Procurement tools for AI regulation by contract. Not the sharpest in the shed

I continue exploring the use of public procurement as a tool of digital regulation (or ‘AI regulation by contract’ as shorthand)—ie as a mechanism to promote transparency, explainability, cyber security, ethical and legal compliance leading to trustworthiness, etc in the adoption of digital technologies by the public sector.

After analysing procurement as a regulatory actor, a new draft chapter for my book project focuses on the procedural and substantive procurement tools that could be used for AI regulation by contract, to assess their suitability for the task.

The chapter considers whether procurement could effectively operationalise digital regulation goals without simply transferring regulatory decisions to economic operators. The chapter stresses how the need to prevent a transfer or delegation (ie a privatisation) of regulatory decisions as a result of the operation of the procurement rules is crucial, as technology providers are the primary target in proposals to use procurement for digital regulation by contract. In this post, I summarise the main arguments and insights in the chapter. As always, any feedback will be most warmly received: a.sanchez-graells@bristol.ac.uk.

Background

A first general consideration is that using procurement as a tool of digital regulation requires high levels of digital and commercial skills to understand the technologies being procured and the processes influencing technological design and deployment (as objects of regulation), and the procurement rules themselves (as regulatory tools). Gaps in those capabilities will jeopardise the effectiveness of using procurement as a tool of AI regulation by contract, beyond the limitations and constraints deriving from the relevant legal framework. However, to assess the (abstract) potential of procurement as a regulatory tool, it is worth distinguishing between practical and legal challenges, and to focus on legal challenges that would be present at all levels of public buyer capability.

A second general consideration is that this use of procurement could be seen as either a tool of ‘command and control’ regulation, or a tool of responsive regulation. In that regard, while there can be some space for a ‘command and control’ use of procurement as a tool of digital regulation, in the absence of clear (rules-based) regulatory benchmarks and legally-established mandatory requirements, the responsive approach to the use of procurement as a tool to enforce self-regulatory mechanisms seems likely to be predominant —in the sense that procurement requirements are likely to focus on the tenderers’ commitment to sets of practices and processes seeking to deliver (to the largest possible extent) the relevant regulatory attributes by reference to (technical) standards.

For example, it is hard to imagine the imposition of an absolute requirement for a digital solution to be ‘digitally secure’. It is rather more plausible for the tender and contract to seek to bind the technology provider to practices and procedures seeking to ensure high levels of cyber security (by reference to some relevant metrics, where they are available), as well as protocols and mechanisms to anticipate and react to any (potential) security breaches. The same applies to other desirable regulatory attributes in the procured digital technologies, such as transparency or explainability—which will most likely be describable (or described) by reference to technical standards and procedures—or to general principles, such as ethical or trustworthy AI, also requiring proceduralised implementation. In this context, procurement could be seen as a tool to promote co-regulation or (responsible) self-regulation both at tenderer and industry level, eg in relation to the development of ethical or trustworthy AI.

Against this background, it is relevant to focus on whether procurement tools could effectively operationalise digital regulation goals without simply transferring regulatory decisions to economic operators—ie operating as an effective tool of (responsive) meta-regulation. The analysis below takes a cradle-to-grave approach and focuses on the tools available at the phases of tender preparation and design, tender execution, and contract design and implementation. The analysis is based on EU procurement law, but the functional insights are broadly transferable to other systems.

Tender preparation and design

A public buyer seeking to use procurement as a tool of digital regulation faces an unavoidable information asymmetry. To try to reduce it, the public buyer can engage in a preliminary market consultation to obtain information on eg different technologies or implementation possibilities, or to ‘market-test’ the level of regulatory demand that could be met by existing technology providers. However, safeguards to prevent the use of preliminary market consultations to advantage specific technology providers through eg disclosure of exchanged information, as well as the level of effort required to participate in (detailed) market consultations, raise questions as to their utility to extract information in markets where secrecy is valued (as is notoriously the case of digital technology markets—see discussions on algorithmic secrecy) and where economic operators may be disinclined (or not have the resources) to provide ‘free consultancy’. Moreover, in this setting and given the absence of clear standards or industry practices, there is a heightened risk of capture in the interaction between the public buyer and potential technology providers, with preliminary market consultations not being geared for broader public consultation facilitating the participation of non-market agents (eg NGOs or research institutions). Overall, then, preliminary market consultations may do little to reduce the public buyer’s information asymmetry, while creating significant risks of capture leading to impermissible (discriminatory) procurement practices. They are thus unlikely to operate as an adequate tool to support regulation by contract.

Relatedly, a public buyer facing uncertainty as to the existing off-the-shelf offering and the level of adaptation, innovation or co-production required to otherwise achieve the performance sought in the digital technology procurement, faces a difficult choice of procurement procedure. This is a sort of chicken and egg problem, as the less information the public buyer has, the more difficult it is to choose an adequate procedure, but the choice of the procedure has implications on the information that the public buyer can extract. While the theoretical expectation could be that the public buyer would opt for a competitive dialogue or innovation partnership, as procedures targeted at this type of procurement, evidence of EU level practice shows that public buyers have a strong preference for competitive procedures with negotiations. The use of this procedure exposes the public buyer to direct risks of commercial capture (especially where the technology provider has more resources or the upper hand in negotiations) and the safeguards foreseen in EU law (ie the setting of non-negotiable minimum requirements and award criteria) are unlikely to be effective, as public buyers have a strong incentive to avoid imposing excessively demanding minima to avoid the risk of cancellation and retendering if no technology provider is capable (or willing) to meet them.

In addition, the above risks of commercial capture can be exacerbated when technology providers make exclusivity claims over the technological solutions offered, which could unlock the use of a negotiated procedure without prior publication—on the basis of absence of competition due to technical reasons, or due to the need to protect seclusive rights, including intellectual property rights. While the legal tests to access this negotiated procedure are in principle strict, the public buyer can have the wrong incentives to push through while at the same time controlling some of the safeguarding mechanisms (eg transparency of the award, or level of detail in the relevant disclosure). Similar issues arise with the possibility to creatively structure remuneration under some of these contracts to keep them below regulatory thresholds (eg by ‘remunerating in data’).

In general, this shows that the phase of tender preparation and design is vulnerable to risks of regulatory capture that are particularly relevant when the public buyer is expected to develop a regulatory role in disciplining the behaviour of the industry it interacts with. This indicates that existing flexible mechanisms of market engagement can be a source of regulatory risk, rather than a useful set of regulatory tools.

Tender execution

A public buyer seeking to use procurement as a tool of digital regulation could do so through the two main decisions of tenderer selection and tender evaluation. The expectation is that these are areas where the public buyer can exercise elements of ‘command and control’, eg through tenderer exclusion decisions as well as by setting demanding qualitative selection thresholds, or through the setting of mandatory technical specifications and the use of award constraints.

Tenderer selection

The public buyer could take a dual approach. First, to exclude technology providers with a previous track record of activity falling short of the relevant regulatory goals. Second, to incentivise or recompense high levels of positive commitment to the regulatory goals. However, both approaches present challenges.

First, the use of exclusion grounds would require clearly setting out in the tender documentation which types of digital-governance activities are considered to amount to ‘grave professional misconduct, which renders [the technology provider’s] integrity questionable’, and to reserve the possibility to exclude on grounds of ‘poor past performance’ linked to digital regulation obligations. In the absence of generally accepted standards of conduct and industry practices, and in a context of technological uncertainty, making this type of determinations can be difficult. Especially if the previous instance of ‘untrustworthy’ behaviour is being litigated or could (partially) be attributed to the public buyer under the previous contract. Moreover, a public buyer cannot automatically rely on the findings of another one, as the current EU rules require each contracting authority to come to its own view on the reliability of the economic operator. This raises the burden of engaging with exclusion based on these grounds, which may put some public buyers off, especially if there are complex technical questions on the background. Such judgments may require a level of expertise and available resources exceeding those of the public buyer, which could eg justify seeking to rely on third party certification instead.

Relatedly, it will be difficult to administer such tenderer screening to systems through the creation of lists of approved contractors or third-party certification (or equivalent mechanisms, such as dynamic purchasing systems administered by a central purchasing body, or quality assurance certification). In all cases, the practical difficulty will be that the public buyer will either see its regulatory function conditioned or precluded by the (commercially determined) standards underlying third-party certification, or face a significant burden if it seeks to directly scrutinise economic operators otherwise. The regulatory burden will to some extent be unavoidable because all the above-mentioned mechanisms foresee that (in some circumstances) economic operators that do not have access to the relevant certification or are under no obligation to register in the relevant list must be given the opportunity to demonstrate that they meet the relevant (substantive) qualitative selection criteria by other (equivalent) means.

There will also be additional challenges in ensuring that the relevant vetting of economic operators is properly applied where the digital technology solution relies on a long (technical) supply chain or assemblage, without this necessarily involving any (formal) relationship or subcontracting between the technology provider to be contracted and the developers of parts of the technical assemblage. This points at the significant burden that the public buyer may have to overcome in seeking to use qualitative selection rules to ‘weed out’ technology providers which (general, or past) behaviour is not aligned with the overarching regulatory goals.

Second, a more proactive approach that sought to go beyond exclusion or third-party certification to eg promote adherence to voluntary codes of conduct, or to require technology providers to justify how they eg generally ‘contribute to the development and deployment of trustworthy digital technologies’, would also face significant difficulties. Such requirements could be seen as unjustified and/or disproportionate, leading to an infringement of EU procurement law. They could also be altogether pre-empted by future legislation, such as the proposed EU AI Act.

Tender evaluation

As mentioned above, the possibility of setting demanding technical specifications and minimum requirements for tender evaluation through award constraints in principle seem like suitable tools of digital regulation. The public buyer could focus on the technical solutions and embedding the desired regulatory attributes (eg transparency, explainability, cyber security) and regulatory checks (on data and technology governance, eg in relation to open source code or interoperability, as well as in relation to ethical assessments) in the technical specifications. Award criteria could generate (further) incentives for regulatory performance, perhaps beyond the minimum mandatory baseline. However, this is far from uncomplicated.

The primary difficulty in using technical specifications as a regulatory tool relates to the challenge of clearly specifying the desired regulatory attributes. Some or most of the desired technological attributes are difficult to observe or measure, the processes leading to their promotion are not easy to establish, the outcomes of those processes are not binary and determining whether a requirement has been met cannot be subject to strict rules, but rather to (yet to be developed) technical standards with an unavoidable degree of indefinition, which may also be susceptible of iterative application in eg agile methods, and thus difficult to evaluate at tender stage. Moreover, the desired attributes can be in conflict between themselves and/or with the main functional specifications for the digital technology deployment (eg the increasingly clear unavoidable trade-off between explainability and accuracy in some AI technologies). This issue of the definitional difficulties and the incommensurability of some or most of the regulatory goals also relates to the difficulty of establishing minimum technical requirements as an award constraint—eg to require that no contract is awarded unless the tender reaches a specific threshold in the technical evaluation in relation to all or selected requirements (eg explainability). While imposing minimum technical requirements is permitted, it is difficult to design a mechanism to quantify or objectify the evaluation of some of the desired technological attributes, which will necessarily require a complex assessment. Such assessment cannot be conducted in such a way that the public buyer has an unrestricted freedom of choice, which will require clarifying the criteria and the relevant thresholds that would justify rejecting the tender. This could become a significant sticking point.

Designing technical specifications to capture whether a digital technology is ‘ethical’ or ‘trustworthy’ seems particularly challenging. These are meta-attributes or characteristics that refer to a rather broad set of principles in the design of the technology, but also of its specific deployment, and tend to proceduralise the taking into account of relevant considerations (eg which impact will the deployment have on the population affected). Additionally, in some respects, the extent to which a technological deployment will be ethical or trustworthy is out of the hands of the technology provider (eg may depend on decisions of the entity adopting the technology, eg on how it is used), and in some aspects it depends on specific decisions and choices made during contract implementation. This could make it impossible to verify at the point of the tender whether the end result will or not meet the relevant requirements—while including requirements that cannot be effectively verified prior to award would most likely breach current legal limits.

A final relevant consideration is that technical specifications cannot be imposed in a prescriptive manner, with technology providers having to be allowed to demonstrate compliance by equivalence. This limits the potential prescriptiveness of the technical specifications that can be developed by the public buyer, at least in relation to some of the desired technological attributes, which will always be constrained by their nature of standards rather than rules (or metrics) and the duty to consider equivalent modes of compliance. This erodes the practical scope of using technical specifications as regulatory instruments.

Relatedly, the difficulties in using award criteria to pursue regulatory goals stem from difficulties in the operationalisation of qualitative criteria in practice. First, there is a set of requirements on the formulation of award criteria that seek to avoid situations of unrestricted freedom of choice for the public buyer. The requirements tend to require a high level of objectivity, including in the structuring of award criteria of a subjective nature. In that regard, in order to guarantee an objective comparison and to eliminate the risk of arbitrary treatment, recent case law has been clear that award criteria intended to measure the quality of the tenders must be accompanied by indications which allow a sufficiently concrete comparative assessment between tenders, especially where the quality carries most of the points that may be allocated for the purposes of awarding the tender.

In part, the problem stems from the absence of clear standards or benchmarks to be followed in such an assessment, as well as the need to ensure the possibility of alternative compliance (eg with labels). This can be seen, for example, in relation to explainability. It would not suffice to establish that the solutions need to be explainable or to use explainability as an award criterion without more. It would be necessary to establish sub-criteria, such as eg ‘the solution needs to ensure that an individualised explanation for every output is generated’ (ie requiring local explainability rather than general explainability of the model). This would still need to be further specified, as to what type of explanation and containing which information, etc. The difficulty is that there are multiple approaches to local explainability and that most of them are contested, as is the general approach to post hoc explanations in itself. This puts the public buyer in the position of having to solve complex technical and other principled issues in relation to this award criterion alone. In the absence of standard methodologies, this is a tall order that can well make the procedure inviable or not used (with clear parallels to eg the low uptake of life-cycle costing approaches). However, the development of such methodologies parallels the issues concerning the development of technical standards. Once more, when such standards, benchmarks or methodologies emerge, reliance on them can thus (re)introduce risks of commercial determination, depending on how they are set.

Contract design and implementation

Given the difficulties in using qualitative selection, technical specifications and award criteria to embed regulatory requirements, it is possible that they are pushed to to the design of the contract and, in particular, to their treatment as contract performance conditions, in particular to create procedural obligations seeking to maximise attainment of the relevant regulatory goals during contract implementation (eg to create specific obligations to test, audit or upgrade the technological solution in relation to specific regulatory goals, with cyber security being a relatively straightforward one), or to pass on, ‘back-to-back’, mandatory obligations where they result from legislation (eg to impose transparency obligations, along the lines of the model standard clauses for AI procurement being developed at EU level).

In addition to the difficulty inherent in designing the relevant mechanisms of contractualised governance, a relevant limitation of this approach to embedding (self-standing) regulatory requirements in contract compliance clauses is that recent case law has made clear that ‘compliance with the conditions for the performance of a contract is not to be assessed when a contract is awarded’. Therefore, at award stage, all that can be asked is for technology providers to commit to such requirements as (future) contractual obligations—which creates the risk of awarding the contract to the best liar.

More generally, the effectiveness of contract performance clauses will depend on the contractual remedies attached to them and, in relation to some of the desirable attributes of the technologies, it can well be that there are no adequate contractual remedies or that the potential damages are disproportionate to the value of the contract. There will be difficulties in their use where obligations can be difficult to specify, where negative outputs and effects are difficult to observe or can only be observed with delay, and where contractual remedies are inadequate. It should be stressed that the embedding of regulatory requirements as contract performance clauses can have the effect of converting non-compliance into (mere) money claims against the technology provider. And, additionally, that contractual termination can be complicated or require a significant delay where the technological deployment has created operational dependency that cannot be mitigated in the short or medium term. This does not seem necessarily aligned with the regulatory gatekeeping role expected of procurement, as it can be difficult to create the adequate financial incentives to promote compliance with the overarching regulatory goals in this way—by contrast with, for example, the possibility of sanctions imposed by an independent regulator.

Conclusion

The analysis has stressed those areas where the existing rules prevent the imposition of rigid regulatory requirements or demands for compliance with pre-specified standards (to the exclusion of alternative ones), and those areas where the flexibility of the rules generates heightened risks of regulatory capture and commercial determination of the regulatory standards. Overall, this shows that it is either not easy or at all possible to use procurement tools to embed regulatory requirements in the tender procedure and in public contracts, or that those tools are highly likely to end up being a conduit for the direct or indirect application of commercially determined standards and industry practices.

This supports the claim that using procurement for digital regulation purposes will either be highly ineffective or, counterintuitively, put the public buyer in a position of rule-taker rather than rule-setter and market-shaper—or perhaps both. In the absence of non-industry led standards and requirements formulated eg by an independent regulator, on which procurement tools could be leveraged, each public buyer would either have to discharge a high (and possibly excessive) regulatory burden, or be exposed to commercial capture. This provides the basis for an alternative approach. The next step in the research project will thus be to focus on such mandatory requirements as part of a broader proposal for external oversight of the adoption of digital technologies by the public sector.

New lengthy reference by Lithuanian Supreme Court raises a range of difficult questions (C-927/19, Klaipėdos regiono atliekų tvarkymo centras) [guest post by Dr Deividas Soloveičik*]

This guest post by Dr Deividas Soloveičik provides interesting background and critical remarks on a recent Lithuanian reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on issues concerning several aspects of the 2014 rules, in particular interesting boundary issues between qualitative selection and technical specifications, as well as exclusion of consortium partners. It will be interesting to keep an eye on the case, as it brings an opportunity for the CJEU to expand its case law.

Some difficult questions

The very end of the 2019 was highlighted by a new lengthy preliminary reference to the CJEU by the Supreme Court of Lithuania (the Supreme Court), in a case that raises a broad range of issues concerning economic and financial standing requirements, the boundary between qualitative selection and technical specification criteria, confidentiality of procurement documents in the context of ensuing litigation and the consequences of the provision of false information. This case and the initial findings of the Supreme Court will be  assessed in this “executive summary” of the references sent to the CJEU—which, at the time of writing (17 January 2020) are yet to be admitted (although the referral has been assigned case number C-927/19, Klaipėdos regiono atliekų tvarkymo centras).

Before proceeding to the analysis, it is worth recalling that, in relation specifically to the point on submission of false information and its impact on the potential exclusion of the tenderer concerned the Supreme Court was perfectly aware of the recent Judgments in Meca (C-41/18, EU:C:2019:507, not available in English) and Delta (C-267/18, EU:C:2019:826) case-law at the time of the reference to the CJEU. However, the Court extends its query and mainly is seeking to find out whether (i) the act of provision of false information by one of the consortium partners “infects” the rest of the team and (ii) what the role of the national court hearing this kind of legal case in the light of the above-mentioned Meca and Delta case-law is, when the CJEU previously specifically emphasized the importance of the discretion of the contracting authority while handling these kind of legal (procurement) situations.

Background

The Lithuanian contracting authority started an open tender for the services of municipal waste gathering and removal to landfill treatment facilities. The procurement procedure was regulated by national and Directive 2014/24/EU. The procurement documents inter alia included the following requirements:

  • Technical specification: the service provider uses vehicles for waste management services that are in line with the requirements of EURO 5 standard; all vehicles must have installed constantly functioning GPS transmitters that would allow the contracting authority monitoring the exact location and movement route of the vehicle. The supplier must allow the contracting authority and the administration of the Neringa municipality to use its installed GPS as much as it is necessary to monitor the location and movement routes of the vehicles used in providing the services of waste management and transporting waste to landfill. If sub-suppliers are involved, this requirement is also applicable for their vehicles.

  • Technical and professional capacity: the supplier must own or lease (or possess otherwise) the necessary quantity of vehicles needed to execute the public contract and these must comply with the requirements listed in the technical specifications. The requirements for qualification and technical specification were almost identical.

  • Financial and economic capacity: tenderers’ average annual operating income from carrying out the activities related to the management of mixed municipal waste during the past 3 financial years (or the period since the supplier’s registration date if the supplier carried out the activities for a period less than 3 financial years) had to be not less than EUR 20,000 EUR excluding VAT.

There were three tenderers in a procedure: the plaintiff, another company and an awardee of the public contract, which was a consortium comprised by three individual companies. The plaintiff took second place. The plaintiff submitted the claim against the contracting authority claiming that the winner had not complied with the: (i) technical specifications – the vehicle indicated by the supplier is not for the mixed waste transportation and considering the years of manufacture – it does not comply with the requirements of the EURO 5 standard; (ii) financial and economic requirements - the average annual operating income of the supplier while carrying out the activities related to the management of mixed municipal waste during the past 3 financial years must be not less than EUR 20 000 EUR excluding VAT, but one of the joint venture partners of the supplier does not carry out waste management activities overall. The crux of the dispute was thus the following: one of the consortium partners made a statement that it had experience in management of mixed municipal waste. The claimant contended that this might not have been the truth because this partner of the consortium had never rendered any services of this type. So the claimant maintained that (a) this consortium partner did not have the needed qualification and (b) that this consortium partner made a false statement. This must have led, in the opinion of the claimant, to rejection of the consortium’s tender.

The court of first instance dismissed the claim but the appeal was successful, and the court obliged the contracting authority to re-execute the evaluation of the tenders. The Court of Appeals considered that the winner of the tender did not prove that it had the technical capacity, because the original tender did not include the information on the required vehicles, which were provided by the tenderer only after the submission of the bid to the contracting authority.

The initial awardee of the contract did not agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals and filed a cassation complaint which was accepted by the Supreme Court.

Regarding the financial and economic capacity as a qualification criterion

By raising the question on the scope of the qualification requirement to hold a relevant financial and economic capacity, the Supreme Court addressed the above-mentioned statements of the procurement documentation which required each tenderer to have an annual operating income from carrying out the activities related to the management of mixed municipal waste during the past 3 financial years or the period since the supplier’s registration date (if the supplier carried out the activities for a period less than 3 financial years) of not less than EUR 20,000 EUR excluding VAT. There were three legal aspects which triggered the Court’s doubts.

First, by reading Art. 58(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU the Supreme Court was prone to conclude that the latter limited the discretion of the contracting authority to require the suppliers to have a turnover from a very specific (niche) economic (business) activity as a sole and main financial criterion. The Court reasoned that the main goal of Art. 58(3) of the Directive was to help contracting authorities finding a financially trustworthy and economically stable contract partner. Therefore, the Court believed that, on the one hand, it allowed the contracting authorities to request from the tenderers having a general financial turnover (as specified in the procurement documentation) and, on the other hand, it left leeway to request the proof of the financial (monetary) capacity gained from a more specific business activity, because the wording of Art. 58(3) of the Directive 2014/24 contains a statement “... including a certain minimum turnover in the area covered by the contract”. However, the Court considered that any requirement for the suppliers’ qualification which is based on Art. 58(3) of Directive 2014/24 (and respectively the national procurement law) should (or even must) a priori address the general financial turnover and must not use a turnover from a niche commercial activity autonomously (i.e. as a sole requirement for financial and economic qualification). In the given case, it seems that the Supreme Court doubted if the contracting authority had a right to require an annual operating income to be received from carrying out the activities related to the management of mixed municipal waste as a single selection ground. The wording of the ruling suggests that the Supreme Court deemed that the contracting authority had a right to require a general turnover (e.g. 200,000 EUR annually) and an income from a specific activity (e.g. 20,000 EUR from management of mixed municipal waste), but not only the latter.

Second, by reading a text of the ruling it seems that the Supreme Court reasoned that if the interpretation of the Art. 58(3) of the Directive 2014/24 was otherwise, i.e. as allowing the contracting authority to require financial and economic standing on the basis of a narrow experience (like in a given case from management of mixed municipal waste), then, in the Supreme Courts’ view, there would be a blurred line between the qualification related to financial and economic standing and the one connected to technical and professional ability. There would hardly be a difference between Art. 58(3) and Art. 58(4) of Directive 2014/24. In other words, the Supreme Court considered that even if legally the requirement for qualification was named as a financial and economical one, it in fact would be the requirement for technical and professional ability when it required financial flows to be gained from a very specific practice. Therefore, it might be said that the Court’s question to the CJEU has an indirect perspective, namely the Court wants the CJEU to clarify the lines between Arts. 58(3) and 58(4) of the Directive 2014/24/EU.

Third, the Court went on to examine the CJEU case-law in Esaprojekt (C-387/14, EU:C:2017:338) and its possible application to the case at hand. It must be recalled that the awardee of the public contract was a consortium of three companies. One of these companies (say company A) constantly held that it had the required financial qualification, because it maintained that this requirement was not personal and could be relied upon as a capacity gained from the execution of a previous public contract which was executed by the consortium to which company A was a member. However, company A did not itself render the services related to the management of mixed waste and therefore it had not received any income from that.  Therefore, the claimant contended that the company A could not hold that it had received any income from the management of mixed municipal waste and, therefore, it did not have a required qualification. The Court recalled that in Esaprojekt the CJEU stated that an economic operator cannot refer to the qualification gained by the whole consortium and may only be deemed to be qualified to the extent it itself executed the relevant (part of) public contract. Therefore, the Supreme Court wonders if this ratio decidendi, delivered in Esaprojekt in respect of technical and professional ability as a qualification requirement, should be applied on the same grounds while dealing with financial and economic standing of the suppliers.

In the light of these considerations, the Court asked the CJEU to answer:

(i) if the requirement to prove the annual income of the relevant size, received from a specific commercial activity (the management of mixed municipal waste), should be subsumed under Art. 58(3) or Art. 58(4) of the Directive 2014/24;

(ii) if the answer to the previous question had any effect on the application of the rules, provided in Esaprojekt, namely, whether it is allowed under the EU public procurement law to disregard the financial and economical capacity, gained during the joint bidding and execution of the previous public contract, if this capacity in corpore is relied upon by a single member of consortium in a later procurement procedure. In other words, the Supreme Court seeks to find out if a consortium member (company A) in a present tender can rely on a qualification, gained by another consortium, to which this company A was also a member, although company A did not actually and directly execute the part of the contract to which it seeks to rely in the later (present) tender (in this case – the management of mixed waste).

Regarding the separation between professional and technical capacity and technical specifications

It is a consistent and already an old national case-law which makes a very clear and precise dividing line between the requirements of the suppliers’ qualification (selection criteria) and technical specification. The Supreme Court maintains a principle that this separation has a substantial practical implication because under the settled case-law of the Lithuanian courts each discrepancy of the tender that is related to qualification (missing document, insufficient provision of required information on qualification, etc.), may be easily rectified. This means that it is forbidden to reject the a tender without at least requesting for a decent explanation from the supplier. The Supreme Court holds that such approach is in line with the view of the CJEU, expressed in such cases as SAG ELV Slovensko (C-599/10, EU:C:2012:191) or Manova (C-336/12, EU:C:2013:647). Meanwhile, any part of the tender that is connected to the requirements of technical specification cannot be amended, rectified or explained by an economic operator at a later stage of procurement in such a way as to turn the non-compliant original tender into a compliant one.

It must be recalled that in this case the requirements for the technical and professional capacity (the supplier must own or lease (or possess otherwise) the necessary quantity of technical measures needed to execute the public contract) were copy-pasted to the technical specification. Therefore, the situation itself became confusing: if those conditions were deemed as criterion for qualification, then there must have been a possibility to provide the additional information upon the request of the contracting authority (what was one of the arguments by the respondent in a case). Meanwhile, in case of an opposite legal approach, i.e. that such requirements are a part of technical specification, any amendment to the original tender after the submission deadline would undergo a much stricter test.

Therefore, the Supreme Court cast doubts on the legal possibility of the mentioned technical and professional qualification requirement. Although the Court referred to Commission v. Netherlands case (C-368/10, EU:C:2012:284) as the one allowing “relevant similar simultaneous requirements both as a condition of technical specification and criteria for entering into a public contract or its execution”, the Supreme Court was not sure if the qualification criterion can be so detailed and exhaustive as it was in the disputed procurement. The Court went on with its reasoning that the more detailed the requirement on qualification was, the more likely it was already a condition of the technical specification and not a selection criterion. In other words, it seems that the Supreme Court was prone to consider that the requirement on qualification cannot be so detailed as it should be in case of technical specification.

Thus, the Court asked the CJEU if the requirement of the procurement documentation that the economic operator used the vehicles needed for waste management services, that were in line with the requirements of EURO 5 standard; all vehicles must have had installed constantly functioning GPS transmitters, that would have allowed the contracting authority monitoring the exact location and movement route of the vehicle fell within the scope of regulation of Directive 2014/24 a) Art. 58(4), b) Art. 42 together with the Annex VII or c) Art. 70.

Regarding the scope of obligation of confidentiality in the light of effective remedies in public procurement

Although since Varec (C-450/06, EU:C:2008:91) there has not been a major development of the concept of confidentiality in public procurement law, on the contrary, in Lithuania it is one of the hottest legal topics during the recent five years. It has been circulated in all possible layers of the legal world, starting from the legislation and ending with the widely elaborated case-law [more on this might be read here: D Soloveičik, ‘Rethinking the confidentiality in public procurement: does public mean naked public?’ (2018) 1 UrT 11-26; for comparative perspectives, see the contributions to K-M Halonen, R Caranta & A Sanchez-Graells (eds), Transparency in EU Procurements. Disclosure Within Public Procurement and During Contract Execution (Elgar 2019)). In a nutshell the current national legal ecosystem in respect of confidentiality could be described as promoting extreme transparency in public procurement and thus limiting the disclosure of competitors’ information in very rare cases, mostly related to top commercial secrets of private parties. The Supreme Court considers that the mentioned “pro disclosure” case-lawis in line not only with the requirements of the principle of effectiveness of remedies in public procurement, but also with the regulation of Directive 2016/943/EU on the protection of trade secrets.

Despite the legal ecosystem, where the transparency should prosper, paradoxically the administrative practice during the procurement procedure is usually different. The contracting authorities, albeit being precisely aware of the mentioned juridical requirements to grant access to the relevant documentation, still are very disclosure averse. In a majority of procurement cases the contracting authorities deny the tenderers their right to gain the access to the competitors’ commercial proposal by arguing that this might lead to an illicit leak of a commercial secret. Moreover, while rejecting the claims of the tenderers, contracting authorities tend to give very abstract and uncomprehensive answers.

This leads to a situation where tenderers launch their legal challenges in from of the courts without having seeing the full picture of the procurement process and, therefore, being refused  an effective protection of their rights as required by the EU public procurement remedies directives. Usually in such cases the situation is rectified by the courts, which tend to disclose the information if it is not a commercial secret. As there is a two-layer procurement dispute system in Lithuania, where access to the court is guaranteed only after the prior submission of the claim to the contracting authority itself, the Supreme Court raised the issue of consistency and rationality of such practice when contracting authorities try to hide the information (usually the winners’) and then such information is only gained at the stage of litigation in court. This makes the procurement dispute at the stage of contracting authority useless. Therefore, the Court referred to Art. 1(1)(3) of Directive 89/665/EEC, Art. 21 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive 2016/943/EU and asked the CJEU if:

(i) if the contracting authority must deliver to the requesting tenderer the information comprising the competitors’ tender if such request is related to a legal challenge of such tender and is needed to verify its compliance with the requirements of the procurement documentation, subject to the fact that the claiming tenderer previously asked for this information. It is interesting to note that actually the main point of that question is whether the contracting authorities should be obliged to disclose the required information in order to avoid the mentioned practice that the information is locked during an early stage of the dispute, meanwhile it will still most likely be unlocked when it reaches the court. The hidden idea of the inquiry is that if it appears that the answer to the question is positive and the contracting authorities would be obliged to be almost fully open, then less disputes might reach the courts as the tenderers, after seeing the competitors’ tender, may find out that their claim would be unfounded.

(ii) In case the contracting authority rejects the suppliers’ claim, if its answer must be comprehensive, clear and informative, even though such an answer and its wording may disclose the confidential information. In other words, the Supreme Court wants to know to what extent the contracting authorities may be reserved while replying to the disclosure requests from tenderers, on the grounds that providing a detailed justification for the rejection could in itself constitute a breach of confidential treatment.

(iii) The mentioned provisions of the EU law must be understood as allowing the tenderer to separately challenge before the court the decision of the contracting authority each time it decides to reject the suppliers’ request for access to the competitors’ bid. It has to be mentioned that it is a long-standing national case-law which allows this kind of legal action in Lithuania. So, it seems that the Supreme Court knows the answer because it gave it to all the practitioners itself a long time ago. However, the inquiry sent to the Luxembourg is more an implicit request for verification if such case-law is in line with the EU legal regulation. An additional aspect to this inquiry is that the Supreme Court wanted to know if in the above-mentioned legal situations the tenderer may claim only the denial of the access to information, leaving the rest of possible legal claims, related to the competitors bid, aside. It seems that the Court is prone to think that if the answer to this question was positive, it would most likely mean that such tenderer would not lose its right to challenge these additional irregularities of the competitors’ tender after it receives the relevant information from the contracting authority, even if it is done with the assistance of the court. In other words, this part of the question is related to possible (non)application of limitation of actions.

(iv) Another two questions were related to a procedural law. The Court asked if the national court, hearing the public procurement dispute, in all cases must require the information on the challenged competitors’ tender from the contracting authority, despite its previous actions during the public procurement procedure. And a related question: if Art. 9(2)(3) of Directive 2016/943/EU must be understood as requiring the court, which declined the disclosure of the competitors’ tender to the claimant (but having this information in a file), to take this information into consideration while deciding on a merits of the case. In other words, the Supreme Court is asking whether the courts hearing the public procurement cases and having the information on one of the tenderers’ tender and which they decided to leave locked (meaning that the claimant would not see this data), are under an obligation to examine such information ex officio and take it into consideration while deciding the case. This means that in case of a positive answer to that question, the claimant might still have a chance to win the case, even without seeing the whole materials of a case-file, if there were actual irregularities of the competitors’ tender and the court spotted them.

Regarding the legal consequences of submitting false information and the courts’ discretion to decide upon this

Under the national provisions of the Law on Public Procurement, economic operators can be “blacklisted” if they provide false information to the contracting authority during the procurement procedure. In case of a joint bidding, all of the consortium members are included into this list.

In the case before the Court, one of the members of the consortium that was awarded the public contract was presenting to the contracting authority an inconsistent information regarding its previous financial income. The Supreme Court mentioned that according to the Esaprojekt ruling (above), there is no need to identify the intentional misbehavior of the tenderer in order to reject its bid. The Court reminded that purely negligent actions are sufficient to disqualify the tenderer if such actions could seriously mislead the contracting authority and negatively affect the result of the procurement. Therefore, taking into consideration the facts of a case, the Supreme Court stated that the actions of the mentioned consortium member, in Court’s view, might be considered as negligent.

After the Court came to such a conclusion, on the one hand it most likely must have decided that the tender of the consortium was invalid and that all the members were blacklisted. On the other hand, the Court was stopped from moving towards this legal direction because of two reasons. Firstly, the contracting authority was of the opposite opinion. It did not hold the tenderer negligent and neither it considered the consortiums’ given information as false. Therefore, the Court had a doubt if it can decide on its’ own initiative completely opposite to the direct will of the contracting authority. Secondly, these doubts were amplified by the recent findings of the CJEU in the above-mentioned Delta and Meca cases, where the Court of Luxembourg emphasized that it is a contracting authority, and only it, which is empowered to decide regarding the reliability of the economic operator. In the light of these conclusions, the Supreme Court decided to stay proceedings and request for explanation from the CJEU on the scope and limits of the discretion of national courts in such legal situations.

Besides, the Supreme Court raised a question on whether in case of submission of false information to the contracting authority the consequences of blacklisting must be applied to all members of the consortium. The Court noted that it is natural to expect the possibility of legal risks, related to the participation in a tender (e.g. the need to replace the partner due to its default, etc.). However, the Supreme Court considered that any such risk should be limited to the particular procurement and not be implemented in a way of a total ban on participation for a specified period of time and for all the consortium members. Although the Court did not use this wording, but it implied that this might be disproportionate.

Therefore, the Court asked the CJEU two following questions:

(i) If, in the light of the Art. 57(4)(h) of Directive 2014/24/EU and the Delta case, the national court is allowed, despite the will of the contracting authority, to ex officio decide that the economic operator intentionally or by negligence provided the contracting authority with false information and must have been excluded from the public tender.

(ii) If, in the light of the Art. 57(4)(h) of Directive 2014/24/EU and the principle of proportionality, the disqualification of a tenderer from a procurement procedure with the possible consequences of being “blacklisted” for the specified period of time is applicable against all the members of a joint bidding consortium or just against the economic operator responsible for such misbehavior.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the Lithuanian Supreme Court triggered important issues related to public procurement practice. The answers from the CJEU are much awaited because procurement professionals face similar situations daily. Some of the areas, such as confidentiality, are extremely different across many EU jurisdictions, albeit all procurers operate under the same EU law on public procurement. Therefore, the interpretation suggested by the CJEU will be used to further unify practice across the internal market.

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Dr. Deividas Soloveičik, LL.M

Dr Deividas Soloveičik is a Partner and Head of Public Procurement practice at COBALT Lithuania. He represents clients before national courts at all instances and arbitral institutions in civil and administrative cases, provides legal advice to Lithuanian and foreign private clients and contracting authorities, including the European Commission , on the legal aspects of public procurement and pre-commercial procurement.

Dr Soloveičik is an Associate Professor and researcher in commercial law at Vilnius University and a contributor to legal publications. He also closely cooperates with globally recognized academic members of the legal profession. Since 2011, MCIArb. Dr Soloveičik is a member of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators; since 2016, he is a member of the European Assistance for Innovation Procurement – EAFIP initiative promoted by the European Commission and a recommended arbitrator at Vilnius Court of Commercial Arbitration.

Guest blogging at HTCAN: If you would like to contribute a blog post for How to Crack a Nut, please feel free to get in touch at a.sanchez-graells@bristol.ac.uk. Your proposals and contributions will be most warmly welcomed!

ECJ clarifies that reliance on third party capacities is not possible after the tenderer has been found not to comply with qualitative selection criteria (C-387/14)

In its Judgment of 4 May 2017 in Esaprojekt, C-387/14, EU:C:2017:338, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) provided clarification on some practical issues concerning the application of qualitative selection criteria to tenderers for public contracts seeking to rely on the capacities of third parties. The case is interesting because it concerns a situation where reliance on third party capacities is only sought once the contracting authority has reached a decision that the tenderer does not meet the relevant qualitative selection criteria on its own (or in the consortium configuration used in the submission of the initial tender).  

Thus, the case combines elements of clarification or supplementation of tender documentation with issues derived from the principles of non-discrimination, equal treatment and transparency. The Esaprojekt Judgment is based on the 2004 EU procurement rules (Dir 2004/18, Arts 2, 45, 48 and 51) but it is relevant for the interpretation of the 2014 rules as well (Dir 2014/24/EU, Arts 18, 19, 57 to 60, 63 and, specially, 56(3)).

In the case at hand, and in simple terms, the tenderer that submitted the preferred bid for the provision of IT services (Konsultant Komputer) had declared that it had the required previous experience through the execution of two contracts prior to the tender. However, on a challenge from a disappointed bidder (Esaprojekt), the contracting authority found that such previous experience was not acceptable because it did not concern contracts of the same type required in the tender documentation. At this stage, Konsultant Komputer sought to 'complement' the documentation evidencing its experience by providing the contracting authority with "a new list of supplies in which it relied on the experience of another entity, Medinet Systemy Informatyczne sp. z o.o. concerning two supplies ... It also sent an undertaking from Medinet Systemy Informatyczne to provide, as an advisor and consultant, the resources necessary for the performance of the contract ..." (C-387/14, para 27).

The contracting authority was satisfied with the submission of such 'complement' to the previous documentation, but (unsurprisingly), this was challenged by Esaprojekt on the basis that "Konsultant Komputer ... had submitted false information and had failed to prove that it had fulfilled the conditions for participation in the procedure" (para 29). The Polish court referring the case for preliminary ruling to the ECJ condensed the main legal issues as concerning whether the EU procurement rules (1) "preclude an economic operator, when it supplements documents at the request of the contracting authority, from relying on supplies of services other than those it included in its initial bid or from being able to rely, in that regard, on supplies of services made by another entity on whose resources it did not rely in its initial bid" (para 30); (2) whether, in the circumstances of the case, "the economic operator is able to ... rely on the capacities of other entities where it does not itself fulfil the minimum conditions required in order to take part in the tender procedure for a service contract" (para 31); and (3) the need to determine "in which circumstances an economic operator may be held liable for serious misconduct and, therefore, be excluded from taking part in a public contract" due to the supply of incorrect or misleading information concerning its previous experience (para 32). However, the questions referred to the ECJ do not map these three legal issues, but rather raise some other (more specific) issues.

It will not be surprising to find that the ECJ, in general, declared that proceeding as Konsultant Komputer and the contracting authority did was not allowed under the relevant provisions. On the main point concerning whether there was a breach of the requirements derived from the procurement rules and the general principles of procurement, after relying extensively on the principled framework consolidated in Partner Apelski Dariusz, the ECJ clarified that "Konsultant Komputer submitted documents to the contracting authority which were not included in its initial bid after the expiry of the time limit laid down for submitting applications for the public tender concerned. In particular ... it relied on a contract performed by another entity and the undertaking by the latter to place at the disposal of that operator the resources necessary for the performance of the contract ... Such further information, far from being merely a clarification made on a limited or specific basis or a correction of obvious material errors ... is in reality a substantive and significant amendment of the initial bid, which is more akin to the submission of a new tender" (paras 41-42). Thus, "by allowing the presentation by the economic operator concerned of the documents in question in order to supplement its original tender, the contracting authority unduly favour[ed] that operator as compared with other candidates and, thereby, breache[d] the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination of economic operators and the obligation of transparency which derives from them" (para 44).

The ECJ later addressed more specific issues. The following is thus just a short excerpt of the relevant parts of the Esaprojekt Judgment in relation to each of the issues--while some more critical reflections are saved for the final part of this post.

First, the ECJ considered the possibility of combining the knowledge and experience of two entities to meet a selection criterion where those entities do not separately have the capacities required to perform a particular contract, and where the contracting authority considers that the contract concerned cannot be divided and must thus be performed by a single operator. On that point, after slightly reinterpreting the question, the ECJ established that the relevant rules do "not allow an economic operator to rely on the capacities of another entity ... by combining the knowledge and experience of two entities which, individually, do not have the capacities required for the performance of a particular contract, where the contracting authority considers that the contract concerned cannot be divided, in that it must be performed by a single operator, and that such exclusion of the possibility to rely on the experience of several economic operators is related and proportionate to the subject matter of the contract which must be therefore performed by a single operator" (para 54).

Second, it considered the possibility for an economic operator that participates individually in an award procedure for a public contract to rely on the experience of a group of undertakings, of which it was part in connection with another public contract, irrespective of the nature of its participation in the performance of the latter. The ECJ found that the EU rules allow "an economic operator, for a particular contract, to rely on the capacities of other entities, such as a group of undertakings of which it is a member, so long as it proves to the contracting authority that that operator will have at its disposal the resources necessary for the execution of the contract" (para 60). Further, it clarified that "where an economic operator relies on the experience of a group of undertakings in which it has participated, that experience must be assessed in relation to the effective participation of that operator and, therefore, to its actual contribution to the performance of an activity required of that group in the context of a specific public contract" because, from a practical perspective, "an economic operator acquires experience not by the mere fact of being a member of a group of undertakings without any regard for its contribution to that group, but only by directly participating in the performance of at least part of the contract, the whole of which is to be performed by that group" and, consequently, "an economic operator cannot rely on the supplies of services by other members of a group of undertakings in which it has not actually and directly participated as experience required by the contracting authority" (paras 62-64).

Third, the ECJ was asked whether the possibility to exclude economic operators that are guilty of serious misrepresentation when supplying information requested by the contracting authority may be applied where the information is of such a nature as to affect the outcome of the call for tenders, irrespective of whether the economic operator acted intentionally or not. On this point, the ECJ concluded that the discretionary exclusion "may be applied where the operator concerned is guilty of a certain degree of negligence, that is to say negligence of a nature which may have a decisive effect on decisions concerning exclusion, selection or award of a public contract, irrespective of whether there is a finding of wilful misconduct on the part of that operator" (para 78) and, more explicitly, that "in order to sanction an economic operator which has submitted false declarations by excluding its participation in a public contract, the contracting authority is not required ... to provide evidence of the existence of wilful misconduct on the part of that economic operator" (para 72).

Finally, the considered whether EU procurement law allows an economic operator to justify compliance with an experience-based selection criterion by relying simultaneously on two or more contracts as a single contract (or, in other words, by combining different partial elements of experience), despite the fact that the contracting authority has not expressly provided for such a possibility either in the contract notice or in the tender specifications. On this point, the ECJ found that "it is conceivable prima facie that the experience necessary for the performance of the contract concerned, acquired by the economic operator in the performance of not one, but two or more different contracts, may be regarded as sufficient by the contracting authority and thereby enables that operator to win the public contract concerned" (para 85) and, therefore, "in so far as the possibility to rely on experience acquired in relation to several contracts has not been excluded either in the contract notice or in the tender specifications, it is for the contracting authority, subject to review by the competent national courts, to check whether the experience gained from two or more contracts, having regard to the nature of the works concerned and the subject matter and purpose of the contract concerned, ensures the proper performance of that contract" (para 87).

Overall, the level of clarification provided by the ECJ in the Esaprojekt should be welcome, although it also raises the broader issue of the extent to which national courts should be willing to engage in principles-based reasoning without referring extremely detailed references for preliminary rulings. There is a clear trade-off to be achieved between ensuring homogeneous interpretation of the EU public procurement rules and (not) overburdening the ECJ. If every case where the general principles of public procurement (now in Art 18(1) Dir 2014/24/EU) are applicable is referred to the ECJ, the system will not be able to cope. In my view, none of the issues raised in this case were particularly complex or controversial, and could have been resolved by general reference to the principles of equal treatment and transparency, which makes me wonder if there may not be a need for a different approach to these issues.

For example, discussion between practitioners has raised the issue whether it would be acceptable for an undertaking in a situation similar to Konsultant Komputer's first submission to 'complement' the selection documentation by supplying a fresh list of new own references (or references to its own experience not submitted in the original documentation). I would submit that it is not allowed. In my view, it is clearly not allowed if the experience has been gained after the date for the submission of tenders, because that establishes the relevant cut off point for the assessment of qualitative suitability (or responsiveness). And, also clearly (although it may be more debatable), this would not be allowed if the experience was gained before that date but the economic operator failed to include the relevant references in the original documentation. I think that this is the case because such an omission of previous experience is not observable by the contracting authority in view of the submitted documentation alone (how could it second guess whether the economic operator provided a full, or even the best, set of references?)--which, in my opinion, excludes it from the scope of application of the rules controlling the request for clarifications under both the Manova case law and the specific provisions of Art 56(3) Dir 2014/24/EU, except if the entire document concerning experience was missing (which would make the defect visible to the contracting authority). Functionally, I would think that this contributes to the manageability of the selection process, while being entirely compliant with the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination.

Anyway, the point I am trying to make is that, if issues at this level of detail need to be clarified by the ECJ in relation with each of the provisions of the procurement directives, the potential gains of having regulation partly based on general principles will be lost. Therefore, I wonder if it would be possible to reconsider the need for preliminary references where the application of general principles could do.

ECJ opens door to remedial possibilities when contracting authorities aim to exclude on the basis of shady participation requirements (C-27/15)

In its Judgment of 2 June 2016 in Pizzo, C-27/15, EU:C:2016:404, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has provided interpretative guidance on some aspects of the qualitative selection process that contracting authorities need to carry out prior to the award of public contracts covered by the relevant EU rules. It is worth noting that, even if the Pizzo Judgment is based on the rules of Directive 2004/18 (Arts 47 and 48), but the functional criteria it sets will be equally relevant under the new rules of Directive 2014/24 (Arts 56 to 58).

In particular, the Pizzo Judgment clarifies the scope of the discretion given to contracting authorities to interpret tender documents in a way that would unfavourably result in the exclusion of economic operators (following Manova, C‑336/12, EU:C:2013:647, see here; and Cartiera dell'Adda, C‑42/13, EU:C:2014:2345, see here), as well as the limits of the possibility given to economic operators to remedy formal shortcomings in the documentation presented in the course of their participation in the tender for a public contract in order to avoid such exclusion.

Pizzo also follows the flexible approach previously established by the ECJ regarding reliance on third party capacities (as per Swm Costruzioni 2 and Mannocchi Luigino, C-94/12, EU:C:2013:646, see here; and in a related fashion to Ostas celtnieks, C-234/14, EU:C:2016:6, see here). 

The case concerned the tender of a public service contract for the management of waste and cargo residues produced on board ships calling at ports within the contracting authority’s territorial jurisdiction (ie the Messina area, in Italy). The contracting authority received four tenders but decided to exclude three tenderers due to the lack of payment of an administrative fee that it considered a mandatory participation requirement, which led the authority to award the contract to the only remaining tenderer (Pizzo).

One of the excluded tenderers (CGRT) appealed the exclusion decision on the basis that the payment of the fee was only mandatory for works contracts, not for services contracts, and that the authority required such payment on the basis of a broad interpretation of the relevant rules and its general powers under Italian administrative law. In CGRT's submission, before proceeding to its exclusion from the tender, the authority should at least have given it the possibility to remedy the situation and pay the fee. CGRT's action was faced with a counterclaim by Pizzo whereby it challenged CGRT's compliance with the economic standing requirements for the participation in the tender due to the fact that it had relied on third party capacities (in the case, those of RIAL). 

Therefore, the case raised two issues: 1) to what extent can a contracting authority engage in a (discretionary) broad interpretation of the tender documents in a way that incorporates the requirement to pay a fee and proceed to the exclusion of those tenderers that had not paid the fee without giving them the opportunity to remedy the situation; and 2) to what extent must contracting authorities follow a flexible approach to the assessment of economic and technical standing requirements when tenderers rely on third party capacities. The first issue is more interesting and controversial than the second one. Thus, let's focus on the second issue first.

Again, on the flexible approach to reliance on third party capacities and how it carries over to new rules of directive 2014/24

In Pizzo, the ECJ revisits its consolidated case law in this area, without adding much to the already clear position that the applicable EU rules create significant flexibility for tenderers to rely on third party capacity, unless the tender documents establish reasonable and proportionate restrictions justified by the subject matter of the contract. In its own terms:

23      The Court has held that EU law does not require that, in order to be classified as an economic operator qualifying for tendering, a person wishing to enter into a contract with a contracting authority must be capable of direct performance using his own resources (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 December 2009 in CoNISMa, C‑305/08, EU:C:2009:807, paragraph 41).
24      ... Article 47(2) and Article 48(3) of Directive 2004/18 does not lay down any general prohibition regarding a candidate or tenderer’s reliance on the capacities of one or more third-party entities in addition to its own capacities in order to fulfil the criteria set by a contracting authority (see Swm Costruzioni 2, paragraph 30).
25      ... those provisions recognise the right of every economic operator to rely, for a particular contract, upon the capacities of other entities, ‘regardless of the nature of the links which it has with them’, provided that it proves to the contracting authority that it will have at its disposal the resources necessary for the performance of the contract (see Ostas celtnieks, paragraph 23).
26      It must therefore be held that Directive 2004/18 permits the combining of the capacities of more than one economic operator for the purpose of satisfying the minimum capacity requirements set by the contracting authority, provided that the candidate or tenderer relying on the capacities of one or more other entities proves to that authority that it will actually have at its disposal the resources of those entities necessary for the execution of the contract (see Swm Costruzioni 2, paragraph 33).
27      Such an interpretation is consistent with the objective pursued by the directives in this area of attaining the widest possible opening-up of public contracts to competition to the benefit not only of economic operators but also contracting authorities (see, to that effect, CoNISMa, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). In addition, that interpretation also facilitates the involvement of small- and medium-sized undertakings in the contracts procurement market, an aim also pursued by Directive 2004/18, as stated in recital 32 thereof (see Swm Costruzioni 2, paragraph 34).
28      ... however ... there may be works the special requirements of which necessitate a certain capacity which cannot be obtained by combining the capacities of more than one operator, which, individually, would be inadequate. It has thus acknowledged that, in such circumstances, the contracting authority would be justified in requiring that the minimum capacity level concerned be achieved by a single economic operator or by relying on a limited number of economic operators as long as that requirement is related and proportionate to the subject matter of the contract at issue. The Court has, however, stated that since those circumstances represent an exception, the requirements in question cannot be made general rules under national law (see, to that effect, Swm Costruzioni 2, paragraphs 35 and 36) (C-27/15, paras 23-28, references shortened).

The only novelty to be found in Pizzo is that the ECJ anticipates the interpretation of Art 63 Dir 2014/24 by stressing that

the specific provisions ... provide that it is possible for the contracting authority to require that the entity which is relied on to satisfy the conditions laid down with regard to economic and financial standing is to be jointly liable (Article 63(1), third subparagraph, of Directive 2014/24) or to require that, with regard to certain types of contracts, certain critical tasks are to be performed directly by the tenderer (Article 63(2) of that directive). Those provisions do not therefore impose specific limits on the possibility of divided reliance on the capacities of third-party undertakings and, in any event, such limits should have been expressly set out for in the call for tenders in respect of the contract at issue, which is not the case in the main proceedings (C-27/15, para 33, emphasis added).

This is in line with the interpretation of Art 63 Dir 2014/24 I hold in Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 315-318, but it is worth stressing that the ECJ has not yet tackled some of the restrictions allowed for under Art 63(2) Dir 2014/24 (ie the requirement that certain critical tasks are to be performed directly by the tenderer) which in my view run contrary to its previous case law. Thus, in this instance, the fact that the ECJ makes obiter comments on the likely future interpretation of the rules of Dir 2014/24 is worrying because there are two possible readings of paragraph 33 in Pizzo: (a) that the ECJ is giving carte blanche to the potential restrictions created by Art 63(1) and (2), or (b), that the ECJ is simply stressing that (regardless of their substantive merit and from a prior formal perspective), for such requirements to apply, they need to be created in the applicable tender documents (which, having not happened in this case, makes them irrelevant). I strongly vouch for (b), but I am certain that there will be claims based on (a) when the issue properly arises in litigation. Thus, in this case, the probably well-intended effort by the ECJ to anticipate the interpretation of the new rules may have created more shadows than lights.

On the tricky issue of the interpretation of tender documents, the duty to seek clarification or, at least, allow for remediation of short-comings leading to exclusion of economic operators

When tackling the challenge of the contracting authority's broad interpretation of the obligation to pay an administrative fee and its decision to exclude, without possibility to remedy such short-coming, the economic operators that had failed to pay it, the rephrased the question to mean 'whether the principle of equal treatment and the obligation of transparency are to be interpreted as precluding an economic operator from being excluded from a procedure for the award of a public contract as a result of that economic operator’s non-compliance with an obligation which does not expressly arise from the documents relating to that procedure or out of the national law in force, but from an interpretation of that law and from the incorporation of provisions into those documents by the national authorities or administrative courts' (C-27/15, para 35).

In that regard, the ECJ makes the following arguments and establishes the following reasoning:

36 ... all the conditions and detailed rules of the award procedure must be drawn up in a clear, precise and unequivocal manner in the contract notice or specifications so that, first, all reasonably informed tenderers exercising ordinary care can understand their exact significance and interpret them in the same way and, second, the contracting authority is able to ascertain whether the tenders submitted satisfy the criteria applying to the contract in question (see, to that effect, Cartiera dell’Adda, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
37      The Court has also held that the principles of transparency and equal treatment which govern all procedures for the award of public contracts require the substantive and procedural conditions concerning participation in a contract to be clearly defined in advance and made public, in particular the obligations of tenderers, in order that those tenderers may know exactly the procedural requirements and be sure that the same requirements apply to all candidates ...
45 ... in the case in the main proceedings, the alleged obligation to pay a fee to the AVCP [the Supervisory Authority on Public Procurement] can be identified only by the interaction between the 2006 Finance Law, the AVCP’s decision-making practice and the judicial practice of the Italian administrative courts in applying and interpreting Law No 266/2005.
46      As the Advocate General points out ... a condition governing the right to participate in a public procurement procedure which arises out of the interpretation of national law and the practice of an authority ... would be particularly disadvantageous for tenderers established in other Member States, inasmuch as their level of knowledge of national law and the interpretation thereof and of the practice of the national authorities cannot be compared to that of national tenderers.
48 ... it is apparent from the order for reference that there is no possibility of rectifying non-compliance with that condition that a fee must be paid.
49      According to paragraph 46 of the judgment in Cartiera dell’Adda ..., the contracting authority may not accept any rectification of omissions which, as expressly provided for in the contract documentation, must result in the exclusion of the bid. The Court stated, in paragraph 48 of that judgment, that the obligation concerned was clearly laid down in the contract documentation, on pain of exclusion.
50      However, in a situation where ... a condition for participating in a procedure for the award of a contract, on pain of exclusion from that procedure, is not expressly laid down in the contract documentation and that condition can be identified only by a judicial interpretation of national law, the contracting authority may grant the excluded tenderer a sufficient period of time in order to rectify its omission (C-27/15, paras 36-50, some references omitted and emphasis added).

I agree with the main reasoning of the ECJ on this issue as it coincides with a possibilistic and functional approach to the management of the exclusion and qualitative selection procedure aimed at minimising exclusion for causes that can be remedied without infringing the principle of equal treatment [for discussion, see A Sanchez-Graells, 'Exclusion, Qualitative Selection and Short-listing', in F Lichère, R Caranta & S Treumer (eds), Modernising Public Procurement. The New Directive, vol. 6 European Procurement Law Series (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2014) 97-129; and ibid, 'Rejection of Abnormally Low and Non-Compliant Tenders in EU Public Procurement: A Comparative View on Selected Jurisdictions', M Comba & S Treumer (eds) Award of Contracts in EU Procurements, vol. 5 European Procurement Law Series (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2013) 267-302].

However, I am not convinced by the way the ECJ has limited the opportunity to remedy the (interpreted) shortcomings in the tender documentation (or material requirements) to a mere possibility. As phrased in the operational part of the Pizzo Judgment, the ECJ has interpreted that

the principle of equal treatment and the obligation of transparency must be interpreted as precluding an economic operator from being excluded from a procedure for the award of a public contract as a result of that economic operator’s non-compliance with an obligation which does not expressly arise from the documents relating to that procedure or out of the national law in force, but from an interpretation of that law and those documents and from the incorporation of provisions into those documents by the national authorities or administrative courts. Accordingly, the principles of equal treatment and of proportionality must be interpreted as not precluding an economic operator from being allowed to regularise its position and comply with that obligation within a period of time set by the contracting authority (C-27/45, para 51, emphasis added).

I find this approach too lenient and I would have expected the ECJ to create a mandatory vis-a-vis procedure similar to the one applicable in case the contracting authority suspects an offer to be abnormally low under Art 69 Dir 2014/24. Generally, I think that rather than focusing solely on the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination, it is worth stressing the relevance of the principle of good administration as well. From that perspective, if the contracting authority identifies a participation requirement that was not obvious from the tender documentation, it should be subjected to a mandatory phase whereby it allows tenderers to remedy the situation. The same would go for the interpretation of Art 56(3) Dir 2014/24 in terms of the possibility (in my view, non-discretionary) to seek clarifications from tenderers and to 'take all appropriate steps to avoid the rejection of candidates on the basis of shortcomings in the available documentation that could be overcome if the contracting authority were to exercise the appropriate level of diligence' [Public procurement and the EU competition rules (2015) 321-323].

Overall, I think that this is an area where the ECJ is avoiding a much needed delineation of the limits (or at least checks and balances) to be imposed on the discretion of the contracting authorities to proceed to exclusion without exhausting the possibilities for clarification or remedy of formal shortcomings in the submission of tenders. This is likely to be an area of continued litigation, particularly as the Pizzo case opens the door to different treatment of participation requirements that directly derive from the tender documentation (where the contracting authority is likely to have its hands tied and not be able to provide any scope for remedial action beyond the very limited possibilities foreseen in Manova and Cartiera dell’Adda) or that indirectly arise from its contextual interpretation (where the Pizzo approach seems to open a rather big door to the enablement of remedial actions). Thus, the last word is certainly not yet written...

CJEU on solo bids by consortium member after partner's bankruptcy: a competition-friendly test? (C-396/14)

In its Judgment of 24 May 2016 in MT Højgaard and Züblin, C-396/14, EU:C:2016:347, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled on whether the principle of equal treatment of economic operators must be interpreted as precluding a contracting entity from allowing an economic operator that is a member of a group of two undertakings which was pre-selected and which submitted the first tender in a negotiated procedure for the award of a public contract, to continue to take part in that procedure in its own name, after the dissolution of that group due to the bankruptcy of the other partner.

This case is important because, even if it is based on the 2004 EU utilities procurement rules (Dir 2004/17), it makes general statements that carry over to public procurement covered by any other set of EU rules (notably Dir 2014/24), or even simply covered by the EU general principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination--thus pervading (almost) all instances of procurement at Member State level. Also of note, the MT Højgaard and Züblin Judgment explores the implications of the application of the principle of equal treatment for intra-tender competition and supports a flexible approach to the modification of bidding consortia that seems to be clearly pro-competitive. However, the CJEU's reasoning in the specific case comes with some difficulties attached, particularly in terms of the desirability of bidding consortia beyond the specific tender and the compatibility of EU public procurement and competition law.

Findings of the Court

In MT Højgaard and Züblin, the CJEU was presented with a case where a contracting authority was running a negotiated procedure with a prior call for competition, and where the contracting authority indicated that it wanted to proceed to negotiations with between four and six candidates. It received expressions of interest from five candidates, which included both the group consisting of MT Højgaard and Züblin (‘the Højgaard and Züblin group’) and the group consisting of Per Aarsleff and E. Pihl og Søn A/S (‘the Aarsleff and Pihl group’). The contracting authority pre-selected all five candidates and invited them to submit tenders. One of the pre-selected candidates subsequently withdrew from the procedure. 

There are some procedural complications due to the parallel existence of the domestic bankruptcy proceedings but, for the purposes of our discussion, the relevant fact is that Pihl entered into bankruptcy prior to the submission of the tender, which de facto implied the dissolution of the Aarsleff and Pihl group, but Aarsleff decided to proceed as a solo tenderer. The contracting authority was thus left with two options: (a) to consider that Aarsleff was not qualified on its own merits and to carry on with the negotiated procedure with 'only' three tenders; or, conversely, (b) to consider that Aarsleff could benefit from the qualification of the group to which it initially belonged and go forward with its desired minimum of four tenders.

After some analysis, the contracting authority 'informed all the tenderers of its decision to allow Aarsleff to continue to take part, alone, in the procedure. [It] explained that decision by stating that Aarsleff, which was the leading contracting company in Denmark in terms of turnover for the financial years 2012 and 2013, satisfied the conditions required for participation in the negotiated procedure, even in the absence of the technical and financial capacities of Pihl . In addition, Aarsleff had taken over the contracts of more than 50 salaried staff of Pihl, including the individuals who were key to the implementation of the project concerned' (C-396/14, para 14). Aarsleff was thus allowed to submit a tender and, after a further round of best and final offers between the three better placed tenderers, it was awarded the contract. Unsurprisingly, the Højgaard and Züblin group challenged the award decision.

As we will see, allowing Aarsleff to progress to the negotiation phase as a solo tenderer raises two separate issues: 1) whether Aarsleff needed to team up with Pihl at all in order to participate in the negotiated procedure [notably because, as confirmed by the referring Danish public procurement complaints board, 'on the basis of the information provided concerning Aarsleff, that company would have been pre-selected if it had sought an invitation to take part in its own name instead of doing so through the intermediary of the Aarsleff and Pihl group', para 18]; and 2) whether Aarsleff's technical standing was being reassessed at a point where no other candidates or potentially interested undertakings were having their technical standing assessed, which would in itself be a competitive advantage. However, the CJEU does not really focus on either of these issues in detail and the test it creates seems to miss some important analytical issues--which assessment is too conveniently left to the referring authority.

Rather, the CJEU focuses on an analysis of the situation as a modification of the composition of the bidding consortium formed by Aarsleff and Pihl. In doing so, the CJEU resorts to its case law in Makedoniko Metro and Michaniki (C‑57/01, EU:C:2003:47) and considers that in the absence of EU and Danish rules on the composition of bidding consortia, 'the question of whether a contracting entity may allow such an alteration must be examined with regard to the general principles of EU law, in particular the principle of equal treatment and the duty of transparency that flows from it, and the objectives of that law in relation to public procurement' (para 36). It then carries on with such an assessment and, fundamentally, determines that

38 The principle of equal treatment of tenderers, the aim of which is to promote the development of healthy and effective competition between undertakings taking part in a public procurement procedure, requires that all tenderers must be afforded equality of opportunity when formulating their tenders, and therefore implies that the tenders of all competitors must be subject to the same conditions ...
41 ...  [the rules on qualitative selection] may be qualified in order to ensure, in a negotiated procedure, adequate competition ...
42 ... the contracting entity considered that there should be at least four candidates in order to ensure such competition.
43 If, however, an economic operator is to continue to participate in the negotiated procedure in its own name, following the dissolution of the group of which it formed part and which had been pre-selected by the contracting entity, that continued participation must take place in conditions which do not infringe the principle of equal treatment of the tenderers as a whole.
44 In that regard, a contracting entity is not in breach of that principle where it permits one of two economic operators, who formed part of a group of undertakings that had, as such, been invited to submit tenders by that contracting entity, to take the place of that group following the group’s dissolution, and to take part, in its own name, in the negotiated procedure for the award of a public contract, provided that it is established, first, that that economic operator by itself meets the requirements laid down by the contracting entity and, second, that the continuation of its participation in that procedure does not mean that the other tenderers are placed at a competitive disadvantage.
45      In the main proceedings, it must, first, be stated that it is apparent  that had Aarsleff, alone, made an application for an invitation to take part in the procedure, it would have been pre-selected ...
47      Last, as regards the fact that, after the dissolution of the Aarsleff and Pihl group, Aarsleff took on the contracts of 50 salaried staff of Pihl, including individuals who were key to the implementation of the construction project concerned, it is for the referring court to determine whether Aarsleff thereby acquired a competitive advantage at the expense of the other tenderers (C-396/14, paras 38-47, references omitted and emphasis added). 

There are some initial remarks to make in view of this. First, the CJEU continues to be largely captured by the trap of tender-specific reasoning when it indicates that 'the aim of [the principle of equal treatment of tenderers] is to promote the development of healthy and effective competition between undertakings taking part in a public procurement procedure' (para 38, emphasis added). This is so because the CJEU fails to take into account that modification of procedural requirements (such as qualitative selection) once the tender is on-going can have discriminatory effects against interested undertakings that decided not to participate in the tender due to the requirements now being modified.

More importantly, the CJEU seems to give great weight to the fact that the contracting authority had determined that, for there to be effective competition in that specific tender, 'there should be at least four candidates in order to ensure such competition' (para 42). This is troubling both because the establishment of a bracket of four to six candidates is an arbitrary decision and it is hard to accept that having three offers is insufficient in the specific tender while the contracting authority decided to have a round of final and best offers precisely with three tenderers only.

Thus, from a material point of view, the way the CJEU conceptualises the relevant competitive framework (as intra-tender, and subject to the minimum participation of four candidates) is very artificial. Nonetheless, these issues do not seem to weigh too heavily in the actual reasoning of the CJEU, which  imposes a flexible approach to the rules on modification of bidding consortia, subject to respect for the qualitative selection requirements imposed by the contracting authority (ie, no selective/preferential waivers), as well as the absence of competitive advantage.

changes in the composition of bidding consortia prior to award,
even when they are only a duo

In abstract and general terms, the approach taken by the CJEU should be welcome because it focuses on the creation of the maximum possible flexibility so as to preserve (intra-tender) competitive pressure. This is something I had broadly advocated for:

Member States should depart from formal criteria based on rigid interpretations of the principle of equal treatment in designing their domestic provisions on bidding consortia—such as rules regulating their composition, their modification, etc. Rules on bidding consortia should adopt a pro-competitive orientation and, consequently, should foster participation of consortia to the maximum possible extent permitted by competition law. In this regard, the general criterion should be to allow the most flexible solutions unless their implementation could be materially negative for the development of the tender process. Along these lines, in relation with, for example, modifications of a group of contractors—such as the inclusion of new members, exclusion or substitution of previous members, re-allocation of shares to the consortium, or of responsibilities and tasks, etc—these should be allowed under national public procurement rules if they are not material, in the sense that the modified composition or internal rules of the consortium have not altered the contracting authority’s decision to qualify the group or to allow it to proceed to any of the stages of the procurement process already conducted. It is submitted that this flexibility should go as far as to allow for the substitution of a consortium with one of its (leading) members, as long as it can prove that it still fulfils all the relevant requirements set by the tender specifications and documents (for instance, by subcontracting to the former members of the consortium or with equally acceptable or equivalent third companies)—since, at least functionally, the group of undertakings involved in the tender would not be materially altered, even though the distribution of risks, responsibilities and benefits amongst them might have significantly changed. Such flexibility is required by the need to favour the continued participation of consortia (or, at least, their core members) in the tender process, since it increases competition and enhances the chances of the public buyer obtaining value for money [A Sanchez-Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 339, footnotes omitted].

However, the issue here is that, in the specific case, it is unclear how Aarsleff could simultaneously have been qualified without resort to Pihl's specialist technical capabilities (particularly, in terms of human resources), and at the same time the fact that it took over the contracts of 50 of Pihl's employees is relevant in terms of ensuring that the changes to the consortium are not material for the purposes of allowing it to proceed as a solo tenderer. Without more details on the case, this is difficult to assess this issue, but it would seem that for Aarsleff's to meet the qualitative selection criteria on its own, it should have demonstrated to have capacity to carry out the specialist bits of the project independently. If this is true, then it would seem that Aarsleff and Pihl's consortium should not have been allowed at all, due to the uncompensated restriction of competition implicit in such type of teaming arrangement (see below).

However, if Aarsleff  had not demonstrated specialist capabilities at qualitative selection stage (because it was not a qualitative selection requirement) and this is only assessed at award stage, it seems that allowing it to rely on the fact that it took over employees from Pihl is a borderline case of conflation of selection and award criteria (not allowed under the rules of Dir 2004/17, but now allowed under the 2014 public procurement package). This can be problematic on its own, but the case does not provide enough information to assess it. At any rate, though, what seems very clear is that the contracting authority seemed to take a "dynamic approach" to the assessment of the technical capabilities of Aarsleff (first as part of the consortium and then on its own, but having taken over part of Pihl's workforce), which seems to create a competitive advantage per se [or, at least, to warrant a very close scrutiny, as stressed by AG Mengozzi in his Opinion (EU:C:2015:774, paras 80-82, not available in English)].

By not establishing this in clear terms and including this concern only as a caveat of the main test created in the MT Højgaard and Züblin Judgment, the CJEU leaves the assessment open to the consideration of the referring Danish complaints board. In that regard, it is important to stress that, in the latter's view,

[the contracting authority] laid down minimum conditions as to quality with respect to the technical capacities of the tenderers and was to undertake a qualitative assessment of the applications only if their number was greater than six. Aarsleff could therefore have been pre-selected in its own name, without being part of the Aarsleff and Pihl group. The fact that Aarsleff took the place of that group had, moreover, no effect on the situation of tenderers, in so far as none of the candidates was excluded in the pre-selection phase and none would have been rejected if Aarsleff itself had applied for an invitation to take part (C-396/14, para 19).

This may well lead the Danish complaints board to conclude that Aarsleff did not gain any competitive advantage over the other candidates participating in the tender. If nothing else, from the beginning, they knew that the capacities of Aarsleff and Pihl would be combined to submit a competing tender. The fact that Aarleff did that under its own name rather than in the name of the group could be seen as a formality without any practical relevance.

However, the broader point is that, once more, this type of reasoning can be affected by the trap of tender-specific reasoning. If it had been foreseeable for undertakings that decided not to participate in the tender that they would only need to demonstrate specialist technical capacity at tender award stage, then this is correct. However, if it would have been the reasonable interpretation that interested economic operators had to demonstrate such specialist capacity at qualitative selection stage, then the analysis would be wrong by failing to identify the discrimination/ disadvantage/ unequal treatment of potentially interested candidates that decided not to participate in the tender.

Thus, it would seem legally sounder to decide the case on the basis of whether the possibility to demonstrate that capacity at tender-specific level (ie award stage) was foreseeable ex ante (and legal, which seems difficult to justify on the basis of Dir 2004/17 and the Lianakis line of case law that controlled its interpretation), rather than whether it is discriminatory ex post. In any case, however, there is the broader issue that the CJEU does not tackle head on, and this is whether the Aarsleff and Pihl's consortium should not have been allowed at all due to its potential incompatibiity with competition law, which requires some attention.

the desirability of bidding consortia more broadly; did the CJEU miss it?

Overall, and from a logical perspective, the discussion on the rules applicable to changes in the composition of bidding consortia and their permissibility necessarily comes second to the broader question of the desirability of bidding consortia in themselves. In my view, this should be assessed under the following framework:

public procurement rules on teaming and joint bidding should be in perfect compliance with article 101 TFEU on agreements between undertakings and its case law—since public procurement rules cannot establish derogations or carve-outs to this fundamental provision of primary EU law ... In this regard, teaming and joint bidding must be seen as instances of collaboration between undertakings and, consequently, should be prohibited if they have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition (ex art 101(1) TFEU), unless (i) they meet the requirements for the legal exemption of article 101(3) TFEU, (ii) they can be considered de minimis, or (iii) they are otherwise exempted from the general prohibition. Of particular relevance here will be the interpretation that should be given to article 101(3) TFEU in the field of public procurement—ie, what requirements should be met by efficient teaming and joint bidding agreements to benefit from the legal exemption. In this regard, it should be noted that—provided the conditions regarding the indispensability of the restrictions derived from the agreement, and regarding the preservation (rectius, non-elimination) of competition in the market are complied with, so that teaming and joint bidding agreements do not distort competition in the market—otherwise restrictive consortia agreements are desirable if they expand the number of candidates or tenderers (ie, if they are concluded between firms that do not have the economic capabilities to undertake the procured contract individually) and/or if they intensify the competition between existing candidates or tenderers (ie, if they improve upon the participants’ efficiency to the benefit of the public buyer). Therefore, the relevant criteria from a competition law perspective seem to be that teaming and joint bidding must contribute to intensifying competition within the tender while not generating significant competitive distortions in the market—eg, not generating significant exclusionary effects or otherwise imposing unnecessary restrictions on the market behaviour of the parties to the consortium agreement [Sanchez-Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules (2015) 338-339, footnotes omitted and emphasis added].

In this specific case, and on the basis of the limited information available in the MT Højgaard and Züblin Judgment, there seems to be a prima facie case to consider that Aarsleff could have participated in the tender on its own and, consequently, there was no justification for it to team up with Pihl if it was a potential competitor, or to prevent the creation of valuable subcontracting relationships between Pihl and third parties. At the very least, Aarsleff should be required to demonstrate and justify the advantages that it intended to achieve with its collaboration with Pihl and how these would have (or indeed have) been passed on to the contracting authority.Thus, a more detailed assessment would be necessary to determine whether the formation of the Aarsleff and Pihl group was in itself restrictive of competition--eg by allowing Aarsleff to 'grab' the specialist technical capabilities of Pihl in order to prevent it from teaming up with a potential competitor or to compete for the contract on its (if it had the necessary capacities)--or not. This is something only the Danish complaints board can do at this stage, if at all.

Final Comments

Overall, it can well be that all the issues discussed here are simply apparent problems derived from the very stylised version of the facts available in the MT Højgaard and Züblin CJEU Judgment. However, in my view, they serve as a cautionary tale against the adoption of seemingly competition-friendly solutions to deal with specific public procurement issues, without previously checking that the competitive situation is not conceived in an artificial manner (ie the need to avoid the trap of tender-specific reasoning) and that the more general compatibility between EU public procurement and competition law is ensured.

Current Proposals on Exclusion, Qualitative Selection and Shortlisting in EU Public Procurement

I have just uploaded on SSRN a short new paper, which provides some initial thoughts on the new rules on exclusion, qualitative selection and short-listing in the 2011 proposal for a new public sector procurement Directive, as amended by the 30 November 2012 Compromise Text published by the Council. The assessment is based on a comparison with the equivalent rules under current Directive 2004/18/EC, as well as on the implementation difficulties that I envisage.

In the paper, I reach the following conclusions:
As this brief overview of the novelties and changes proposed by the Compromise Text on the rules concerning exclusion, qualitative selection and short-listing has shown, the Commission has presented (and the Council is willing to allow for) reform proposals that aim to generate some simplification and flexibilisation of the current rules. The Compromise Text has also tried to clarify and improve the drafting of the current Directives and to consolidate requirements and avoid duplication where possible.
The search for flexibility and simplification is particularly clear concerning the rules that aim to make exclusion of economic operators a dynamic activity (§2.2), that increase the scope and power for contracting authorities to seek clarifications and source additional information from tenderers (§2.4), that allow for an evaluation of the effectiveness of self-cleaning measures adopted by economic operators that should otherwise be excluded (§3.3), or that allow for a ‘certificate-less’ qualitative selection of candidates, subject to an ex post verification of the self-declarations submitted (§4.5). However, such flexibility does not come without risks and contracting authorities must tread lightly if they want to avoid challenges based on potential abuses of their (increased) administrative discretion. Moreover, the extent and weight of the obligations derived from the principle of good administration are expanding and this needs being duly taken into consideration.
There are also clear indications of a clearer integration of public procurement and competition rules (such as the possibility to exclude bid riggers, §3.2) and of the use of public procurement as a lever to ensure compliance with social, labour and environmental rules, in a classic example of pursuit of secondary (or horizontal) considerations in procurement (§2.3). This shows that, despite the search for simplification, the (asymmetrical) integration of public procurement and other economic and non-economic policies by necessity depicts a more complicated scenario that requires further professionalism and capacity building in the Member States, as well as more cooperation between contracting authorities and other competent authorities, such as national competition or environmental agencies.
All in all, in my view, EU public procurement regulation continues becoming more and more sophisticated (and complicated), the Compromise Text does not solve all problems and creates some new and, consequently, public procurement litigation will continue playing a key role in the clarification of the applicable rules.