First thoughts on the Commission's bid rigging exclusion guidance -- what difference will it make?

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On 18 March 2021, the European Commission officially published its Notice on tools to fight collusion in public procurement and on guidance on how to apply the related exclusion ground (the ‘bid rigging exclusion guidance’). This document has been a long time in the making and officially announced almost four years ago, so it is no exaggeration to say that it was keenly awaited (by competition and procurement geeks like yours truly, at least).

The guidance is clearly addressed to contracting authorities — not economic operators — and is distinctly ‘pro exclusion’ in its minimisation of the practical difficulties and legal constraints inherent in the adoption of exclusion decisions. However, even with such clearly programmatic orientation, after a first reading, I have a few thoughts that do not make for an optimistic assessment of the guidance’s likely practical impact.

Mostly, because I do not think the Commission’s bid rigging exclusion guidance provides much by way of actionable practical advice to contracting authorities—and it certainly does not really go beyond already existing guidance, such as the OECD’s 2009 guidelines for fighting bid rigging in public procurement. By contrast with more general documents e.g. the OECD guidance, the Commission’s bid rigging exclusion guidance intends to concentrate on the possibility to exclude operators engaged in the manipulation of a tender. However, it includes lenghty discussion of measures to prevent collusion, as well as complementary measures such as training and data analysis and, when it comes to the specific issues that the interpretation and application of Art 57(4)(d) of Dir 2014/24/EU generates, it is mainly restricted to setting out issues that Member States’ domestic legislation cannot do — rather than focusing on what contracting authorities can (and should) do.

Moreover, its likely limited practical impact results from the fact that the guidance simply ignores that the EU rules (especially discretionary ones) need to be embedded in the Member States’ administrative/public law system and, in many places, the guidance is at odds with the latter. In that regard, the guidance seems to presume a sort of sphere of subjective rights for contracting authorities that they are capable of exercising even against the decisions of other (superior/centralised) administrative authorities, or in disregard of broader constraints and requirements for administrative action—such as burden of proof, the duty to state reasons, the increasing enforceability of exclusion grounds against other tenderers, or the very practical implications of risking damages compensation for unlawful exclusion—which is (as far as I know) an area of constant interest for tenderers and practitioners alike.

To be fair, this in part follows from the stance of the Court of Justice in some recent cases (referred to in the guidance), but that is still no excuse for the Commission’s guidance not to recognise that Member States retain significant discretion in their administrative self-organisation and that some of the issues raised in the practical implementation of the relevant provisions will be conditioned by pre-existing administrative law doctrines and procedures.

The most glaring example of this approach that sidesteps the difficulties in the domestic implementation of EU procurement law is the fact that the guidance simply states that ‘The possibility to exclude an economic operator for suspected collusion is not construed in the Directive as a penalty for its behaviour before or during the award procedure’ (section 5.2). That is at face value fine. But the Directive also does not say that exclusion is not a penalty or a sanction and, consequently, establishing the legal nature of an exclusion will be dependent on the relevant public/administrative law framework at Member State level. Moreover, exclusion has been framed as a penalty in at least one recent preliminary reference and the Court of Justice has not disabused the referring court from that prima facie legal classification (see eg Tim, C-395/18, EU:C:2020:58). Given the increasing relevance of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the interpretation of economic operators’ rights in the context of procurement litigation, I think it is far from certain that exclusion will not be construed as a (quasi)penalty, in particular when it is grounded on the infringement of prohibitive legal rules (such as Art 101 TFEU), rather than on shortcomings in the standing of the economic operator or non-compliance of its tender with substantive and formal requirements included in the tender documents.

To my mind, this (ie the nature of exclusion measures) can be one of the thorniest interpretive issues in this area, particularly because of the due process implications of exclusion being treated as a penalty or sanction—which is also not helped by the absence in the Remedies Directive of any procedural requirements applicable to the exclusion stage. The perpetuation of this disconnect with the Member States’ administrative law framework can in itself constitute the quicksands where the bid rigging exclusion guidance disappears, and certainly can continue to prevent an adequate use of the possibility to exclude tenderers suspected of bid rigging, because the fundamental issues raised by Art 57(4)(d) Dir 2014/24/EU remain unresolved — coupled with other sweeping statements concerning e.g. the level of demonstrability of the suspected collusion that contracting authorities need to meet (as discussed below).

For these and the reasons given below, I am afraid that the bid rigging exclusion guidance will not leave up to the expectations. I will carry out a more detailed and formal assessment of the guidance in a future research paper (likely after my shared parental leave… so not until mid summer or so), but here are my further initial observations, which do not attempt to be comprehensive.

Framing the issue

For those interested in understanding how to interpret and apply Art 57(4)(d) and the associated Art 57(6) self-cleaning possibilities, only section 5 and the Annex of the bid rigging exclusion guidance will be relevant. Indeed, the bid rigging exclusion guidance includes a rather lengthy explanation of what the Commission has done and what it expects to do (or for Member States to do) in the broader area of professionalisation and promotion of collaboration between competition and procurement authorities, which makes the document not very practical. This raises some questions on the fitness for purpose of the document, and whether alternative guidance format that had discharged most of sections 1 to 4 onto a different policy document would have been preferable, but perhaps this is mostly just presentational.

One of the most welcome aspects of the bid rigging exclusion guidance is that, in section 5.2, it makes it clear that the ground for exclusion based on suspected ‘contemporaneous’ collusion (or bid rigging) in Article 57(4)(d) of Directive 2014/24/EU is separate from (and compatible with) the possibility of excluding infringers of competition law as economic operators ‘guilty of grave professional misconduct’ under Article 57(4)(c). It is also to be welcome that, also in section 5.2, the Commission shares the view that, despite the different wording of Art 57(4)(d) and Art 101 TFEU, the former needs to be interpreted in a Treaty-consistent manner, which means that the exclusion must be possible for all types of behaviours caught by Art 101 TFEU — notably, concerted practices and decisions by associations of undertakings, in addition to agreements [for discussion, and advancing the positions now confirmed by the guidance, see A Sanchez-Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (2nd edn, Hart 2015) 296 ff].

The Commission also rightly stresses that contracting authorities in principle retain discretion not to exclude economic operators suspected of bid rigging, as the exclusion ground in Art 57(4)(d) is discretionary. However, this obviates not only the possibility for Member States to transpose it as a mandatory exclusion ground, but also more general EU law duties (such as the duty not to deprive Art 101 TFEU of its effet utile), and domestic administrative law duties (such as equivalent duties not to promote or tolerate illegal activity, or duties mandating inter-administrative collaboration with competition authorities). In that regard, the bid rigging exclusion guidance could have usefully developed a checklist of reasons that could (objectively) justify not excluding economic operators despite there being sufficiently plausible indications to conclude that the economic operator had entered into agreements with other economic operators aimed at distorting competition. In the end, it will not (or should not) be entirely up to the contracting authority to decide to turn a blind eye on those indicia.

Lack of practical guidance, or guidance that is impractical

Despite the largely correct framing of the issue, and despite acknowledging that tackling bid rigging in procurement is fraught with difficulties, the bid rigging exclusion guidance fails to deliver the much needed practical orientations on how to identify contemporaneous bid rigging and how to apply (as opposed to interpret) the relevant exclusion ground of Art 57(4)(d) Dir 2014/24.

The guidance does not really provide practical tips on how to identify bid rigging in a single tender scenario (which is the most likely to be faced by most contracting authorities). If indications of the existence of bid rigging that require cross-sectional or time series analysis are left to one side (as those are generally not for contracting authorities, but rather for competition authorities to screen for and analyse), and with the exception of flagging as suspicious unexpected tender withdrawals (annex, section 3), the only indications highlighted in the guidance (section 5.3) are:

  • The text of the tenders (for instance, the same typos or phrases in different tenders or comments left by mistake in the text of the tender indicating collusion among tenderers).

  • The prices offered in the award procedure (for instance, tenderers who ... offer excessively high or low prices) [although the interaction of this with the rules on abnormally low tenders is not explored]

  • Administrative details (for instance, tenders submitted by the same business representative)

This is then slightly expanded in the annex (section 3), which details indicia such as:

  • Identical mistakes or spelling errors in different tenders.

  • Different tenders drafted with similar handwriting [in 2021!] or typeface [except default in most commonly used software applications, one would hope!].

  • Tenders using another tenderer’s letterhead or contact details.

  • Different tenders with identical miscalculations or identical methodologies to estimate the cost of certain items.

  • Tenders submitted by the same person or with persons having the same contact details.

This can only help contracting authorities identify clumsy economic operators, potentially involved in collusion. However, in all seriousness, this is unlikely to result in much practical results as once these types of issues are included in official guidelines, it is likely that economic operators will make sure to avoid those mistakes when thy submit rigged bids [for discussion, in the context of automated treatment of bids, see A Sanchez-Graells, '"Screening for Cartels" in Public Procurement: Cheating at Solitaire to Sell Fool’s Gold?' (2019) 10(4) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 199–211].

The guidance also incurs in temporal inconsistencies, such as when it uses as an indication of bid rigging that contracting authorities should take into account for the purposes of exclusion: ‘The selected tenderer subcontracting work to unsuccessful tenderers for the same contract or the selected tenderer not accepting to sign the contract and later found to be a subcontractor of the tenderer that is finally awarded the contract may be considered sufficiently plausible indications of collusion’ (annex). This can well be an indication of bid rigging, but at this stage no exclusion can take place because the contract will have been awarded. Consequently, the relevant consequence here should be reporting this issue to the competition authority as well as, where possible, terminating the contract (which is not, however, explicitly foreseen in the Directive).

The guidance is also somewhat naive or flippant, for example in its remarks concerning the contracting authority’s (potential) knowledge that a tenderer ‘has pre-ordered the material needed to perform the specific contract in question well before the evaluation of the tenders is concluded’. Quite how a contracting authority would get to this knowledge, or how specific the pre-order should be for it not to be susceptible of confusion with just a standard supply of the economic operators is anybody’s guess.

It can also generate confusion when it, on the one hand, recommends resorting to centralised procurement as a way of avoiding collusion and, on the other, stresses that framework agreements managed by central purchasing bodies are more susceptible to collusion than ordinary tender procedures (annex, section 2).

Moreover, the guidance lacks detail in crucial aspects and, in particular, concerning the extremely complex analysis of joint tenders and subcontracting among (potential) competitors (section 5.6). Here, the Commission’s guidance does not even cross-refer to the more detailed guidelines published by some Member States’ competition authorities — notably, the Danish Competition and Consumers Authority. Similarly, the guidance largely brushes over the complex issue of multiple participation by economic operators belonging to the same corporate group (section 5.5), and also sets aside the difficulties of deciding the scope of application of exclusion decisions that need to respect the doctrine of the single economic entity under competition law [for discussion, see K Kuzma and W Hartung, Combating Collusion in Public Procurement (Elgar, 2020)].

Let’s ignore the administrative legal framework

The Commission’s bid rigging exclusion guidance largely ignores the administrative legal framework at Member State level. This is not only in relation to the treatment of exclusion as (not) a penalty, but also in relation to evidentiary requirements and the related duty to provide reasons. In that regard, the literal interpretation of the Directive leading to the conclusion that ‘national rules should comply with both the letter and the spirit of the Directive, which requires only “indications” of participating in illegal agreements that distort competition in an award procedure and not formal evidence, such as a court judgment confirming such participation’ (section 5.4) is misleading and conflates the need for a prior administrative or judicial decision with the existence of ‘evidence’ of collusion.

First, the guidance is right to exclude the need for a previous administrative or judicial decision, but that should not be treated as excluding ‘evidence’ of collusion, but rather as a precedent decision that has the effects of (quasi) res iudicata or, at least, constitutes a legal fact that the contracting authority cannot ignore. It is also wrong to indicate that ‘plausible indications’ of collusion include, for example, ‘information brought to the attention of the contracting authority of an investigation launched by the competition authority or of penal charges brought against the management of the operator for suspected collusion either in the pending award procedure or in other award procedures’, as this raises fundamental issues concerning the presumption of inocence (which treatment will also differ across jurisdictions, depending on e.g. the trigger for the opening of an administrative investigation). Here the guidance makes the reverse mistake of conflating a formal decision with the evidence (presumably) underpinning it.

Second, the guidance ignores the legal meaning of ‘evidence’ when it establishes that ‘contracting authorities are not required to have evidence of collusion in a pending award procedure, as this would contradict the letter of the Directive’. ‘Plausible indicia’ are a type of evidence, falling short of direct (uncontrovertible) evidence, but clearly above the absence of evidence. This should have been clear from the excerpt that the guidance quotes, where the CJEU stressed that ‘anti-competitive behaviour, “may be proved not only by direct evidence, but also through indicia, provided that they are objective and consistent and that the related tenderers are in a position to submit evidence in rebuttal”’ (Specializuotas transportas, C-531/16, EU:C:2018:324, paragraph 37).

Indiciary evidence is still evidence and the unresolved problem is where to draw the line to decide that the contracting authority has enough evidentiary support to adopt an exclusion decision. Moreover, this is of paramount relevance to the adequate discharge of the duty to state reasons. Here, it not only is impossible for a contracting authority to act in the absence of evidence, but the administrative file will usually be accessible to the economic operator for the purposes of its legal defence. This makes the further recommendation for contracting authorities not to disclose to economic operators that they suspect the existence of bid rigging largely impractical, as the contracting authority will only be able to keep this under wraps up to the point where it must make a formal decision and notification to the economic operator affected by the (potential) exclusion.

Some problematic statements

Unfortunately, in addition to the shortcomings stressed above (and some others), the guidance includes some unhelpful statements concerning the interpretation and application of Art 57(7) of Directive 2014/24/EU, in particular when it states that ‘If an economic operator, who has been excluded from award procedures for a certain period under Article 57(7) of the Directive, submits a tender during the period of exclusion, the contracting authority, without any further need for assessment, must automatically reject that tender’ (section 5.9), and when it reiterates that ‘It goes without saying that if the economic operator has been excluded from all award procedures in your country for a period of time and submits a tender during this period, you must exclude it from your award procedure without assessing the tender submitted.’ (section 3 of Annex) (both emphases added).

These statements are, at best, confusing and misleading and, at worse, legally incorrect. In that regard, it should be stressed that Art 57(6) Dir 2014/24/EU is very clear that the conditions for lengthy exclusions stipulated by Member States in the implementation of Art 57(7) are to be applied ‘if no measures as specified in paragraph 6 are taken by the economic operator to demonstrate its reliability’. Therefore, the statements above should have made it clear that further assessment is required and contracting authorities must carry it out where an economic operator, who has been excluded from award procedures for a certain period under Article 57(7) of the Directive, submits a tender during the period of exclusion and it claims to have implemented the sort of measures detailed in Art 57(6).

This is the sort of problematic drafting that should be avoided in official guidance and, in this instance, rectified by the Commission as soon as possible.

Final thoughts

On the whole, a first reading of the guidance does not call for optimism. While the Commission’s bid rigging exclusion guidance does contain some useful information, it is at its weakest in relation to the particularities of the interpretation and application of Art 57(4)(d) and related provisions of Directive 2014/24/EU, which are supposed to constitute its core concentration.

I would not be surprised if contracting authorities found little to no comfort in the guidance when pondering how to address the key issue of how to spot collusion in single-tender settings, how to decide if there are sufficient plausible indications, and how to go about the adoption of an exclusion decision that is, in almost all likelihood, going to be challenged on the basis that it constitutes a sanction/penalty for a (suspected) breach of competition law that the contracting authority has no competence to enforce, or which has not followed the heightened procedural requirements of procedures leading to the imposition of a sanction. It should be obvious that exclusion on these grounds generates the additional risk of a follow-on investigation by the competition authority and/or private litigation, so no economic operator should be expected to just accept an exclusion on grounds of contemporaneous bid rigging under Art 57(4)(d) Dir 2014/24/EU (or, rather, its domestic transposition).

I will continue reflecting on the guidance and its implications, and I am sure there will be a lively debate in the months and years to come. As always, any feedback and comments will be most welcome.

The European Commission's Recommendation on procurement professionalisation: Show me the money

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In a second ‘mini-round’ of ‘procurement tennis’, Pedro Telles and I are critically assessing the European Commission’s October 2017 package of communications on public procurement. We started with the ‘voluntary ex ante mechanism for large infrastructure projects’ (see here and here), and Pedro has followed with his views on the ‘recommendation on professionalisation’ (see here). I will also discuss this document now. In two following pairs of posts, we plan to discuss the consultation on guidance on procurement of innovation and the communication on 'Making public procurement work in and for Europe' itself. Watch this space.

Focusing on the recommendation on professionalisation, Pedro has raised important points about the limited effects that professionalisation (understood as training and career management) can have in the absence of financial and reputational incentives for procurers, as well as specific issues concerning the aspects of the recommendation that deal with issues that have no (or almost no) bearing with a discussion on professionalization—such as issues concerning environmental and sustainable procurement, e-procurement or anti-corruption measures. Pedro has also raised important points concerning the need to look beyond the EU in search for best practices, and the need to distinguish between exchange of experiences and exchange of best practices (that is, the need to create a filter to ensure that different procurement communities do not replicate erroneous or illegal solutions that seemed to work in a specific context).

I fully subscribe Pedro’s criticism of the proposal of the Commission and would go even further. There are quite a few aspects that can be criticised, both in the recommendation itself (which is unfocused, exceeds the scope of professionalisation (in particular in part III) and tends to simply state the obvious) and in the staff working document that accompanies it (which is sloppily drafted, breaks up and repeats examples in a way that comes to inflate their number, and has for no reason been published as a pdf with the promise of a future interactive online tool, rather than being directly in that format—for what was the rush?). They are both also fatally flawed by a lack of recognition of the real costs of training a procurement workforce, in particular in terms of the time and effort of those being trained (as indicated by Pedro, and as masked with the only example that contains costing figures, No 2, from Consip) and of the long-term strategies and measures that need to be developed. In this post, however, I will concentrate particularly on six issues that I consider particularly restrictive of any effectiveness of the Commission’s recommendation, which largely ignores them.

In my view, the main areas for criticism of the recommendations on professionalisation formulated by the Commission are: (1) that procurement is not different from other areas of public sector activity requiring specialist skills, (2) that skills (human capital) need to be recompensed and incentivised if the public sector wants to avoid capacity drainage and cross-subsidisation, (3) that increasingly complex systems and sophisticated procurement do not require ‘super-procurers’ but rather ‘teams of procurers’, (4) that language is a very relevant barrier, both for advocacy/awareness efforts and cross-learning, (5) that the Commission cannot pass on to Member States the hot potato of issuing procurement guidance, and (6) that any initiatives will not be implemented in the vacuum or in a blank slate, which requires both consideration of change management and competition neutrality. I will keep my comments on each of these points short.

(1) Procurement is not different from other areas of public sector activity requiring specialist skills

The recommendation on professionalization largely assumes that developing and retaining a skilled workforce is a particular challenge in procurement, and it only mentions customs clearance as an area with equivalent needs and with a previous experience meriting study at EU level. However, from the perspective of a Member State, resourcing procurement is not less or more challenging than resourcing regulatory agencies (competition, energy, telecoms, etc), oversight bodies (central banks, insurance authorities), entities with budgetary responsibility (courts of auditors) and a number of other functions (food control, patents, consumer protection, ...). Importantly, in several Member States, the systems are generally developed around a model of relatively generalist civil servants that then go on to specialise in specific tasks as they are called to particular positions. This has two big implications: one, that it will hardly be acceptable for ‘procurers’ to be trained, recompensed and supported in ways much different than those dedicated to other activities. Second, that the State will probably not be in a position to undertake a significant reform of its entire civil service (access, training and remuneration) in the short term. These are rather complex issues and it is not realistic to think that procurement can change much more, or at a faster pace, than general civil service reforms. Some (small) parts of the procurement workforce can receive a different treatment in the context of ‘private-form’ procurement entities (such as central purchasing bodies, or CPBs), but this can hardly be a general solution.

(2) Skills (human capital) need to be recompensed and incentivised if the public sector wants to avoid capacity drainage and cross-subsidisation

The recommendation on professionalization ignores the evidence contained in itself. I find it quite telling that both RESAH in France (example No 34) and BBG in Austria (example No 35), which is one of the CPBs portrayed as having been more successful in creating a training programme in the staff working document, indicate that they have significant retention issues, as their trained employees/ members are scooped by other entities. This echoes similar trends in other countries (such as Hansel in Finland and Pianoo in the Netherlands, although this is less clear in the document), and is a simple matter of common sense. Given that there is a general shortage of skills in procurement across the economy, if a part of the public sector invests in training in a context where retention is an issue, then it is simply cross-subsidising other parts of the public sector or, more likely, the private sector. Again, this is an endemic problem that has affected countries with strong systems of training of their public service and judicature (such as Spain) and the only way of trying to contain it is to impose statutory or contractual obligations to stay in post (not a great incentive, as demonstrated by levels of turnaround of employees having completed CIPS training in UK institutions) or to improve the working conditions (and pay) of highly skilled individuals (which is really difficult to do in an austerity context and, given what I mentioned above, the difficulty of making ‘exceptions’ for procurement).

(3) Increasingly complex systems and sophisticated procurement do not require ‘super-procurers’ but rather ‘teams of procurers’

In simple terms, the entire recommendation on professionalization is premised on the basis that, if sufficiently skilled/educated, individuals can carry out complex procurement satisfactorily on their own. While I will be the first to submit that an overall understanding of procurement processes and the business context in which it takes places is necessary, I do not think that sophisticated procurement (eg projects including elements of innovation or sustainability, or negotiations, or complex goods or services, or infrastructure …) can be carried out by individuals, however skilled. More and more, it is necessary to think along the lines of teams with complementary and interdisciplinary expertise. There is no such thing as a ‘super-procurer’, and the Commission and the Member States would be foolish to try to find her (or educate her). In that regard, if there are competency schemes that require developing (which is a big if), they should not be premised on individuality, but rather on team work and collaborative approaches. This will mean that teams of engineers (or technical personnel), economists and lawyers will need to be put together so that they can complement each. Some training to give them an overall understanding of what they are collectively doing will be necessary and helpful, but that is a long way away from expecting them to each master a sufficiently advanced knowledge of law, economics and technology.

(4) Language is a very relevant barrier, both for advocacy/ awareness efforts and cross-learning

The recommendation on professionalisation also ignores the fact that learning from others’ experiences and using others’ documents (technical, guidance or advocacy documents) requires, amongst other things, a sufficient knowledge of other languages—which are not necessarily English. There are very clear examples, such as the French vademecum (example No 55) or the Greek bid rigging guidelines (example No 53), which will be completely incomprehensible for a large part of the procurement taskforce of any given Member State. This will create difficulties more generally in any cross-border initiative, and can end up creating inadvertent language barriers and/or facilitating the prominence (if not imperialism) of practices created in native English-speaking jurisdictions, which is not necessarily a guarantee of success.

(5) The Commission cannot pass on to Member States the hot potato of issuing procurement guidance

The recommendation on professionalisation repeatedly stresses the need for Member States to provide guidance (see in particular recommendation 8), thus expecting them to ‘give legal certainty on EU and national law or requirements stemming from the EU’s international obligations’. Not to be blunt, but this is risible. The Commission, having so far been so reluctant and slow in issuing any guidance on the novelties of the 2014 Public Procurement Package, can hardly expect Member States to be in a better position to do so. And, even if that was the case, having each Member State issue its own guidance, based on its own interpretation of EU law and the requirements stemming from the EU’s international obligations is a recipe for contradictions and further legal uncertainty. This is precisely an area where the Commission has both a better position to issue guidance and (hopefully, at least) the relevant expertise. Of course, the Commission has included some soft promises for guidance as part of the broader October 2017 package (on green and innovative procurement, and remedies, which we will discuss in due course), but it would have been well-advised to refrain from recommending Member States to fill in the gap (even if only temporarily).

(6) Any initiatives will not be implemented in the vacuum or in a blank slate, which requires both consideration of change management and competition neutrality

The recommendation on professionalization does not take into account that in different Member States, there will be different structures in place (eg universities, private firms) offering capacity and training services, as well as consultancy services aimed at closing skills gaps, in particular in relation to complex procurement (law firms, consultancies, etc). There is a strong push, although rather implicit, for the public sector to create its own ‘knowledge centres’ and use them to offer the same type of services across the public sector. In particular, there is a repeated suggestion that CPBs can be in a good position to do so. Such recommendation ignores the fact that there will be issues of competition neutrality involved in such a practice (for example, the growing consultancy business of CPBs such as Hansel in Finland), which merits separate discussion at some other time. It also ignores that there can be difficulties around managing change where ‘new’ professionalisation and training initiatives are meant to replace previous structures. All of this could (and should) be addressed more explicitly in the recommendation. It is to be welcome that the Commission explicitly excludes the creation of ‘professional bodies’ in procurement, but this is only one of the potential negative impacts of the suggestions included in the recommendation from a competition perspective. Where Member States create semi-markets or public provision in liberalised (training and education) markets, a much more in-depth and careful assessment will be necessary.

Overall assessment

I think that, for the reasons discussed here and in Pedro’s post (some of which, clearly, overlap), it is highly unlikely that, however well-intended, the recommendation on professionalization can catalyse a significant change at Member State level. It also masks a significant number of issues that have very limited to do with professionalisation and training, such as sustainable procurement, e-procurement or the fight against corruption, but I will save my comments on that for some other time. In my view, even if marginal improvements can result from Member States efforts as a result of these recommendations—particularly for those that build on a lower capability level—changes will be constrained due to budgetary and resource restrictions, language issues and inability (or unsuitability) to offer proper guidance. Rather than having the Commission engage in this type of ‘human resources consultancy’ activities, I would have it dedicate whatever resources it could muster to provide effective guidance and, where possible, to provide financial and logistic support to Member States.

Some thoughts on procurement flexibility and accountability after the 2014 EU Public Procurement Package & recent trends in case law

I had the honour of being invited to deliver a keynote presentation at the annual conference on procurement organised by FCG in Helsinki on 2 June. The organisers invited me to address two topics: first, an overview of the 2014 reform of EU public procurement rules from the perspective of flexibility, discretion and checks and balances. Second, a more focused discussion of recent ECJ case law in three areas of relevance for the Finnish practice after the transposition of the EU rules: the exemption for in-house provision and public-public cooperation, the requirements derived from general principles of procurement law, and the rules on discretionary exclusion and self-cleaning.

These are the two sets of presentations I used, which I hope reflect some of the ideas I presented, and which gave rise to very stimulating debate.