each of the paragraphs of that provision is different. Whereas the application of Article 8(1)(b) ... is conditional on a finding of a degree of similarity between those signs which is capable of giving rise to a likelihood of confusion between them on the part of the relevant public, the existence of such a likelihood of confusion is not, by contrast, necessary as a condition for the application of paragraph 5 of that article.
42 Since Article 8(5) ... merely requires the similarity which exists to be capable of leading the relevant public to make a connection between the signs at issue, that is to say, to establish a link between them, but does not require that similarity to be capable of leading that public to confuse those signs, it must be held that the protection which that provision lays down in favour of marks with a reputation may apply even if there is a lower degree of similarity between the signs at issue (C-603/14, paras 39-42, emphasis added).
The general framework seems conceptually clear, and there is an internal logic that excludes protection under either Art 8(1)(b) or Art 8(5) CTR where the existing and the new trade marks are not similar. The problems and difficulties come in the application of this framework. 

In the case at hand, the core of the question relied on the General Court's (GC) assessment of the existence of any similarity between 'El Corte Inglés' and 'The English Cut'. One of the compounded difficulties in the assessment is that the GC's Judgment is only available in French and Spanish, which complicates matters. In the CJEU's (English) account,
45 ... it must be pointed out that, when it examined the conditions for the application of Article 8(1)(b) ..., the General Court held, in paragraph 29 of the judgment under appeal, that there was a low degree of conceptual similarity between the signs at issue. However, in paragraph 33 of that judgment, it took the view that, in the light of the absence of any visual and phonetic similarity, it had been rightly found in the contested decision that those signs were different overall. Consequently, the General Court held that, as one of the cumulative conditions for the application of Article 8(1)(b) was not satisfied, there was no need to carry out a global assessment of the likelihood of confusion.
46 However, as regards the assessment of the conditions for the application of Article 8(5) ..., the General Court stated, in paragraph 39 of the judgment under appeal, that it was apparent from the comparison of the signs at issue, which was carried out in the context of paragraph 1(b) of that article, that those signs were not similar and therefore that the conditions for the application of paragraph 5 of that article were not satisfied.
47 In ruling to that effect, the General Court erred in law (sic). That Court could not disregard its own finding, in paragraph 29 of the judgment under appeal, that there was a conceptual similarity between the signs at issue.
48 In those circumstances, the General Court should have examined whether that degree of similarity, albeit low, was not sufficient, on account of the presence of other relevant factors such as the renown or reputation of the earlier mark, for the relevant public to establish a link between those signs, for the purpose of Article 8(5) (C-603/14, paras 45-48, emphasis added).
Frankly, upon reading these passages, I have the feeling that the CJEU is screaming 'gotcha' in the background. Firstly, it seems clear to me that the GC could not have erred in law by failing to take into account its own factual findings. When the GC stressed in para 39 that 'those signs were not similar', it was clearly making a (factual) reference to a previous factual assessment. Thus, if anything, the GC could have erred in fact. But, even then, it is hard to see why the CJEU engages in such a tricky reconstruction of the facts as found by the GC and their interpretation. It seems clear to me that, in paragraphs 29 and 33, the GC carried out the assessment of whether similarity existed for the purposes of Art 8(1)(b) protection. On this point, the GC could only reach two conclusions. Either there was similarity and an assessment of the likelihood of confusion was engaged. Or, conversely, there was no similarity and thus there was no need to proceed to such assessment. 

At this stage, it is important to go back to the original GC Judgment rather than relying on the stylized summary that the CJEU provides. Quite clearly, in para 29 of its Judgment, the GC indicated that 'the signs at issue have a weak conceptual similarity requiring proper prior translation, not a strong conceptual identity' (own translation from Spanish and French). And in para 33, it indicated that 'there is a slight conceptual similarity, but no visual and phonetic similarity between the conflicting signs. It follows that the Board of Appeal correctly concluded that the signs were different overall(own translation from Spanish and French). 

Now, it must be acknowledged that the GC could have been clearer. Its (corteous?/naive?) deference to the point that, upon proper prior translation, there was a weak conceptual similarity between the signs, but that the signs were different overall is open to (re)interpretation. Was there some similarity or not? However, the natural and systematic interpretation of what paragraph 33 means needs to be found in the GC's Judgment itself. 

In para 39, it is clearly stated that 'it nevertheless follows from the comparison between the conflicting signs, that they are not similar(own translation from Spanish and French, emphasis added). By ignoring this statement and the weight it must be given as authetic interpretation of what the GC meant in the same Judgment, only some 10 or 6 paragraphs earlier, the CJEU engages in an exercise of semantics that certainly does not contribute to conceptual clarity. More importantly, the CJEU also fails to recognise the difficulty of carrying simultaneously a conceptual and linguistic comparison, given that concept and language are, if not impossible, certainly hard to disentangle [or is it only when humour is concerned; see G Ritchie, The Linguistic Analysis of Jokes, vol. 2 Routledge Studies in Linguistics (London, Routledge, 2004) 28 and ff]. Are we doomed to remain lost in translation?

AG Wathelet proposes creation of excessive presumption of liability for third party infringement of Art 101 TFEU (C-542/14)

In his Opinion of 3 December 2015 in case VM Remonts and Others, C-542/14, EU:C:2015:797 (not yet available in English), Advocate General Wathelet advised the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on issues concerning the subjective elements (ie mens rea-like requirements) of the prohibition of anticompetitive behaviour in Art 101(1) TFEU. 

In particular, the case addresses issues concerning the imputability of anticompetitive practices in which a third party services provider is engaged to the 'client' undertaking that hired those services (ie how to make the 'client' undertaking liable for the anticompetitive behaviour of one of its services providers). In my view, AG Wathelet's proposal is clearly excessive (see critical assessment below) and deserves closer inspection. 

The case is quite convoluted because it concerns the imputability of a bid rigging offence to a supplying company that engaged a consultant to help it formulate a bid in a tender for a public contract. After the fact, it became apparent that the consultancy engaged in collusion with other tenderers in the same bid. The question was, thus, to what extent the bidder should be liable for the collusion that resulted from the allegedly independent activity of the consultancy (third party services supplier) and, in any case, what level of proof of anticompetitive intent would be necessary to impose liability on the 'client' undertaking.

In AG Wathelet's Opinion, it is not necessary to prove a personal behavior of any corporate officer of the 'client' undertaking, or his knowledge or consent to the behavior of the external services provider that also acted on behalf of other participants in a possibly prohibited agreement. AG Wathelet proposes to create a presumption of (vicarious?) liability, so that it is incumbent upon the 'client' undertaking to adduce sufficiently convincing evidence to rebut that presumption and escape liability. 

In particular, AG Wathelet considers that the necessary proof concerns (i) evidence relating to the fact that the third party (services provider) has acted outside the scope of the functions that had been entrusted to it, (ii) evidence regarding the precautionary measures taken by the 'client' undertaking at the time of designation of the third party and during the monitoring of the implementation of the functions in question, and (iii) evidence regarding the 'client' undertaking's conduct upon becoming aware of prohibited behavior.

AG Wathelet's VM Remonts Opinion follows the expansive/strict interpretation of the subjective elements in the prohibition of Art 101(1) TFEU in recent cases such as AC-Treuhand v Commission (C-194/14 P, EU:C:2015:717, re liability of a cartel facilitator, see an interesting comment here); Schenker and Others (C-681/11, EU:C:2013:404, re reliance on third party advice, see comments here); or Kone (C-557/12, EU:C:2014:917, re extension of 'umbrella' liability for damages to third parties to a cartel, see comments here). 

This is a very relevant opinion, with potentially very significant effects commensurate to those of the presumption of liability of the parent company, which has shaken competition law enforcement in the EU for the last 5 years or so.  

Therefore, it is interesting to look at AG Wathelet's reasoning in some more detail:
60. In my view, two extreme positions must be rejected. On the one hand, the automatic imputation of responsibility to the undertaking for the actions of a third party, regardless of the degree of involvement of the undertaking, which would go against fundamental principles governing the imposition of competition law sanctions (in particular the principles of personal responsibility and legal certainty), and, on the other hand, the obligation of the competent competition authority to demonstrate convincingly that the undertaking receiving the services from the third party was aware of the criminal acts committed by the latter or had consented to them, which would create a risk of seriously undermining the effectiveness of competition law.
61. Indeed, "... the prohibition on participating in anti-competitive practices and agreements and the penalties which infringers may incur are well known, it is normal that the activities which those practices and agreements involve take place in a clandestine fashion, for meetings to be held in secret, frequently in a non-member country, and for the associated documentation to be reduced to a minimum. " Therefore, it would be too easy to "hide" behind a third party in order to go unpunished under competition law.
62. Moreover, the importance of keeping free competition allows for companies that entrust third parties with functions such as those at issue in the present case [ie public procurement consultancy services] to be required to take all possible precautions to prevent such third parties from infringing competition law, avoiding, in particular, any negligence or recklessness in the definition or in the monitoring of these functions.
63. In line with this, the solution I propose for cases such as that in the main proceedings is to establish a rebuttable (iuris tantum) presumption of liability of the undertakings for acts contrary to competition law committed by a third party whose services it has engaged and which cannot be considered its subsidiary or ancillary body. Such a presumption can maintain the balance between, on the one hand, the objective of effectively suppressing behavior contrary to the competition rules, in particular to Article 101 TFEU, and to prevent their recurrence bearing in mind that respect for these rules requires an active corporate behavior at all times and, on the other hand, the requirements arising from the fundamental rights regarding the imposition of sanctions. Such a presumption would apply even if the acts performed by the third party were different from the functions entrusted to it, and even when it was not possible to demonstrate that the undertaking that used the services was aware of the acts of the provider or consented to them.
64. This presumption should apply to an undertaking from the moment the authority responsible for the enforcement of competition rules proves the existence of an act contrary to competition law committed by a person working for (or providing services to) the undertaking but which does not, directly or indirectly, form part of its organisational chart.
 65. In order to respect the balance to which I referred in point 63 of this Opinion, the undertaking may rebut the presumption of liability by submitting all elements supporting its claim that it was unaware of the illegal behavior  in which the third party service provider engaged, and by demonstrating that it took all necessary measures to prevent such a breach of competition law precautions, and this in three stages.
66. The first is when his appointment or hiring occurs. It refers in particular to the choice of supplier, the definition of the functions and the monitoring of its implementation, the conditions (or exclusion) of recourse to subcontracting, obligations to ensure respect for the law, in particular, competition, and the sanctions for breach of contract, as well as whether authorization was required for  any act not provided for in the contract.
67. The second stage includes the period of execution of the functions entrusted to the third party, ensuring that the latter strictly sticks to its functions as defined in the contract.
68. The third stage is when the third party commits a breach of competition law, even if committed at the back of the undertaking. The undertaking cannot simply ignore that behaviour, it should distance itself publicly from the forbidden act, prevent its repetition or report it to the administrative authorities. Indeed, as stated by the Court: "... passive modes of participation in the infringement, such as the presence of an undertaking in meetings at which anti-competitive agreements were concluded, without that undertaking clearly opposing them, are indicative of collusion capable of rendering the undertaking liable under Article [101(1) TFEU], since a party which tacitly approves of an unlawful initiative, without publicly distancing itself from its content or reporting it to the administrative authorities, encourages the continuation of the infringement and compromises its discovery" (C-542/14, paras 60-69, references omitted, own translation from Spanish, emphasis added).
In my own opinion, the creation of the presumption proposed by AG Wathelet goes way too far. In simple conceptual terms, it excessively erodes the principle of personal responsibility and falls short of meeting the desirable balance that the AG presents himself. The 'client' undertaking and the third party service provider are, in these cases, completely independent undertakings and the creation of the presumption would go beyond the acceptable limits of expansion of the concept of (functional) single economic entity. 

Plainly, it is excessive to impose this type of burden of proof (probatio diabolica) on undertakings that simply lack the knowledge and manpower required to monitor the execution of the activities contracted out to the third party to the standard created by AG Wathelet. This applies at least in stages one (design of the contract) and two (monitoring of execution), where the 'client' undertaking will in many cases be affected by significant asymmetries of information and gaps in human capital. Otherwise, what would be the economic rationale for contracting out something the undertaking could carry out on its own?

I would thus prefer the CJEU to deviate from the proposal of AG Wathelet in this case and to reject the creation of such rebuttable presumption of liability for the anticompetitive behaviour of third parties to which a 'client' undertaking has outsourced certain types of functions. The competent competition authority should always be obliged to demonstrate, at least at the level of sufficient indicia (balance of probabilities, but for?), that the recourse to the third party aimed to circumvent the prohibition of Art 101(1) TFEU--ie, that there was an anticompetitive agreement (by object) between the 'client' undertaking and the third party services provider because the outsourcing had the object of creating further restrictions of competition (on the issue of prohibitions by object, see here). Thus, if the contracting out arrangement was not genuine or if there are indications that the outsourcing aimed at a restriction of competition, then the burden of proof could be reversed. But to create a presumption of liability in the way that AG Wathelet proposes is excessive.

Evaluation of tenders after the expiry of their validity does not annul tender for EU public contracts (T-553/13)

In its Judgment of 2 December 2015 in European Dynamics Luxembourg and Evropaïki Dynamiki v Joint undertaking Fusion for Energy, T-553/13, EU:T:2015:918, the General Court (GC) of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has assessed one more case of procurement litigation concerning a cascade-based framework agreement for the provision of IT services (for previous cases, see here and here). This is proving to be quite a highly litigated design for framework agreements, so it is worth looking in detail at the scope of the dispute to determine whether the design of this type of arrangement makes them more exposed to litigation. The analysis will show that it does not because the claims made against the conclusion of the framework agreement are purely procedural.

In the case at hand, the Joint undertaking Fusion for Energy (F4E) issued a tender for a framework agreement for the provision of IT Services and requested that offers remained valid for a minimum of 130 days from the deadline for the receipt of tenders. The successful tenderers were also required to maintain the validity of their tenders for a further 60 days from the notification of the award of the contract. Given the high volume of tenders received, F4E took longer than 130 days in evaluating them, and the evaluation was concluded after the minimum validity period of the tenders had expired.

European Dynamics (ED) was once more a disappointed tenderer. Its offer was not included in the cascade mechanism of the framework agreement, which F4E intended to conclude with three alternative suppliers. Additionally to its standard arguments on failure to meet the duty to provide reasons (which, this time, do not constitute the core of the dispute), ED challenged the process claiming that by evaluating the tenders after their validity period had come to an end, F4E infringed the applicable rules [which require that [t]he invitation to tender ... shall at least … specify the period during which a tender will remain valid and may not be varied in any respect’] and treated ED in a discriminatory manner compared with other tenderers. The key argument submitted by ED is that
the principles of sound administration, transparency and equal treatment of tenderers require that no contract be awarded or signed in the event that one or more tenders are no longer valid in the course of the evaluation, unless the contracting authority officially requests and obtains an extension of the validity period of the tenders... Accordingly, it is a prerequisite for the validity of the evaluation of tenders and the award procedure that tenders be valid throughout the entire evaluation process, in order to ensure that the evaluator’s examination is impartial (T-553/13, para 18).
The GC rejects the argument on several points. Firstly, the GC stresses that the requirement to indicate a minimum tender validity does not impose 
an obligation on the contracting authority to complete the evaluation of a tender within the validity period of that tender. Whilst it is certainly in the interest of the contracting authority to complete its assessment before the expiry of the tenders’ validity period, exceeding that time-limit cannot render the procedure unlawful, nor can it constitute a ground for cancellation of the evaluation of the tenders (T-553/13, para 22).
The GC clarifies that 'the purpose of the validity period of tenders is to ensure that a tenderer does not vary his tender during the evaluation stage and that compliance with that period is not a condition sine qua non for the signature of contracts at the end of the award procedure' (T-553/13, para 24). 

The formulation of the second part of this clarification could lead to uncertainty, as it could be understood that a tender which validity period did not meet the minimum, or that was modified during that term, could still lead to award of the contract. That is not what the GC intends to indicate. In fact, the GC makes reference to the previous case Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, T-236/09, EU:T:2012:127, where that clarification was made in a different context. In that case, the GC ruled that
As regards the ... argument that the principles of transparency, good administration and equal treatment among tenderers preclude a contract being signed when one or more tenders are no longer valid, suffice it to say that the purpose of the period of validity of tenders is to ensure that a tenderer does not vary his tender during the evaluation stage ... it is not a condition sine qua non for the signature of contracts at the end of the award procedure. In the present case, the decisions to award the contracts were taken ... within the period of validity of the tenders. Moreover, the applicant merely states that signing the contract when one or more tenders are no longer valid is a breach of the principles of transparency, good administration and equal treatment, but does not explain in what way that constitutes a breach (T-236/09, para 40, emphasis added).
Therefore, the combined reading of para 24 of ED v E4F (T-553/13) and para 40 of ED v Commission (T-236/09) leads to the interpretation that the signature of the contract is not prevented by the fact that one or more tenders are no longer valid at that time. However, it also raises the issue of whether the tender chosen for the award of the contract must remain valid at the time of that decision (as T-236/09, para 40 suggests). The rest of the ED v E4F case discusses this in more detail. As the GC explains
25 ... the applicants may not regard evaluation of the tenders during their validity period as a condition of the validity of the tender procedure ...[the] claim that the principles of transparency, sound administration and equal treatment between tenderers preclude a contract from being concluded when one or more tenders is no longer valid must be rejected (see, to that effect, [T-236/09] paragraph 40).
26 Moreover, in so far as the applicants claim that F4E should have officially requested [ED] to extend the validity of its tender when it realised that the period in question was not long enough to complete the evaluation phase, it should be stressed that, whilst it is true that the contracting authority is entitled to request an extension of the validity period of tenders, it is not required to do so under any of the applicable provisions.
27 As F4E correctly notes, the only consequence that may arise from that provision for the contracting authority is that it cannot oblige a tenderer whose tender has expired to sign and perform a contract based on the conditions set out in that tender.
28 In addition, equal treatment between tenderers is ensured by evaluating all the tenders using the same evaluation criteria and comparing them with one another. If the validity period of the tenders is not one of the evaluation criteria, it could only lead to discrimination in respect of their evaluation if it were proved that a tender was not taken into account on the ground that it had expired ...
29 The file shows that the tenders of all tenderers were evaluated, including [ED]’s tender, and that that evaluation took place while the tenders were valid ...
30 In such circumstances, the mere fact that the final decision was adopted after that validity period had ended cannot render the award decision unlawful (T-553/13, paras 25-29, emphasis added).
In my view, the GC fails to take into account all possible scenarios of discrimination that could arise in such circumstances. It is true that not taking into account a tender for the purposes of evaluation on the ground that it had expired would constitute discriminatory treatment. However, it would also be discriminatory to allow undertakings that set a specific period of validity for their tender to waive it upon hearing that their tender was chosen for award. 

Thus, the argument that the contracting authority must ensure that all tenders remain valid throughout the period carries weight if one considers the strategic games that could ensue when tenderers whose offer has expired are allowed to extend them, particularly if that implicitly creates financial impacts that will (possibly) require modifications of the contract down the line (even if those modifications 'simply' result in the trigger of price revision clauses earlier than would have otherwise been expected).

In my view, the GC also fails to make proper use of the right to good administration. If a diligent contracting authority fails to evaluate the tenders it receives in good time to make sure that all of them remain valid when it aims to enter into the framework agreement or contract, it should (or, I would say, shall) actually request them to extend the validity of their offers. There is no reason to allow the contracting authority not to do so on the basis that "the only consequence ... is that it cannot oblige a tenderer whose tender has expired to sign and perform a contract based on the conditions set out in that tender". That would constitute very poor administration and would severely limit the ability of the contracting authority (and society at large, indirectly) to benefit from competitive outcomes leading to value for money due to its poor time and workload management. Thus, this does not seem to be a proper analysis under the principle of good administration.

On a related note, I think that the GC also got the wrong end of the stick when assessing instances where the contracting authority actually decides to request such extensions of the validity of offers when it realises that it cannot complete the evaluation and award the contract in time. In the previous ED v Commission case, the GC considered that "the fact that the [contracting authority] stated that it did not intend to cancel the tendering procedure in the event of a tenderer refusing to extend the validity of its tender does not mean that the [tenderer who was approach for an extension] was under pressure to agree to the request for extension" (T-236/09, para 39). From a business perspective, this simply makes no sense. Commercial pressure to extend offers should also be subjected to a high standard of assessment under the principle of good administration and the contracting authority should have very powerful reasons not to cancel the tender. The same reasoning that prevents contracting authorities to resort to urgency-based procedures due to situations they should have avoided applies here [see A Sanchez Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn, (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 435-436].

Overall, it seems to me that the GC is generally failing to incorporate commercial reality arguments into its judicial decision-making when it comes to this tricky issue of expiry of time-limited tenders during the evaluation process, or before award of the contract. I would thus support a change of tack in future cases, so that there is really no space for strategic games at that stage, and so that contracting authorities do not engage in business-like negotiations that they could (and should) have prevented by reacting earlier on during the evaluation period.

Joint Bidding and Subcontracting under EU Competition Law: Some critical comments on Thomas (2015)

Christopher Thomas has recently published the paper "Two Bids or not to Bid? An Exploration of the Legality of Joint Bidding and Subcontracting Under EU Competition Law" (2015) 6(9) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 629-638. It is interesting to read the paper, particularly while we await the decision of the CJEU in a pending matter where issues of public restrictions to subcontracting and their impact on competition for the public contract need to be addressed--Wrocław - Miasto na prawach powiatu, C-406/14 (for discussion of the Opinion of AG Sharpston, see here). 

Thomas' paper attempts to apply to the public procurement setting the general criteria used in competition law to assess joint bidding and subcontracting arrangements [something that I address in Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 336-340 and 353-355]. The arguments are grouped around two issues: (1) the subjection or not of joint bidding and subcontracting agreements to the prohibition of Art 101(1) TFEU, and (2) the possible exemptions to the prohibition under Art 101(3) TFEU.

(1) Applicability of Art 101(1) TFEU prohibition to joint bidding agreements
After providing some background on the international competition law approaches to joint bidding and subcontracting in procurement, Thomas tries to establish a test to assess whether those arrangements run contrary to EU competition law, and Art 101(1) TFEU more specifically, or not.

Thomas critically considers the general guidance offered by the European Commission regarding horizontal commercial cooperation agreements that are excluded from the application of Art 101(1) TFEU, whereby "consortia arrangements that allow the companies involved to participate in projects that they would not be able to undertake individually. As the parties to the consortia arrangement are therefore not potential competitors for implementing the project, there is no restriction of competition " (emphasis added). I interpret this guidance to mean that undertakings concluding joint bidding and teaming agreements should be able to prove that they can only submit a compliant tender if they participate together. Thomas takes the mirroring position.

He argues that the Commission's guidance is quite limited in practical terms because it "is simplest to apply in the situation of undertakings with expertise only in different products, all of which are required in order to bid for the contract in question. Clearly, such undertakings are not competitors, and their joint bid cannot raise competition concerns." However, he stresses that this is not the usual situation. 

Remarkably, he submits that the Commission's position "would ignore the possibility that each undertaking might nonetheless be able to submit an independent bid, by bringing in specialist resources from outside. If it were in fact feasible for each undertaking to submit a tender in this way, then surely it cannot be excluded that a joint bid would restrict competition. The real question is rather whether, in the absence of the joint bid, there could in fact have been two or more independent bids" (emphasis added). And, more specifically, he clarifies that "One possible approach to this issue would be to ask whether, in the ordinary course of business, each undertaking would normally bring in such resources from outside. Alternatively, and more precisely, are such resources demonstrably available on reasonable terms and in time to prepare and submit the tender, from an undertaking that is not a competitor in the procurement procedure?"

I find this line of argument exceedingly restrictive. Conceptually, because it relies on an assessment of whether the parties of the teaming/joint bidding agreement could have cooperated with other undertakings or complemented their capacities in a different way, which fundamentally and in itself proves the point that they were unable to submit bids individually or with a total independence from third parties. Once this is clear, I see no good reason for the assessment to rely on whether there were alternative potential partners, not least because this would require an excessive amount of second-guessing by procurement and competition authorities, who may not be the best placed to ex post query business decisions.

Discussing this issue further, Thomas emphasises that "it should be noted that the test is whether an independent bid is objectively possible, and demonstrating this does not require proof that it is easy, or even achievable without substantial sacrifices (such as giving up other projects to which relevant capacity is currently dedicated). Second, it is arguably sufficient in principle for the competition authority to demonstrate that the contract is of the general type carried out by the undertaking in the ordinary course of its activities" (emphasis added).

In my view, once again, his analysis of the type of joint bidding agreements not covered by Art 101(1) TFEU is too narrow and restrictive. It would be clearly excessive to consider undertakings 'objectively' able to submit an independent bid if, for instance, they need to give up alternative projects. Thus, generally, I disagree with his interpretation of the European Commission's guidance and the implicit requirements for a team/joint bidding arrangement not to be covered by Art 101(1) TFEU. 

I also disagree with his assessment of whether the joint bidding agreement needs to be analysed as either a restriction by object or by effect, particularly under the Cartes bancaires test. Given that the boundaries of that test are unclear and that it would only carry issues of burden of proof of anticompetitive effects (which need to be addressed anyway in view of the potential exemption of Art 101(3) TFEU, as discussed below), the discussion seems very superficial and practically unhelpful to me (for assessment of the by object/by effect division, see here). In any case, particularly under his approach, most cases will depend on the assessment of the applicability of the exemption of Art 101(3) TFEU to agreements caught by the prohibition of Art 101(1) TFEU.

(2) Applicability of Art 101(3) TFEU exemption to joint bidding agreements
As Thomas stresses, "Once the analysis has reached this stage, an approach needs to be found to balance the loss of competition with the objective benefits deriving from cooperation between the undertakings concerned." In my view, the test needs to be whether the joint bidders could actually submit a bid (ie there is an expansion of the pool of competitors for the given contract), or whether the terms of the joint tender are substantially better for the public buyer than those they could offer independently—ie, that there are specific and measurable efficiencies derived from the teaming or joint bidding strategy and that they are passed on to the public buyer. He generally agrees by stressing that "Where the joint bid offers no tangible performance benefit for the customer, when compared with the provision of the relevant products by one of the bidders acting alone, then the cooperating undertakings should be put to the full burden of proof."

Going beyond this, he engages in an interesting assessment of whether "the consent of the customer is either a necessary or a sufficient indicator of legality. After all, if the assessment is designed to balance the objective benefits of the cooperation with the loss of competition, who is better placed than the customer to make that judgement? It is submitted that the consent of the customer, while relevant, is neither necessary nor sufficient in itself". This is an interesting issue. However, Thomas' analysis is almost impossible to bring to practice under the applicable EU public procurement rules.

Thomas gives the following example:
It is therefore inappropriate for legality to depend on the discretion of the customer. Indeed, were this to be the case, then the customer might threaten to withhold its consent as a means of imposing commercial pressure precisely in the form of exposure to investigation by a competition authority. Thus customer consent should not be, in itself, a prerequisite for exemption under Article 101(3). On the other hand, if, before actually coordinating their intentions and exchanging any confidential information, two potential bidders approach the customer, explain the benefits that might be achieved from combining their efforts, and offer the customer the choice between a joint bid and two independent bids, and if the customer considers those alternatives and indicates that its preference is for a joint bid, then this is surely very relevant evidence for the purposes of Article 101(3). Indeed, in such circumstances, a court or competition authority would need to be very confident indeed if it envisaged forming a different view of the balance between the benefits from cooperation and the loss of competition (emphasis added).
This would simply infringe such a large number of EU public procurement that it is not worth engaging in the detail. In my view, this is one of the main risks of uncritically trying to extrapolate competition principles and criteria developed in a scenario of free bargaining inter privatos to settings of regulated tendering for public contracts. Therefore, most of what Thomas submits in his paper is actually of little or no relevance to public procurement practitioners, which should avoid engaging in too complex competition-related issues that, in reality, bear no relevance in the regulated setting. Generally, this shows a continued need for more procurement-specific guidance, and competition practitioners would be well advised to double check their arguments within the constraints created by the EU and domestic public procurement rules.

CJEU's new formulation of legal test to distinguish between anticompetitive agreements by object and by effect (C-345/14)

In its Judgment of 26 November 2015 in Maxima Latvija, C-345/14, EU:C:2015:784, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has returned to the debate on the distinction between anticompetitive agreements by object and by effect for the purposes of the application of Art 101(1) TFEU [for background commentary of the case, see here].

This is a field of EU competition law of notable and growing complexity, fundamentally due to the lack of clear demarcating lines between both types of anticompetitive conduct [see S King, Agreements that restrict competition by object under Article 101(1) TFEU: past, present and future (2015) PhD Thesis, London School of Economics]. 

Some of the consequences of the distinction remain obscure or highly theoretical, not least because Art 101(1) TFEU covers both types of anticompetitive practices, which should therefore be subjected to similar sanctions (moderated only by the magnitude of the effects, where they exist). Two main areas of debate have emerged, though, around the (practical) boundaries where the categorisation carries legal weight: on the one hand, the possibility to exempt de minimis "by object" infringements; and, on the other hand, the standard of proof applicable to "by object" anticompetitive conduct.

Regarding the possibility to exempt de minimis "by object" infringements, the debate focuses on the implications of the CJEU Judgment of 13 December 2012 in Expedia (C-226/11, EU:C:2012:795), as well as the guidelines issued by the Commission in trying to clarify the state of the law [see the Guidance on restrictions of competition "by object" for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice]. For the purposes of this discussion, it is worth stressing para 36, where the CJEU clarified that "the distinction between ‘infringements by object’ and ‘infringements by effect’ arises from the fact that certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition" (emphasis added).

Regarding the standard of proof applicable to cases concerning "by object" anticompetitive conduct, the discussion revolves around the Judgment of 11 September 2014 in CB v Commission ('Cartes bancaires'; C-67/13 P, EU:C:2014:2204) [for discussion from a legal perspective, see here; and for an economic perspective, see here]. The significance of the Cartes bancaires Judgment is commonly seen as resting in the recasting of the case law in para 51, where the CJEU ruled that "it is established that certain collusive behaviour, such as that leading to horizontal price-fixing by cartels, may be considered so likely to have negative effects, in particular on the price, quantity or quality of the goods and services, that it may be considered redundant, for the purposes of applying Article [101(1) TFEU], to prove that they have actual effects on the market" (emphasis added).

In its Judgment in Maxima Latvija, the CJEU has followed the same general approach to the delineation between anticompetitive practices by object and by effect, and has consolidated the Cartes bancaires test. More specifically, the CJEU has ruled that
18 ... the concept of restriction of competition ‘by object’ ... must be interpreted restrictively and can be applied only to certain types of coordination between undertakings which reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition that it may be found that there is no need to examine their effects ... That case-law arises from the fact that certain types of coordination between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition ...
19 ... certain collusive behaviour, such as that leading to horizontal price-fixing by cartels, may be considered by their nature as likely to have negative effects, in particular on the price, quantity or quality of the goods and services, so that it may be considered redundant, for the purposes of applying Article 101(1) TFEU, to prove that they have actual effects on the market ... Experience shows that such behaviour leads to falls in production and price increases, resulting in poor allocation of resources to the detriment, in particular, of consumers.
20 ... the essential legal criterion for ascertaining whether an agreement involves a restriction of competition ‘by object’ is ... the finding that such an agreement reveals in itself a sufficient degree of harm to competition for it to be considered that it is not appropriate to assess its effects (C-345/14, paras 18-20, references omitted and emphasis added).
In my view, the formulation of this test is conceptually appealing. However, it is equally problematic because it relies on a test of 'balance of economic probabilities' that actually requires, in most cases, at least a quick look at the effects the anticompetitive practice has (or could have) generated. In terms of alleviating the burden of proof, this is less than clear cut. These complications are self-evident in the Maxima Latvija Judgment itself, where the CJEU applies this newly (re)formulated test as follows:
21 ... Maxima Latvija [an operator of large shops and hypermarkets] is not in a competitive situation with the shopping centres with which it has concluded the [lease] agreements at issue in the main proceedings. Although ... a fact of that nature in no way precludes an agreement from containing a restriction of competition ‘by object’ ... it must, however, be stated that the agreements at issue in the main proceedings are not among the agreements which it is accepted may be considered, by their very nature, to be harmful to the proper functioning of competition ...
22 Even if the clause at issue in the main proceedings could potentially have the effect of restricting the access of Maxima Latvija’s competitors to some shopping centres in which that company operates a large shop or hypermarket, such a fact, if established, does not imply clearly that the agreements containing that clause prevent, restrict or distort, by the very nature of the latter, competition on the relevant market, namely the local market for the retail food trade.
23 Taking account of the economic context in which agreements ... are to be applied, the analysis of the content of those agreements would not ... show, clearly, a degree of harm with regard to competition sufficient for those agreements to be considered to constitute a restriction of competition ‘by object’ within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU (C-345/14, paras 21-23, references omitted and emphasis added).
Looking at the application of the test in the Maxima Latvija case, two difficulties emerge. Firstly, there is no existing list of anticompetitive agreements by object (neither an open, closed or indicative list). This creates a significant complication and legal uncertainty, not least because of the potentially moving target of what constitutes "agreements which it is accepted may be considered, by their very nature, to be harmful to the proper functioning of competition".

Secondly, there is no clear indication as to what "degree of harm" (ie presumed anticompetitive effects) suffices to allow for an agreement to be categorised as "by object" rather than by effect. The need to consider the anticompetitive agreements in the "the economic context in which [those] agreements ... are to be applied" is a puzzling requirement from a legal perspective. If (one of) the main point(s) concerning the distinction between anticompetitive agreements "by object" and "by effect" is to clarify the burden of proof required for each of them (implicitly, in order to reduce the requirements for a finding of an anticompetitive agreement "by object"), then this requirement does not really help and ends up resulting in a slippery slope of relaxation of requirements depending on the general consensus (?) that some agreements are by their nature harmful.

Given the ongoing uncertainty, the test for the distinction between anticompetitive agreements by object and by effect is not likely to reduce litigation at all. Overall, then, this seems to be a never-ending discussion. In terms of legal simplicity, it could be preferable to return to a state of the law where it was clear that Art 101(1) TFEU covers both types of anticompetitive practices and triggers an enforcement procedure that needs to comply with the same requirements, regardless of whether ex post and in a specific case, it may look like some of the probatory efforts could have been spared. 

The classical justification for per se prohibitions and not rule of reason approaches is fundamentally based on enforcement costs--and that is, at least in part, why they are progressively abandoned in the US (see here). It seems clear to me that trying to create that distinction in this area is, unfortunately, not leading to any savings and, in that case, it may be worth avoiding a shaky per se rule...

CJEU decouples limitation periods for award challenges and for damages actions in EU public procurement (C-166/14)

In its Judgment in MedEval, C-166/14, EU:C:2015:779, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has clarified the rules on the establishment of limitation periods applicable to damages actions based on the infringement of EU public procurement rules. The CJEU has interpreted the EU Remedies Directive in a way that excludes the establishment of absolute time periods. In particular, the CJEU has ruled that , when it comes to damages actions for breach of EU public procurement rules, the establishment of an absolute 6-month limitation period from the day after the date of the award of the public contract in question runs contrary to the principle of effectiveness of EU law. 

In the case at hand, which concerned Austrian procurement rules, actions seeking damages for the illegal award of a public contract could only be derived or of a follow-on nature. That is, damages actions were conditional upon a prior declaration by the competent procurement supervisory authority that the implementation of a public procurement procedure without prior notice or without prior call for competition was unlawful. Such original action, from which the damages claim could only derive, had to be lodged within 6 months of the day following the date of the award of the contract. As a result of this dual requirement, and even if no specific time period was foreseen for damages actions themselves, the latter were absolutely time barred at the expiry of a 6-month period from the day after the date of the award of the public contract.

MedEval challenged this implicit or indirect absolute 6-month limitation period for the exercise of damages claims on the basis that it made it particularly difficult, if not totally impossible, to challenge direct awards that were never disclosed to the public. Under Austrian law, and under a strict interpretation of those cumulative requirements, it would be possible for a contracting authority to enter into an illegal direct award and shield itself from any liability in damages, provided only that it could keep such illegal direct award secret for 6 months. 

In MedEval's view, it should be possible for disappointed bidders to challenge illegal direct awards and obtain reparation in damages provided they acted promptly from the moment when they became aware of the unlawfulness of the procedure at issue. Ultimately, as the referring court stressed, that would be in line with the Judgment in Uniplex (UK) (C-406/08, EU:C:2010:45), according to which the period for bringing proceedings to obtain damages should start to run from the date on which the claimant knew, or ought to have known, of that alleged infringement.

The CJEU has accepted such an approach and has stressed that, indeed, the establishment of absolute limitation periods would have a very negative impact on the effectiveness of EU public procurement law. In the MedEval Judgment, the CJEU reasoned that
35 As regards actions for damages, it must be noted that Directive 89/665 provides ... that Member States may provide that where damages are claimed, the contested decision must first be set aside ‘by a body having the necessary powers’ without, however, laying down a rule as regards the time-limits for bringing actions or other conditions for the admissibility of such actions.
36 In the present case it appears, in principle, that ... Directive 89/665 does not preclude a provision of national law ... under which a claim for damages is admissible only if there has been a prior finding of an infringement of procurement law. However, the combined application [of the 6-month time limit applicable to that prior action] ... has the effect that an action for damages is inadmissible in the absence of a prior decision finding that the public procurement procedure for the contract in question was unlawful, where the action for a declaration of unlawfulness is subject to a six-month limitation period which starts to run on the day after the date of the award of the public contract in question, irrespective of whether or not the applicant was in a position to know of the unlawfulness affecting that award decision.
37 ... it is for the Member States to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for damages. Those detailed procedural rules must, however, be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, judgments in eVigilo, C-538/13, EU:C:2015:166, paragraph 39, and Orizzonte Salute, C-61/14, EU:C:2015:655, paragraph 46).
38 In consequence, it is necessary to examine whether the principles of effectiveness and equivalence preclude a national rule such as that set out in paragraph 36 of the present judgment.
39 As regards the principle of effectiveness, it is appropriate to point out that the degree of necessity for legal certainty concerning the conditions for the admissibility of actions is not identical for actions for damages and actions seeking to have a contract declared ineffective.
40 Rendering a contract concluded following a public procurement procedure ineffective puts an end to the existence and possibly the performance of that contract, which constitutes a significant intervention by the administrative or judicial authority in the contractual relations between individuals and State bodies. Such a decision can thus cause considerable upset and financial losses not only to the successful tenderer for the public contract in question, but also to the awarding authority and, consequently, to the public, the end beneficiary of the supply of work or services under the public contract in question. ... the EU legislature placed greater importance on the requirement for legal certainty as regards actions for a declaration that a contract is ineffective than as regards actions for damages.
41 Making the admissibility of actions for damages subject to a prior finding that the public procurement procedure for the contract in question was unlawful because of the lack of prior publication of a contract notice, where the action for a declaration of unlawfulness is subject to a six-month limitation period, irrespective of whether or not the person harmed knew that there had been an infringement of a rule of law, is likely to render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of the right to bring an action for damages.
42 Where there has been no prior publication of a contract notice, such a limitation period of six months is likely not to enable a person harmed to gather the necessary information with a view to a possible action, thus preventing that action from being brought.
43 Awarding damages to persons harmed by an infringement of the public procurement rules constitutes one of the remedies guaranteed under EU law. Thus, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the person harmed is deprived not only of the possibility of having the awarding authority’s decision annulled, but also of all the remedies provided for in ... Directive 89/665.
44 Consequently, the principle of effectiveness precludes a system such as that at issue in the main proceedings (C-166/14, paras 35-44, emphasis added).
This Judgment is particularly important for jurisdictions that set absolute time limits for the start of proceedings, particularly if they create similar cumulative effects of definitely time-barring actions for damages based on infringements of EU public procurement law (ie where damages actions are necessarily of a derivative or follow-on nature). Those jurisdictions will likely need to change their procedural rules to adapt to MedEval

In the UK, however, there seems to be no need to reform reg.92 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015, which already establishes time periods based on the the starting point of when the economic operator first knew or ought to have known that grounds for starting the proceedings had arisen (see here).

New paper with extended comments on EasyPay from a public procurement perspective (C-185/14)

Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui, from the Faculty of Law of the University of Bergen, and I have just uploaded on SSRN a new paper where we offer comments from a public procurement perspective on the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 22 October 2015 in EasyPay and Finance Engineering, C-185/14, EU:C:2015:716 (for an initial reaction, see here).

As the abstract details,
In EasyPay and Finance Engineering (C-185/14), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has revisited the concept of undertaking for the purposes of the application of EU competition law. It has clarified the test applicable to economic agents engaging in ‘mixed’ economic and non-economic activities. The EasyPay test determines that, in order not to be qualified as “economic” because of its links with another activity that fulfils an exclusively social function based on the principle of solidarity and entirely non-profit making, an activity must, by its nature, its aims and the rules to which it is subject, be inseparably connected to it. In the paper, we discuss how the CJEU has arguably given a stricter interpretation and adopted a less lenient approach to the severability or separation of activities than in previous cases like FENIN, Selex or Compass-Datenbank. In our view, this interpretation is anchored on a functional analysis of the concept of undertaking, and it is a welcome development that will have far reaching implications.

Beyond that general discussion, the paper focuses on the potential implications of the EasyPay test in the area of public procurement and, in particular, for the activities of central purchasing bodies. We submit that EasyPay facilitates a revision of the current position regarding the direct applicability of EU competition law to entities carrying out public procurement activities and, in particular, central purchasing bodies. We also submit that this is highly desirable because it grants legal certainty to economic operators when dealing with a central purchasing body, to the effect that the purchasing activities will be under competition law and the derived constrains on the market behaviour of large public buyers that may abuse of their buyer power.
The paper is available as: Sanchez-Graells, Albert and Herrera Anchustegui, Ignacio, Revisiting the Concept of Undertaking from a Public Procurement Law Perspective – A Discussion on Easypay and Finance Engineering (C-185/14) (November 26, 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2695742.

Legitimate expectations claims and EU State aid rules after SAM: some thoughts

One of the points I raised in my paper "Digging Itself Out of the Hole? A Critical Assessment of the European Commission's Attempt to Revitalise State Aid Enforcement after the Crisis" concerned the treatment of legitimate expectations claims in EU State aid enforcement proceedings in the scenario created by the State Aid Modernisation (SAM). In probably not very clear terms, I submitted that
... the Commission will most likely not have the upper hand in withdrawal procedures where Member States (and beneficiaries) will raise important issues related to due process guarantees and good administration duties that limit the Commission’s leeway—unless the old mantra that ‘there is no legitimate expectation to be protected in the field of State aid so as to trump the application of Article 107(1) TFEU’ is extended and applied in an absolute manner—which I do not think possible after the Treaty of Lisbon granted binding force to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights[68] and, in particular, to the rights to good administration (Art 41)[69] and to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (Art 47).[70]

[68] Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/389. The specific reasons for this assessment exceed the scope of this paper. For discussion, see R Luja, “Does the Modernisation of State Aid Control Put Legal Certainty and Simplicity at Risk” (2012) EStAL 765-66.
[69] P Craig, “Article 41 – Right to Good Administration”, in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner and A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Oxford, Hart, 2014) 1069-98.
[70] P Aalto et al, “Article 47 – Right to an Effective Remedy and to a Fair Trial”, in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner and A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Oxford, Hart, 2014) 1197-275.
I was rightly challenged on this point by an anonymous reviewer, to whom I am grateful for the opportunity to rethink and expand my arguments on the treatment of legitimate expectations claims for the purposes of State aid enforcement after SAM. I have now addressed the comments and, in the final version of the paper (hopefully soon to be published in the Journal of Antitrust Enforcement), I now explain in more detail what I meant. I hope the argument is now easier to share or, at least, more strongly supported.
... the Commission will most likely not have the upper hand in withdrawal procedures where Member States (and beneficiaries) are likely to raise important issues related to due process guarantees and good administration duties that can limit the Commission’s leeway.[78] It is generally accepted that the principle of legal certainty is one of the general principles recognised in the EU legal order,[79] and that this principle and the corollary protection of legitimate expectations are binding on the Member States and the EU Institutions when they implement EU rules.[80] Nonetheless, the traditional position in this area has been to consider that ‘there is no legitimate expectation to be protected in the field of State aid so as to trump the application of Article 107(1) TFEU’.[81] This has been repeatedly criticised as an inconsistency in the development of the principle of legal certainty and its corollary, the protection of legitimate expectations, in the area of EU State aid law as compared to general EU law.[82] Furthermore, this old mantra may well have been significantly eroded by the entry into effect of the Treaty of Lisbon,[83] which granted binding force to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights[84] and, in particular, to the rights to good administration (Art 41)[85] and to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (Art 47).[86] Any attempt to transfer the pre-Lisbon ‘no protection of legitimate expectations in State aid law’ paradigm to the post-Lisbon, post GBER paradigm is problematic. The Commission may be tempted to insist that nothing has changed and that, consequently, arguments of legal certainty cannot restrict its ability to dis-apply BER coverage ex post. That would push the old mantra to its extremes and, in my view, would break it. Relatively recent clarifications by the CJEU have tried to establish a balance, whereby recipients of State aid cannot claim legitimate expectations protection if, being diligent, they should have been capable of determining whether or not the EU procedure leading to the award of the aid was complied with or not.[87] Thus, the argument ultimately rests on the observability of the Commission’s ex ante intervention or the absence of such mandatory intervention, where prescribed by EU law (ie Arts 107 and 108 TFEU). In the case of BER protection, this is highly problematic because the restriction of any substantive analysis by the Commission to an ex post phase by necessity requires the recipient to rely on the Member States’ assessment of the BER. As the CJEU has also clarified, ‘a person may not plead breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations unless he has been given precise assurances by the competent authority’.[88] A contrario, such assurances by the Member State as a co-enforcer of EU State aid law in the new post 2014 GBER paradigm may well trigger significant levels of protection of those legitimate expectations.[89] It is submitted, this is likely to increase the weight given to arguments based on legitimate expectations and legal certainty, particularly in the case of attempts to withdraw BER coverage based on a Commission’s ex post assessment that runs contrary to arguments of reasonable reliance (by recipients) on Member State-supported interpretations of the applicable BER,[90] particularly if it derives from a stricter interpretation of the EU State aid rules.[91] This arguments, or at least litigation based on these arguments, can add more layers of ineffectiveness to the post 2014 GBER paradigm based on more withdrawal procedures.
[78] Indeed, this argument is frequently raised in State aid litigation before the EU Courts. For a recent example, see Opinion of AG Whatelet in A2A SpA v Agenzia delle Entrate, C-89/14, U:C:2015:211, paras 44 to 53. However, the AG Whatelet rejected the arguments on the basis of reasons similar to those criticised in the main text.
[79] ISD Polska and Others v Commission, C-369/09 P, EU:C:2011:175, para 122.
[80] Gerekens and Procola, C-459/02, EU:C:2004:454, paras 21 to 24.
[81] However, this is not warranted upon closer examination of the case law, as demonstrated by A Giraud, “A study of the notion of legitimate expectations in State aid recovery proceedings: ‘Abandon all hope, ye who enter here’?” (2008) 45(5) CMLRev 1399-1431.
[82] See T Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, OUP, 2006, repr. 2009) 296; W Weiβ and M Haberkamm, “Legitimate expectations in state aid and the CFI” (2010) 9(2) EStAL 537; A Winckler and FC Laprévote, “Reconciling legal certainty, legitimate expectations, equal treatment and the prohibition of state aids” (2011) 10(2) EStAL 321-326.
[83] Similarly, see E Fink, “The Possibility of Protection of Legitimate Expectations in Recovery of Unlawful State Aid” (2013) 1 Juridica International 133-141.
[84] Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/389. The specific reasons for this assessment exceed the scope of this paper. For discussion, see R Luja, “Does the Modernisation of State Aid Control Put Legal Certainty and Simplicity at Risk” (2012) EStAL 765-66.
[85] P Craig, “Article 41 – Right to Good Administration”, in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner and A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Oxford, Hart, 2014) 1069-98.
[86] P Aalto et al, “Article 47 – Right to an Effective Remedy and to a Fair Trial”, in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner and A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Oxford, Hart, 2014) 1197-275.
[87] Fink (n 83) 136, with reference to France Télécom v Commission, C-81/10 P, EU:C:2011:811, para 59.
[88] AJD Tuna, C-221/09, EU:C:2011:153, para 72; Agrargenossenschaft Neuzelle, C-545/11, EU:C:2013:169, para 25.
[89] At least, where the interpretation by the Member State was reasonable, in line with the original case law in the area of State liability as per The Queen v H.M. Treasury, ex parte British Telecommunications, C-392/93, EU:C:1996:131, para 43 in particular.
[90] The situation is not completely different to that of reliance on legal advisors’ advice, which could erode the argument by reference to Schenker & Co. and Others, C-681/11, EU:C:2013:404. However, this is clearly a controversial area of EU procedural law that requires future developments. In my view, a new wave of protection of legitimate expectations can be expected, particularly where domestic constitutional principles of protection of legitimate expectations as part of the right to good administration are engaged. For discussion, see R Bousta, 'Who Said There is a ‘Right to Good Administration’? A Critical Analysis of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union' (2013) 19(3) European Public Law 481-488.
[91] Fink (n 83) 139, with reference to Alcoa Trasformazioni v Commission, C-194/09 P, EU:C:2011:497.

Restrictions on subcontracting under EU public procurement rules: à-propos the Opinion of AG Sharpston (C-406/14)

(c) Gregory Fox
In her Opinion of 17 November 2015 in Wrocław - Miasto na prawach powiatu, C-406/14, EU:C:2015:761, Advocate General Sharpston assessed to what extent contracting authorities tendering contracts under the EU public procurement rules can limit the percentage of the contract that the winning tenderer can subcontract to third parties. The Judgment in this case will be important because it addresses an area of EU public procurement law bound to be of growing relevance, particularly if Member States develop the supply-chain related tools that Directive 2014/24 has created in Art 71 (see here). It will also be important because it technically deviates from previous cases on reliance on third party capacities (comments here).

In the case at hand, the contracting authority imposed a requirement whereby '[t]he economic operator is required to perform at least 25% of the works covered by the contract using its own resources'. In her Opinion, AG Sharpston proposes that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) declares that such requirement runs contrary to EU public procurement law--ie that Directive 2004/18 on public procurement precluded a contracting authority from stipulating in the tender specifications of a public works contract that the successful tenderer is required to perform part of the works covered by that contract, specified in abstract terms as a percentage (in that case, 25%), using its own resources.

Given that the specific circumstances of the case did not allow for an assessment of the subcontracting requirement at the stage of qualitative selection (which was the approach followed by previous case law, see paras 36-37), AG Sharpston's analysis rests heavily on Art 25 of Directive 2004/18, according to which
In the contract documents, the contracting authority may ask ... the tenderer to indicate in his tender any share of the contract he may intend to subcontract to third parties and any proposed subcontractors. This indication shall be without prejudice to the question of the principal economic operator's liability.
The reasoning of AG Sharpston would apply equally to Directive 2014/24, which Art  71 reiterates the same rules in paras 2 and 4. In that regard, it is interesting to stress how, in AG Sharpston's view,
30 Directive 2004/18 is designed not only to avoid obstacles to freedom to provide services in the award of public service contracts or public works contracts but also to guarantee the opening-up of public procurement to competition. Recital 32 in the preamble to that directive states that the possibility of subcontracting is liable to encourage small and medium-sized undertakings to get involved in the public contracts procurement market. Subcontracting enables such undertakings to participate in tendering procedures and to be awarded public contracts regardless of the size of those contracts. Subcontracting thus contributes to achieving the directive’s objectives by increasing the number of potential candidates for the award of public contracts.
31. Accordingly, Article 25 of Directive 2004/18 not only envisages that a tenderer may subcontract part of the contract but also sets no limit in that regard. Indeed, Directive 2004/18 confirms explicitly that an economic operator may, where appropriate and for a particular contract, rely on the economic, financial, technical and/or professional capacities of other entities, regardless of the legal nature of the links which it has with them. Consequently, a party may not be eliminated from a procedure for the award of a public service contract solely because it proposes, in order to carry out the contract, to use resources which are not its own but belong to one or more other entities. 
32. That said, contracting authorities do have a legitimate interest in ensuring that the contract will be effectively and properly carried out. Where an economic operator intends to rely on capacities of other economic operators in a tendering procedure, it must therefore establish that it actually will have at its disposal the resources of those operators which it does not itself own and whose participation is necessary to perform the contract. A tenderer claiming to have at its disposal the technical and economic capacities of third parties on which it intends to rely if it obtains the contract may be excluded by the contracting authority only if it fails to meet that requirement. 
33. The contracting authority may not always be in a position to verify the technical and economic capacities of the subcontractors when examining the tenders and selecting the lowest tenderer. The Court has held that in such cases Directive 2004/18 does not preclude a prohibition or a restriction on subcontracting the performance of essential parts of the contract. Such a prohibition or restriction is justified by the contracting authority’s legitimate interest in ensuring that the public contract will be effectively and properly carried out. Directive 2004/18 does not require a contracting authority to accept performance of essential parts of the public contract by entities whose capacities and qualities it has been unable to assess during the contract award procedure.
34. In my view, considering the essential role subcontracting plays in promoting the objectives of Directive 2004/18, no other prohibition or restriction is permissible. It is true that, in Swm Costruzioni 2 and Mannocchi Luigino, the Court considered that there may be works with special requirements necessitating a certain capacity which cannot be obtained by combining the capacities of more than one operator which individually would be unable to perform that work. In those specific circumstances, the Court has held that the contracting authority is justified in requiring that the minimum capacity level concerned be achieved by a single economic operator or, where appropriate, by relying on a limited number of economic operators ... as long as that requirement is related and proportionate to the subject-matter of the contract at issue. However, that is not a specific ground for prohibiting or restricting subcontracting as such. Nothing precludes that ‘single economic operator’ or ‘limited number of economic operators’ from being a subcontractor or subcontractors of the successful tenderer(s).
35. It follows that a stipulation such as that in issue in the main proceedings [ie that the economic operator is required to perform at least 25% of the works covered by the contract using its own resources] is clearly not consistent with Directive 2004/18 (Opinion in C-406/14, paras 30-35, references omitted and emphasis added).
In my view, this proposed interpretation should be generally welcome, not least because the imposition of this sort of requirements could neutralise the open-ended character of the qualitative selection phase through the back door. I developed some thoughts regarding subcontracting in Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 353-355, where I reached the complementary and compatible conclusion that 'contracting authorities should refrain from mandating or inducing subcontracting (in particular, by using the percentage of subcontracted work as an award criterion)'. A contrario, as AG Sharpston proposed, contracting authorities should also be prohibited from imposing a 'ceiling' on the amount of work to be subcontracted.


More generally, I would submit that contracting authorities generally do not have much to say about the distribution of works between a contractor and its subcontractors. They can insist on mechanisms that ensure proper expertise, actual availability of means, proper mechanisms of liability (of the prime contractor and any subcontractors). They can also implement measures to monitor the supply-chain, particularly as legal compliance is concerned (provided they have the expertise and resources to do so). However, they seem not to be in a good position to intervene in the market by choosing some productive structure (of minimum or maximum vertical integration) over others. 

Thus, the CJEU would do well in following AG Sharpston's advice and, more generally, in clarifying the limited role of rules on subcontracting for the purposes of imposing specific productive structures (if they can have any role in that regard at all).

Are English Universities likely to stop having to comply with EU public procurement law?

One of the elements implicit in the on-going discussion about higher education reform in England concerns the extent to which changes in the funding and governance structure of HEFCE (to be transformed into the Office for Students, or any other format that results from the consultation run by BIS) can free English universities from their duty to comply with EU public procurement law. 

The issue is recurring in the subsequent waves of higher education reform in England, and the same debate arouse last summer following BIS statements that the most recent reform (lifting the cap on student numbers) would relieve English universities of their duty to comply with EU public procurement law (see discussion here).

Overall, then, there is a clear need to clarify to what extent English universities are actually and currently obliged to comply with EU public procurement rules, both as buyers and as providers of services. That analysis can then inform the extent to which in the future English universities are likely to remain under a duty to comply with EU public procurement rules.

In this study we provide an up-to-date assessment of situations in which universities are bound by public procurement rules, as well as the combined changes that market-based university financing mechanisms can bring about in relation to the regulation of university procurement and to the treatment of the financial support they receive under the EU State aid rules. National differences in funding schemes are likely to trigger different answers in different EU jurisdictions. This study uses the situation of English universities as a case study.
The first part focuses on the role of universities as buyers. The traditional position has been to consider universities bound by EU public procurement rules either as state authorities, or because they receive more than 50% public funding. In the latter case, recent changes in the funding structure can create opportunities for universities to free themselves from compliance with EU public procurement rules.
In the second part, we assess the position of universities as providers. Here the traditional position has been that the State can directly mandate universities to conduct teaching and research activities. However, new EU legislation contains specific provisions about how and when teaching and research need to be procured if they are of an economic nature. Thus, accepting the exclusion of university services from procurement requirements as a rule of thumb is increasingly open to legal challenge.
Finally, the study assesses if and in how far universities can benefit from exemptions for public-public cooperation or in-house arrangements either as sellers or buyers. 
The full paper is available on SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2692966.

We have submitted our piece of research to BIS as part of the consultation on the green paper. We hope that our research and the insights it sheds can inform the discussion on the new mechanisms for the allocation of the teaching grant to English universities (and particularly the discussion around Q18 of the consultation).

CJEU clarifies and minimises Rüffert, and expands scope for minimum wage requirements in public procurement (C-115/14)

In its much awaited Judgment of 17 November 2015 in RegioPost, C-115/14, EU:C:2015:760, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has allowed for the imposition of minimum wage requirements as special performance conditions in public procurement covered by the EU rules. 

Interestingly, the CJEU achieves this result despite deviating from the proposal of AG Mengozzi, who also advocated for more scope for minimum wage clauses, but on very different legal grounds (discussed here).  It is also worth stressing that the case is decided on the basis of Art 26 of Directive 20014/18, but the reasoning is equally applicable to the new rules under Art 70 of Directive 2014/24

The RegioPost Judgment is particularly significant for its deviation from the restrictive approach to the use of minimum wage requirements in public procurement that was established by Rüffert, C-346/06, EU:C:2008:189 and Bundesdruckerei, C-549/13, EU:C:2014:2235. Thus, it is worth analysing the reasoning of the CJEU in detail, particularly to determine to what extent RegioPost restricts the effects of the previous line of cases in this area.

It is worth reminding that,according to Rhineland-Palatinate's regional legislation (ie at Länder-level, as opposed to Federal-level which did not at the relevant time regulate minimum wage), public contracts could not be awarded to tenderers that did not commit to pay a gross minimum hourly wage of €8,70 to the workers involved in the execution of the contract. This minimum wage requirement was challenged on the basis of several grounds (see here for further background).

In specific legal terms, the main question addressed to the CJEU was to determine 'whether Article 26 of Directive 2004/18 must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a regional entity of a Member State ... which requires tenderers and their subcontractors to undertake, by means of a written declaration to be enclosed with their tender, to pay staff who are called upon to perform the services covered by the public contract in question a minimum wage laid down in that legislation' (C-115/14, para 53).

In order to answer this question, the CJEU engages in a step-by-step approach were, after confirming that the minimum wage requirement creates a special performance condition covered by Art 26 Dir 2004/18 (and now Art 70 Dir 2014/24) and that it is not discriminatory, it determines to what extent such requirement can be assessed under the requirements of EU primary law. 

In that regard, the CJEU is clear in subjecting minimum wage requirements to EU primary law on the basis that the procurement Directive does not lay down exhaustive rules in respect of special conditions relating to the performance of contracts and, therefore, this is not a field that has been exhaustively harmonised at EU level and minimum wage requirements must not only be assessed in the light of the provisions of the Directive, but also in the light of the primary law of the European Union (C-115/14, paras  57-59).

The CJEU then engages in such assessment of compatibility of minimum wage requirements with primary EU law, but does so by reference to Directive 96/71 on the posting of workers (PWD), which had been rejected by AG Mengozzi (here). This is interesting in itself because, in my view, EU primary law does not cover a Directive such as the PWD. However, the analysis that the CJEU carries out does not seem to attach particular relevance to the actual primary or secondary law nature of the PWD [for critical discussion of similar issues, see P Syrpis, 'The relationship between primary and secondary law in the EU' (2015) 52(2) Common Market Law Review 461-487].

It is also interesting because of the route that leads the CJEU to resort to the analysis of the situation under the PWD as a benchmark for the legality of the minimum wage requirement. As the CJEU explains,
60 ... in accordance with recital 34 to Directive 2004/18, in examining whether the national measure ... is compatible with EU law, it is necessary to determine whether, in cross-border situations in which workers from one Member State provide services in another Member State for the purpose of performing a public contract, the minimum conditions laid down in Directive 96/71 are observed in the host member State in respect of posted workers (C-115/14, para 60, emphasis added).
This is also remarkable because the CJEU resorts to the recital of the procurement Directive in order to engage the PWD, rather than directly identifying the applicability of the PWD to the case [cf Casa Fleischhandel v BALM, C-215/88, EU:C:1989:331, para 31].

Once the analysis is framed in terms of the PWD, the CJEU basis its arguments on compliance with Art 3(1) PWD, according to which 'Member States shall ensure that, whatever the law applicable to the employment relationship ... undertakings ... guarantee workers posted to their territory the terms and conditions of employment covering the following matters which, in the Member State where the work is carried out, are laid down: by law, regulation or administrative provision, ... (c) the minimum rates of pay'. The CJEU considers that the requirement at issue in RegioPost meets all these conditions. It further clarifies that it is compatible with EU law more generally despite applying only to public contracts and not to private contracts. It does so by stressing that:
62 ... contrary to the Law of the Land Niedersachsen on the award of public contracts at issue in the case that gave rise to the judgment in Rüffert (C-346/06, EU:C:2008:189), a provision such as [Rhineland-Palatinate's regional legislation] itself lays down the minimum rate of pay...
63 That categorisation cannot be called in question on the basis that the national measure in question applies to public contracts and not to private contracts, since the condition as to universal application defined in the first subparagraph of Article 3(8) of Directive 96/71 applies only to the collective agreements or arbitration awards referred to in the second indent of the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of that directive.
64 Moreover, since the national measure at issue in the main proceedings falls within the scope of Article 26 of Directive 2004/18, which permits, subject to certain conditions, the imposition of a minimum wage in public contracts, that measure cannot be required to extend beyond that specific field by applying generally to all contracts, including private contracts.
65 The limitation of the scope of the national measure to public contracts is the simple consequence of the fact that there are rules of EU law specific to that field, in this case, those laid down in Directive 2004/18.
66 It follows that Article 26 of Directive 2004/18, read in conjunction with Directive 96/71, permits the host Member State to lay down, in the context of the award of a public contract, a mandatory rule for minimum protection referred to in point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of that directive ... which requires undertakings established in other Member States to comply with an obligation in respect of a minimum rate of pay for the benefit of their workers posted to the territory of the host Member State in order to perform that public contract. Such a rule is part of the level of protection which must be guaranteed to those workers (see, to that effect, judgment in Laval un Partneri, C-341/05, EU:C:2007:809, paragraphs 74, 80 and 81).
67 That interpretation of Article 26 of Directive 2004/18 is confirmed, furthermore, by a reading of that provision in the light of Article 56 TFEU, since that directive seeks in particular to bring about the freedom to provide services, which is one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty (see, by analogy, judgment in Rüffert, C-346/06, EU:C:2008:189, paragraph 36) (C-115/14, paras 62-67, emphasis added).
This is remarkable because, at this stage, the CJEU fills in the requirement for the special performance conditions to be compatible with EU law under Art 26 Dir 2004/18 (Art 70 Dir 2014/24) with reference to the PWD only. It then goes on to assess the need to such measures to also comply with Art 56 TFEU in the following terms:
69 ... according to the case-law of the Court, the imposition, under national legislation, of a minimum wage on tenderers and their subcontractors, if any, established in a Member State other than that of the contracting authority and in which minimum rates of pay are lower constitutes an additional economic burden that may prohibit, impede or render less attractive the provision of their services in the host Member State. Consequently, a measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings is capable of constituting a restriction within the meaning of Article 56 TFEU (see to that effect, inter alia, judgment in Bundesdruckerei, C-549/13, EU:C:2014:2235, paragraph 30).

70 Such a national measure may, in principle, be justified by the objective of protecting workers (see, to that effect, judgment in Bundesdruckerei, C-549/13, EU:C:2014:2235, paragraph 31).

71 However, as the referring court has observed, the question arises whether it follows from ... Rüffert ... that such a justification cannot be accepted on the grounds that the minimum wage ... applies to public contracts only, and not to private contracts.

72 That question calls for a negative answer.

73 It is clear from ... Rüffert ... that although the Court concluded, in the context of the examination of the national measure at issue in the case that gave rise to that judgment in the light of Article 56 TFEU, that that measure could not be justified by the objective of the protection of workers, it based that conclusion on certain characteristics specific to that measure, which clearly distinguish that measure from the national measure at issue in the main proceedings.

74 Thus, ... in Rüffert ... the Court based its conclusion on the finding that what was at issue in the case that gave rise to that judgment was a collective agreement applying solely to the construction sector, which did not cover private contracts and had not been declared universally applicable. Furthermore, the Court observed that the rate of pay set by that collective agreement exceeded the minimum rate of pay applicable to that sector ...

75 The minimum rate of pay imposed by the measure at issue in the main proceedings is laid down in a legislative provision, which, as a mandatory rule for minimum protection, in principle applies generally to the award of any public contract in the Land of Rhineland-Palatinate, irrespective of the sector concerned (C-115/14, paras 69-75, emphasis added).
This effort to distinguish Rüffert is remarkable and the CJEU has fundamentally back-tracked from its restrictive line of case law when it comes to the use of public procurement for social policy purposes. The way it distinguished Rüffert from RegioPost is coated in very technical terms under the PWD, but the key point in my view is that the CJEU is willing to sacrifice important non-discrimination issues and a major excuse for shadow economic protectionism at the altar of a politically-charged move to facilitate the politicised use of public procurement.

Indeed, by minimising the non-discrimination requirements of Rüffert, the CJEU has opened the door to very significant distortions of competition between undertakings engaged in the performance of public contracts and those that provide goods and services in private markets, as well as distortions in employee protection for those hired by undertakings to perform public contracts and those hired to perform private contracts. This is likely to create further litigation in the employment and non-discrimination law arenas where undertakings engage in both private and public contract activity with a single workforce.

The RegioPost judgment is likely to trigger very significant attention in the coming days and weeks. Together with colleagues at the University of Bristol Law School who hold very different views to mine, we will be putting together an event to discuss the implications of RegioPost. stay tuned for more discussion on this important area of EU economic law.

CJEU confirms its jurisdiction to review procurement decisions linked to EU's external action (C‑439/13 P)


In its Judgment in Elitaliana v Eulex Kosovo, C-439/13 P, EU:C:2015:341, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has followed the Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen (discussed here) and considered that it has jurisdiction to review procurement procedures conducted by external missions of the European Union as part of the Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) because they functionally fall within its competences linked to the execution of the EU budget.

The CJEU clearly indicated that, despite the fact that it does not, in principle, have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the CFSP or with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions (para 41), any restrictions on its competence to interpret the EU Treaties needs to be narrowly construed and, consequently, it must assert jurisdiction when CFSP matters affect the EU budget. More specifically, the CJEU indicated that
47 ... it is not disputed that the Eulex Kosovo Mission is civilian in nature and that the expenditure relating to the helicopter-support service for the Eulex Kosovo Mission was to be allocated to the European Union budget.
48 Therefore, the measures at issue, whose annulment was sought on the basis of an infringement of the rules of EU public procurement law, related to the award of a public contract which gave rise to expenditure to be charged to the European Union budget. Accordingly, the contract at issue is subject to the provisions of the Financial Regulation.
49 Having regard to the specific circumstances of the present case, the scope of the limitation, by way of derogation, on the Court’s jurisdiction ... cannot be considered to be so extensive as to exclude the Court’s jurisdiction to interpret and apply the provisions of the Financial Regulation with regard to public procurement.
50 Consequently, the General Court and, in the case of an appeal, the Court of Justice have jurisdiction to hear this case (C-439/13 P, paras 47-50, emphasis added).
In my view, this is the correct decision. However, as indicated earlier (here), the question that remains open, then, is to what extent there is a need to revise the EU's Financial Regulation to include provisions on mixed civil-military/defence procurement along the lines of the regime foreseen in Directive 2009/81, so that compliance with the rules is not too burdensome for external missions, at least in their early stages. To be fair, running the external missions of the European Union is clearly challenging and procurement probably does not rank very high in the priorities of bodies and agents that need to make it happen. And, in those circumstances, it is fair to say that the regime for urgent procurement can still be rather limiting, particularly as challenges and protests are concerned. Hence, this may be an area that needs regulatory reform.

Other than that, and from the strict perspective of the scope of competence of the Union courts in the field of public procurement, it may also be a good occasion to rethink the role of the General Court and the CJEU as public procurement review bodies. In my opinion, developments such as the Elitaliana v Eulex Kosovo case point to the need to either create a specialized review chamber parallel to the EU Civil Service Tribunal, or to subject procurement review processes to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Maybe this is a second area in need of regulatory reform/institutional redesign.

CJEU requires EU law compliant interpretation of national principles of res iudicata (C-505/14)

In its Judgment of 11 November 2015 in Klausner Holz Niedersachsen, C-505/14, EU:C:2015:742, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has reiterated that the requirement of effectiveness (effet utile) of EU law is incompatible with national principles and rules of finality of judicial decisions (res iudicata) that would prevent a court from drawing all the consequences of a breach of the EU State aid rules in Art 107(1) and 108(3) TFEU because of a (related, previous) national judicial decision which has become definitive.

The case does not set any new principle of EU law. The CJEU has repeatedly stressed that the effectiveness of EU law trumps res iudicata considerations under the domestic rules of the Member States--which has led some of them to develop a progressive approach to determining the finality of judicial decisions when not doing so would result in an infringement of EU law [regarding Italy, see Impresa Pizzarotti, C-213/13, EU:C:2014:2067 and comments here]. 

However, in my view, the case is interesting because the CJEU expands its case law as far as the application of the principle of consistent or harmonious interpretation is concerned, by indicating that domestic courts must try to reinterpret the principle of res iudicata itself in accordance with EU law so as not to impar its effectiveness and, only where that consistent interpretation is not possible, then proceed to a strict analysis of the principle of res iudicata under the principle of effectiveness of EU law.

In Klausner Holz Niedersachsen, the CJEU starts its reasoning by reiterating its settled case law on the duty of consistent interpretation and its limits. 
30 While accepting that the principle of res judicata, as construed in national law, has certain objective, subjective and temporal limitations and certain exceptions, the referring court notes that that law precludes not only re-examination, in a second action, of the pleas already expressly settled definitively, but also the raising of questions which could have been raised in an earlier action and which were not so raised. 
31 In that regard, it is appropriate to recall that it is for the national courts to interpret, as far as it is possible, the provisions of national law in such a way that they can be applied in a manner which contributes to the implementation of EU law (judgment in Lucchini, C-119/05, EU:C:2007:434, paragraph 60).
32 It is true that this principle of interpreting national law in conformity with EU law has certain limitations. Thus the obligation on a national court to refer to the content of EU law when interpreting and applying the relevant rules of domestic law is limited by general principles of law and it cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem (see to that effect, judgments in Impact, C-268/06, EU:C:2008:223, paragraph 100, and Association de médiation sociale, C-176/12, EU:C:2014:2, paragraph 39).
...
34 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law also requires national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by it, with a view to ensuring that EU law is fully effective and to achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (see, to that effect, judgment in Dominguez, C-282/10, EU:C:2012:33, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
35 Thus, it is for the referring court to ascertain, on that basis, whether it can find such an interpretation ... (C-505/14, paras 30-35, emphasis added).
The CJEU then proceeds to extend the analysis where an EU law compliant interpretation of the principle of res iudicata is not possible. Unsurprisingly, it resorts to the principle of effectiveness of EU law, and reasons as follows:
38 If such a measure or interpretation should, however, prove not to be possible, attention should be drawn to the importance, both in the legal order of the European Union and in national legal systems, of the principle of res judicata. In order to ensure stability of the law and legal relations, as well as the sound administration of justice, it is important that judicial decisions which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the time-limits provided for in that regard can no longer be called into question (see judgments in Fallimento Olimpiclub, C-2/08, EU:C:2009:506, paragraph 22, and Târșia, C-69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 28).
39 Therefore, EU law does not always require a national court to disapply domestic rules of procedure conferring finality on a judgment, even if to do so would make it possible to remedy a breach of EU law by the decision at issue (see judgments in Kapferer, C-234/04, EU:C:2006:178, paragraph 22, Fallimento Olimpiclub, C-2/08, C:2009:506, paragraph 23, Commission v Slovak Republic, C-507/08, EU:C:2010:802, paragraph 60, Impresa Pizzarotti, C-213/13, EU:C:2014:2067, paragraph 59, and Târșia, C-69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 29).
40 In the absence of EU legislation in this area, the rules implementing the principle of res judicata are a matter for the national legal order, in accordance with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States. However, such procedural rules must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and must not be framed in such a way as to make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (see judgments in Fallimento Olimpiclub, C-2/08, EU:C:2009:506, paragraph 24, and Impresa Pizzarotti, C-213/13, EU:C:2014:2067, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
41 As regards application of the principle of effectiveness, the Court has held that every case in which the question arises as to whether a national procedural provision makes the application of EU law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its conduct and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national bodies. In that context, it is necessary to take into consideration, where relevant, the principles which lie at the basis of the national legal system, such as the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of the proceedings (see, to that effect, judgments in Fallimento Olimpiclub, C-2/08, EU:C:2009:506, paragraph 27, and Târșia, C-69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraphs 36 and 37 and the case-law cited).
42 In that regard, it must be noted that an interpretation of national law ... can have the consequence, in particular, that effects are attributed to the decision of a national court ... which frustrate the application of EU law, in that they make it impossible for the national courts to satisfy their obligation to ensure compliance with the third sentence of Article 108(3) TFEU
43 It follows therefrom that both the State authorities and the recipients of State aid would be able to circumvent the prohibition laid down in the third sentence of Article 108(3) TFEU by obtaining, without relying on EU law on State aid, a declaratory judgment whose effect would enable them, definitively, to continue to implement the aid in question over a number of years. Thus, in a case such as that at issue in the main proceedings, a breach of EU law would recur ... without it being possible to remedy it.
44 Furthermore, such an interpretation of national law is likely to deprive of any useful effect the exclusive power of the Commission ... to assess, subject to review by the EU Courts, the compatibility of aid measures with the internal market. If the Commission, to which the Federal Republic of Germany has in the meantime notified the aid measure constituted by the contracts at issue, should conclude that it is incompatible with the internal market and order its recovery, execution of its decision must fail if a decision of the national court could be raised against it declaring the contracts forming that aid to be 'in force' (C-505/14, paras 38-44, emphasis added).
The CJEU concludes that a significant obstacle to the effective application of EU law and, in particular, a principle as fundamental as that of the control of State aid cannot be justified either by the principle of res judicata or by the principle of legal certainty (C-505/14, para 45). The final result leaves the open question of whether the initial analysis under the duty of consistent interpretation was at all necessary.

In my view, the CJEU tried to show deference towards the general principles of law of the national domestic orders of the Member States, while at the same time reaffirming the supremacy of the general principles of EU law. And in doing so, indicated to the Member States' courts that they should try to mediate any possible conflict by recourse to the duty of consistent interpretation, so as to 'domesticate' the requirement of effet utile of EU law. It will be interesting to see to what extent that leads to a reinterpretation of the German principle of res iudicata, which may well become 'progressive' all'Italiana. Who said that debates on general EU law were a thing of the past?

Excellent workshop on 2014 reform of EU public procurement Directives, soon to lead on to new book

Thanks to the generous financial support of the Department of Economics of the Copenhagen Business School and the Danish foundation Gangstedfonden, Dr Grith Skovgaard Ølykke (CBS) and myself (Bristol), organised a workshop to discuss the papers that a group of young procurement academics are putting together for our edited collection with Edward ElgarReformation or Deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules in 2014 (2016). 

The discussion focused on the legislative process that took part during the period between 2011, when the Commission published its proposal for new Directives, and 2014, when they were finally published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Two days of intense debate and brainstorming allowed us to identify many interesting issues, such as the two-way interaction between the Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union, or the  key importance of the 'blackbox' represented by the trilogue phase.

We will now finalise papers and hope that the book will be ready soon enough in 2016, roughly to coincide with the end of the transposition period for the 2014 EU public procurement Directives. Keep an eye for it!

  

GC imposes liability on the European Commission for obvious breach of equal treatment in public procurement (T-199/14)

In its Judgment of 29 October 2015 iVanbreda Risk & Benefits v Commission, T-199/14, EU:T:2015:820 (not available in English), the General Court (GC) annulled a procurement award decision for several breaches of the principle of equal treatment and condemned the European Commission to compensate the complainant for the damages resulting from the award of the contract to a competing undertaking. 

This is the second instance of imposition of liability on EU Institutions for breach of the applicable public procurement rules in less than a month (see European Dynamics Luxembourg v OHIM). However, this case differs from previous findings of liability of EU Institutions because it is not concerned with formal aspects of the procurement process (namely, debriefing obligations and the duty to state reasons), but with substantial issues concerning the equal treatment of tenderers. 

In fact, as the analysis below will show, the case indicates very poor procurement practice by the European Commission, which is surprising and may diminish the credibility of the institution that is aiming to foster a culture of compliance with public procurement rules as a key aspect of the new strategy for a deeper and fairer internal market (see comments here). Indeed, the Commission would be well advised to tighten up its own procurement processes and to lead by example in such change of mentality regarding compliance with  substantive standards and good procurement practices.

In the case at hand, the European Commission had tendered a contract for insurance services. Amongst the tender conditions, the Commission imposed that 'in the case of awarding the contract to a consortium of economic operators, all members of this group had to have " joint responsibility [...] in executing the contract"'. This requirement triggered a significant volume of documentary obligations in case tenderers intended to submit joint offers as part of a consortium (see T-199/14, paras 7-12). 

The Commission received two offers: one from Vanbreda Risk & Benefits (Vanbreda) and one from Marsh. Marsh's offer was made in consortium with others, and this included the participation of AIG Europe Limited (AIG). In view of this, Vanbreda indicated to the European Commission that, in its ownexperience,
AIG, who participated in the Marsh consortium, refused on principle to jointly undertake liability and therefore [Vanbreda] was almost certain that [Marsh's] could not comply with the substantive and formal requirements of the tender specifications (T-199/14, para 14, own translation from French).
The European Commission did not respond to this claim by Vanbreda. First, on the basis that the evaluation of the tenders was on-going (para 15) and, upon communicating its decision to award the contract to the Marsh consortium and Vanbreda's insistence that the offer could not possibly meet the requirement of joint liability, on the pretext that at this debriefing stage, it could not provide information other that 'the characteristics and relative advantages of the successful tender and the name of the successful tenderer' (para 21). After repeated requests from Vanbreda, the Commission eventually replied that
the issues at the root of the applicant's concern had been duly analyzed throughout the tender evaluation stage, that all offers were found compliant and, therefore, the contract was awarded to the bid with the lowest price. The Commission did not forward any of the requested documents to the applicant (T-199/14, para 24, own translation from French).
Unsurprisingly, Vanbreda challenged the award decision. Its main contention was that by allowing Marsh to offer a joint bid for the performance of the contract with a consortium of non-jointly and severally liable insurers, the Commission would have allowed this operator to offer a much lower price (see paras 42-43, where the impact of joint liability on pricing is further discussed).

Upon review of the file in the context of the challenge, Vanbreda discovered that its interpretation of the offer submitted by Marsh did not reflect the reality of the offer submitted by Marsh in cooperation with other insurers. As the GC summarises
Marsh would have in fact filed its offer as a broker sole tenderer and the Commission and Marsh would have corresponded extensively after the opening of tenders about the solidarity condition. The Commission never reported these facts to [Vanbreda], despite repeated questioning of the latter (T-199/14, para 45, own translation from French).
In view of these additional facts, Vanbreda adjusted its arguments to oppose the possibility that an insurance company such as Marsh could have submitted an offer as a 'broker sole tenderer' because, in its view, this would have infringed the requirement of joint liability in the execution of the contract. The Commission opposed this argument on the basis that it relied on an erroneous and restrictive interpretation of both the tender documentation and Belgian law (see details in paras 54-55).

In view of these arguments, and after reminding that the principle of equal treatment of tenderers aims to promote the development of healthy and effective competition between companies participating in a public tender and requires that all tenderers have the same chances in formulating the terms of their offers and are subject to the same conditions of competition (para 64), the GC found that
93 It appears from the foregoing that the admission of a broker to participate in the tender as the sole tenderer is contrary both to the provisions of the tender and the economy of the system set up thereby. The arguments put forward by the Commission concerning the goal it would have pursued of trying to maintain a high level of competition by the participants in the contested tender, are not likely to justify non-compliance with the tender documentation.

94 Furthermore, it appears from the evidence that one of the essential conditions of the tender consisted in the commitment, by the insurer or insurers, to ensure that the contracting authority would benefit from a 100% coverage of the risks set out in the specifications.

95 According to the Commission, in the hypothesis ... of a broker sole tenderer, it would have been incumbent upon the latter to organize the practicalities of the execution of the contract. This approach would have meant for the Commission to check whether the 100% coverage condition described in paragraph 94 above was fulfilled by focusing solely on the results and not on how it was obtained.

96 In this case, when submitting his tender, Marsh presented a distribution of risks between the participating insurance companies in order to reach the goal of 100% coverage. By letter of 14 February 2014, Marsh informed the Commission that one of the insurers to take part in its offering, AIG, had refused to sign the contract. Following this defection, Marsh proposed a new allocation of these risks, without changing the total price of the successful tender, which implied that the coverage of the share of AIG's participation would firstly be achieved by increasing the participation quotas of the remaining insurance companies and, secondly, by allocating a portion of that share to two new insurance companies  that were not among those originally specified in the Marsh's tender.

97 Accordingly, when Marsh had to, firstly, renegotiate increasing the shares of the insurance companies which had initially mandated it as a broker and, secondly, negotiate the participation of two new insurers, not only the competing offer [by Vanbreda] was known, but the certainty of the award to Marsh was acquired. Conversely, if at the time of the formation of the initial offer, and therefore without knowing that the contract would be awarded to them, the insurance companies mandating Marsh had had to assume higher quotas of participation, which implied greater risks for them, it is likely that, in all economic probability, they would have demanded an increase in their remuneration. This could, therefore, have lead to an increase in the tender price. Similarly, the negotiation of a stake by two new insurers in the offer, at a time when neither the price of the competing offer nor the certainty of obtaining the contract would have been known, was also likely to lead to a different result, potentially affecting the total price of the offer proposed by Marsh upwards. Rather, in this case, the two new insurance companies could know exactly the maximum remuneration they could get at the time when they entered into an agreement with Marsh.

98 Therefore, even if the total price of the successful tender has actually not changed for the Commission, the conditions negotiated between the broker sole contractor and the rest of the insurance companies have undoubtedly been changed.

99 It follows from the above that the admission of a broker to participate in the call as a sole tenderer mandated by insurance companies, first, makes illusory the verification by the evaluation committee of the merits of the offer against the conditions imposed by the specifications; secondly, allows said broker to benefit, in this case, of a competitive advantage over other bidders; and thirdly, causes unequal treatment in favour of the broker sole tenderer relative, in particular, to a competitor submitting a joint bid with one or more insurers (T-199/14, paras 93-99, own translation from French and emphasis added).
The GC then goes on to assess to what extent the mere fact of the Commission's engagement with Marsh in pushing for a substitution of AIG after having found out that such insurance company had not accepted the clause on joint liability (as suggested by Vanbreda) amounted to a violation of the principle of equal treatment and the prohibition of negotiations immediately prior to award of the contract, and finds that it is indeed the case (paras 102-133) [for discussion on how such pre-award negotiations can affect competition, and arguments supporting the position followed by the GC, see A Sanchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 418-421].

The GC also assesses to what extent the post-evaluation authorisation of a change in the composition of the consortium on which Marsh actually relied also amounts, in itself, to a breach of the principle of equal treatment and, once more, it finds that such a breach took place (paras 134-158). 

Once these infringements are settled, the GC then goes one to assess to what extent the Commission needs to indemnify Vanbreda and finds that the damage derived from the loss of a chance of being awarded the contract and to obtain the corresponding market references in terms of experience is recoverable, but that the rest of claims on the basis of expected benefits and moral damage are not (paras 160-217).

As mentioned at the beginning, in my view, this is a case that shows that the European Commission may not be itself prepared to comply with the very same principles it expects Member States to adhere to. It seems just too obvious that the Commission was willing to engage in very significant procedural irregularities in order to secure a saving of about €0.25mn/year, which was the difference between the offers submitted by Marsh and Vanbreda

Under certain lenses, this is an understandable situation, but this is precisely why the rules on the award of public contracts need to prevent these situations of financial conflict of interest in the assessment of non-compliant bids. It seems like there is a very long and winding road ahead in terms of trying to avoid these problems down the rout of fostering a culture of compliance... In the meantime, this type of hard enforcement decisions such as the GC Judgment in Vanbreda Risk & Benefits v Commission must be most welcome.

Nothing is what it seems: A different concept of 'body governed by public law' for public procurement and VAT (C-174/14)

In its Judgment of 29 October 2015 in Saudaçor, C-174/14, EU:C:2015:733, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) followed the Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen (of 25 June 2015, C-174/14, EU:C:2015:430, paras 59-67) and ruled that the concept of ‘other bodies governed by public law’ within the meaning of Article 13(1) of Directive 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax (VAT) must not be interpreted by reference to the definition of ‘body governed by public law’ in Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18 on public procurement (now substituted by Art 2(4) of Directive 2014/24). 

This is an important Judgment because it consolidates the atomisation of concepts that are increasingly relevant for the application of EU economic law in a scenario of ever growing recourse to private law institutions by the public sector in the organisation of its activities. Thus, it is worth looking closely at the reasons that led to this disconnect between concepts of 'body governed by public law' for the purposes of different branches of EU economic law (namely, taxation and public procurement).

In the Saudaçor case, the dispute concerned the VAT treatment of Sociedade Gestora de Recursos e Equipamentos da Saúde dos Açores SA (Saudaçor). This entity was created by Regional Legislative Decree No 41/2003/A of the Autonomous Region of the Azores (RAA) transforming the Institute of Financial Management of the Health Service of the RAA into a limited company with exclusively public capital, that company being wholly owned by that region. 

Saudaçor has the task of providing services of general economic interest in the field of health and, particular, the planning and management of the regional health system and associated information systems, infrastructure and facilities and the completion of construction, conservation, rehabilitation and reconstruction work on health establishments and services, in particular in areas covered by natural disasters and in areas regarded as risk areas. 

Saudaçor had not been charging VAT to the RAA for the provision of these services. It relied on the exemption as a non-taxable person under Article 13(1) of Directive 2006/112, according to which
States, regional and local government authorities and other bodies governed by public law shall not be regarded as taxable persons in respect of the activities or transactions in which they engage as public authorities, even where they collect dues, fees, contributions or payments in connection with those activities or transactions.

However, when they engage in such activities or transactions, they shall be regarded as taxable persons in respect of those activities or transactions where their treatment as non-taxable persons would lead to significant distortions of competition.
In this setting, the Public Treasury opened an investigation and considered that the services provided by Saudaçor in respect of the planning and management of the regional health service concern areas of activity involving private initiative, which means that treatment as a non-taxable person for VAT purposes might lead to distortions of competition, thus challenging Saudaçor's status as a non-taxable person.

The appeals of the case went all the way up to the Supreme Administrative Court of Portugal, who harboured doubts as to the interpretation of the concept 'other bodies governed by public law' used by the judge of instance, which had decided that 
for the purpose of interpreting the rule laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 13(1) of Directive 2006/112, under which bodies governed by public law are not regarded as taxable persons for VAT purposes, there is no need to refer to the concept of ‘body governed by public law’ defined, in the context of public procurement law, in Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18 since the latter concept is understood in a broad sense, whereas the concept of ‘body governed by public law’ within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 13(1) of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted strictly when applying the rule of treatment as a non-taxable person for VAT purposes because that rule constitutes an exception to the general rule of taxation of any economic activity (C-174/14, para 24).
The Supreme Administrative Court of Portugal considered that
whilst it is clearly established in the [CJEU]’s case-law that only the activities of bodies governed by public law acting as public authorities are excluded from liability to VAT, it cannot be determined on the basis of that case-law whether an entity such as Saudaçor, having regard to its legal status as a limited company originating from the transformation of a State entity, comes within that concept of body governed by public law. The question arises in particular whether the scope of that concept tallies with the scope of the concept of ‘body governed by public law’ in Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18 in the context of the definitions of the various categories of ‘contracting authorities’ (C-174/14, para 28, emphasis added).

In his Opinion, AG Jääskinen considered that there was no need to consider the compatibility of the definition in Article 13(1) of Directive 2006/112 and that in Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18. In his view, such irrelevance of the concept of ‘body governed by public law’ within the meaning of Directive 2004/18 for the interpretation of Article 13(1) of Directive 2006/112 derived from the following reasons

63. Article 13 has been regarded in the Court’s case-law as an exemption which should be placed in the general context of the common system of VAT. Thus, as a derogation from the principle that any activity of an economic nature must be subjected to VAT, the first subparagraph of Article 13(1) of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted strictly. Obviously, this also holds for the interpretation of the concept of ‘other bodies governed by public law’ in the first subparagraph of Article 13(1).
64. By contrast, in the light of the objectives pursued by the provisions of Union law on the coordination of the procedures for the award of public contracts, and in particular the dual objective of opening up competition and transparency, the concept of ‘body governed by public law’ within the meaning of Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18 should be given a broad and functional interpretation.
65. It should be stated that the meanings of, on the one hand, ‘body governed by public law’ for the purposes of Directive 2004/18 and, on the other, ‘other bodies governed by public law’ for the purposes of Directive 2006/112 cannot be the same, as those two directives have very different objectives (sic) [...]
66. It should be added that, as was rightly pointed out by the United Kingdom Government, the Union legislature made the deliberate choice not to make reference in Directive 2006/112 to the concept of ‘body governed by public law’ which appears in Directive 2004/18. In other contexts, where it considered that a link should be made between two instruments of EU law, the Union legislature chose to adopt the definition used in Directive 2004/18 by means of a cross-reference (Opinion of AG Jääskinen in C-174/14, paras 63-66, references omitted and underlining added--other emphasis in the original).
In my view, this approach creates two difficulties. Firstly, if concepts of identical wording are to be interpreted differently depending on the ultimate goals of the rules of EU economic law in which they are inserted, legal certainty can hardly be satisfied. Secondly, the narrow interpretation of Article 13 could have been implemented through a strict approach to the concept of  'activities or transactions in which they engage as public authorities', or to the existence of 'distortions of competition'. This would have been preferable to the dissociation of concepts that are meant to determine the subjective scope of application of rules of EU economic law--which, by the way, are meant to be applied concurrently to the those entities.


In its final Judgment, the CJEU followed the Opinion of AG Jääskinen and ruled that
46 By defining in broad terms the concept of ‘body governed by public law’ and, as a result, the concept of ‘contracting authorities’, Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18 seeks to define the scope of that directive in a sufficiently extensive manner so as to ensure that the rules on, in particular, transparency and non-discrimination which are required in connection with the award of public contracts apply to all State entities which do not form part of the public administration but which are nevertheless controlled by the State, in particular by means of their financing or their management.
47 However, the context of the concept of ‘other bodies governed by public law’ referred to in Article 13(1) of Directive 2006/112 is fundamentally different.
48 That concept is not intended to define the scope of VAT but, on the contrary, makes an exception to the general rule on which the common system of that tax is based, namely the rule that the scope of that tax is defined very broadly as covering all supplies of services for consideration, including those provided by bodies governed by public law (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission v Netherlands, C-79/09, EU:C:2010:171, paragraphs 76 and 77) (C-174/14, paras 46-48, emphasis added).
I have difficulty accepting the reasoning of the CJEU as persuasive. Taken literally, it would mean that the rules that determine the (material, and personal?) scope of application of a norm are only those of a positive nature--ie rules of inclusion--whereas the negative rules that free situations or agents from coverage by that norm--ie rules of exclusion--would not be seen as able to construct its scope. This is logically confusing, as delineating the actual scope of application of a norm involves taking into account both the elements that determine what is included and those that determine what is not included therein [for a discussion on the validity and effectiveness of restrictive legal norms, see K Larenz, Metodología de la Ciencia del Derecho, 2a ed (Madrid, Ariel, 2001) 252-253].

Moreover, when the CJEU engages in the determination of whether Saudaçor meets the requirements to be considered within the category of ‘other bodies governed by public law’ for the purposes of Article 13(1) of Directive 2006/112 (paras 55 and ff), the CJEU uses criteria that are fundamentally aimed at determining if: 1) it has powers that traditionally would belong to the public sector (paras 58-59), 2) the region that owns it can exercise decisive control over it (paras 60-65), and 3) it engages in any competition with private providers (para 66). Implicitly, the CJEU also considers whether more than 50% of its funding comes from the public sector (para 63), and it stresses that the activity carried out by Saudaçor is a service of general economic interest (para 67), to the effect of (implicitly) determining that it is not of a purely commercial nature. 

Thus, in my view, these are fundamentally the same criteria and considerations that would apply under the test designed to determine whether an entity is a body governed by public law under the applicable public procurement rules. Functionally, then, the analysis actually carried out by the CJEU is convergent in the fields of taxation and procurement. I consequently struggle to see what was there to be won in the position that "the concept of ‘other bodies governed by public law’ within the meaning of Article 13(1) of [Directive 2006/112] must not be interpreted by reference to the definition of ‘body governed by public law’ in Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18". 

It seems that the CJEU is only willing to engage in functionalism in the application of the rules, but not in the formulation of the concepts that underpin them. This creates significant confusion and threatens legal certainty. Specially when it is impossible to know in which situations where it is confronted with (almost) identically drafted provisions of EU economic law the CJEU will adopt a single 'EU law' autonomous concept or more than one... Nothing is what it seems under EU economic law...