Soft Administrative #EULaw? Some comments on Temple Lang's views on #DGComp Manual of Procedure


Prof. Temple Lang has published an interesting assessment of the European Commission's Antitrust Manual of Procedures: 'The strengths and weaknesses of the DG Competition Manual of Procedure' (2013) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1-30. In his very detailed account, Temple Lang identifies a rather lengthy list of shortcomings of the Manual. The most relevant are that:
The Manual does not deal with submissions made to other parts of the Commission. It says nothing about the need for impartiality, or the duty to respect the Charter of Fundamental Rights, or the need to expect judicial review of all decisions. It allows officials to hold meetings without keeping minutes. It says too little about interim measures, and does nothing to reduce the two basic flaws in the Commission's procedure: the same officials draft the statement of objections and the decision, and none of the Commissioners who formally take the decision have seen the evidence or read the arguments. There are several examples of failure to deal with difficult questions, which are precisely those on which guidance is needed.
Certainly, as Temple Lang further elaborates in the paper and despite the general administrative practices of DG Comp meeting a high standard of procedural requirements, there are some shortcomings that, given the increasing transparency of the competition investigation procedures, will most likely lead to actions for judicial review. 

Even if the Manual is only adopted as guidance (and only after the Commission was forced to do so, precisely as a result of Temple Lang's request to access the document under Regulation 1049/2001), it is easy to see how its content, its shortcomings and any instances of non-compliance will be exploited to the furthest possible extent by defendant companies, despite the Commission stressing that 'the fact that the [Manual is] in the public domain does not change [its] character as purely internal guidance to staff. The published modules therefore do not create or alter any rights or obligations arising under the competition rules of the Treaty' (which remains to be seen). As Temple Lang rightly points out 'It seems [...] that companies will be able to claim that they have legitimate expectations that their cases will be dealt with in accordance with the Manual, and that they will be treated equally in whatever way the Manual provides' (p. 15). Therefore, a proper understanding of the content of the Manual and a future correction of its shortcomings are much needed in order to avoid excessive litigation--potentially, on the basis of formalities without significant impact on the outcome of the cases (as Temple Lang acknowledges in p. 26).

In Temple Lang's view, the Manual is particularly lacking as regards the regulation of due process and impartiality, and he raises the issue that the 'principle of good administration' is not expressly discussed, whereas 'this is a legal rule with legal consequences and not merely an administrative standard' (p. 5). This point is relevant. However, the Manual does refer (once...) to the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, which does analyse and impose compliance with the principle of good administration on all staff of the European Commission [see J Mendes, ‘Good Administration in EU Law and the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour’, EUI Working Paper Law 2009/09]. A similar criticism is raised by Temple Lang in relation with the duty of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU (pp. 24-25), but it may equally be counter argued that this is an issue that applies across the broad and that DG Comp staff must know about it as a matter of general training.

Similarly, Temple Lang criticizes that the Manual fails to remind DG Comp officials about the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights, particularly as regards 'the possibility and intensity of judicial scrutiny' (p. 5). In this regard, the silence in the Manual may be understandable, given the heated debate that surrounds this issue [as I already discussed here]. I agree with Prof. Temple Lang that 'an introduction to the Manual calling attention to the Charter and the fundamental principles of due process would add much to the stature of the document, and to the professionalism of its approach' (p. 5). However, I also see how drafting such an introduction could backfire and could come to restrict the Commission's space for manoeuvre, particularly on the basis of the hardening of such soft law instruments due to the extensive application of the principle of legitimate expectations. Therefore, maybe such omission is not that negative after all.

Other than on these matters of principle, where the position of the Commission may be more justifiable than in Temple Lang's view, the rest of the detailed assessment that he carries out is very accurate and practically oriented, and definitely offers lessons and valuable recommendations for the review of the Manual--which the European Commission has endeavored to undertake 'from time to time'. As Temple Lang suggests, it would be desirable that they do so rather soon, and that they open a proper public consultation along the way. After all, every improvement that can be introduced in the procedures of the European Commission will increase the quality of its Decisions and will reduce the need for judicial scrutiny (as Temple Lang stresses in p. 21, with reference to the case law of the ECtHR)--and, consequently, is a worthy effort.

More generally, the publication of the Manual and the controversies that may arise from it come to support the need for a further development of a consistent set of 'hard' EU Administrative Law rules, particularly as regards infringement procedures against private parties, not only in Competition Law (as Temple Lang also supports, pp. 27-28). In that regard, there are some interesting projects carried out by the members of ReNEUAL.

FSA fines Barclays in LIBOR / EURIBOR misconduct case: does it prevent competition law fines?

I have just seen a tweet by Angus MacCulloch (@AngusMacCulloch) where he wondered whether the FSA case against Barclays for misconduct relating to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) (two key bank interest rates that influence the cost of loans and mortgages) would preclude an OFT investigation into possible cartel offences, since Barclays has been fined for conduct that involved other financial entities as well (see http://tinyurl.com/FSABarclays).
The question is highly relevant, since Barclays is said to have sought whistleblower immunity before the European Commission (as mentioned by Andrew Ward also on twitter, @ARWardMadrid), while it has settled the case with CFTC and DoJ. In general terms, the case raises (once again) the hard issue of the limits and overlaps between competition law and sectoral regulation--which remains an open issue with far reaching implications.
In general, it looks like the EU holds a very tough approach that requires the simultaneous, concurrent application of sectoral regulation and competition law, at least as long as the (dominant) undertakings retain some degree of discretion or room for maneuvre that would have allowed them to avoid a breach of competition law while competing within the limits set by the sectoral rules--as set in the field of art 102 TFEU by the 'ADSL saga' of the Court of Justice of the European Union [the next chapter to be delivered in the pending appeal C-295/12 P - Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission].
That is, complying with sectoral rules is not an antitrust defence if, within the same regulatory framework, the undertaking could have behaved procompetitively or, at least, could have avoided a breach of the competition law provisions of the TFEU. To be sure, this case law assumes that there is a clash between competition law goals and not sectoral regulation itself, but the understanding and strategic behaviour of (dominant) undertakings subjected to regulation--and ultimately, somehow, seems to blame undertakings under the (implicit) principle of the 'special responsibility' derived from market dominance and a more general duty to 'analyse and comply with' sectoral regulation in a procompetitive manner.
Per comparison, the US has a more lenient approach that tends to prevent overlaps and double enforcement of competition and sectoral rules, as long as undertakings meet the test set by the US Supreme Court decision in Credit Suisse v. Billing [127 S.Ct. 2383 (2007)]-- which requires a sectoral watchdog to be properly working and exercising its regulatory powers, and undertakings to behave within the limits set by sectoral regulation and the watchdog's decisions. Therefore, undertakings are 'off the hook' if their (possibly more competitive) conduct has been effectively overseen and approved by the sectoral watchdog. 
Under the US approach, it seems clear that, in a simplified manner, competition law should be adjusted (ie, reduced) when its application in regulated sectors could defeat the purpose and objectives of sectoral regulation (particularly, because it would impose a second check on market activities that were mandated by the sectoral regulator, diminishing legal certainty due to a potential squeeze between ex ante regulatory tools and ex post competition enforcement). If this is the case, then it may even be necessary to go so far as to refrain from applying competition law at all in regulated industries if the allegedly anti-competitive practices have been the object of specific regulation and effective supervision by the sectoral agency. But only in those cases.
In my opinion, regardless of the significant difference in approach at both sides of the Atlantic, there is nothing to be found in EU or US case law that suggests that there is a 'blanket competition law immunity' for market activities carried out in regulated industries. 
Hence, it is relevant to distinguish the LIBOR / EURIBOR case from existing case law in the EU and the US because the behaviour in this particular instance was in breach of sectoral regulation and, consequently, compliance with sectoral rules cannot be claimed as a defence by Barclays or other financial institutions that have similarly misconducted.
Moreover, price-fixing cartels are at the core of competition law prohibitions and fully in line with sectoral regulation, which cannot and does not require price-fixing agremeents (but, on the contrary, tends to promote competition by bridging gaps left by potential insufficiencies of 'natural' competitive pressure). Therefore, there is no potential clash between the goals of sectoral regulation and 'general' antitrust rules--and, consequently, no apparent spill-over or unintented consequences derived from the joint enforcement of both sets of rules.
The only concern that may be left to consider is the aggregate amount of the fines finally imposed, in order to deter overdeterrence and to avoid jeopardising the viability of entities already in a difficult financial situation (so that competition law fines do not require bail outs, for instance). In that regard, competition authorities (the European Commission, OFT, or others within the ECN)  should probably take into consideration the fines already paid to the financial supervision agencies, in order to adjust the level of the competition fines they intend to impose on the banks.
But, as a whole, the case seems to be sufficiently distinct from prior instances where the overlap between regulation and competition law has been analysed by the CJEU, and there seems to be no good reason to refrain from conducting full-fledged competition law investigations and, if deserved, to impose (adjusted) competition law fines.