AI regulation by contract: submission to UK Parliament

In October 2022, the Science and Technology Committee of the House of Commons of the UK Parliament (STC Committee) launched an inquiry on the ‘Governance of Artificial Intelligence’. This inquiry follows the publication in July 2022 of the policy paper ‘Establishing a pro-innovation approach to regulating AI’, which outlined the UK Government’s plans for light-touch AI regulation. The inquiry seeks to examine the effectiveness of current AI governance in the UK, and the Government’s proposals that are expected to follow the policy paper and provide more detail. The STC Committee has published 98 pieces of written evidence, including submissions from UK regulators and academics that will make for interesting reading. Below is my submission, focusing on the UK’s approach to ‘AI regulation by contract’.

A. Introduction

01. This submission addresses two of the questions formulated by the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee in its inquiry on the ‘Governance of artificial intelligence (AI)’. In particular:

• How should the use of AI be regulated, and which body or bodies should provide regulatory oversight?

• To what extent is the legal framework for the use of AI, especially in making decisions, fit for purpose?

  • Is more legislation or better guidance required?

02. This submission focuses on the process of AI adoption in the public sector and, particularly, on the acquisition of AI solutions. It evidences how the UK is consolidating an inadequate approach to ‘AI regulation by contract’ through public procurement. Given the level of abstraction and generality of the current guidelines for AI procurement, major gaps in public sector digital capabilities, and potential structural conflicts of interest, procurement is currently an inadequate tool to govern the process of AI adoption in the public sector. Flanking initiatives, such as the pilot algorithmic transparency standard, are unable to address and mitigate governance risks. Contrary to the approach in the AI Regulation Policy Paper,[1] plugging the regulatory gap will require (i) new legislation supported by a new mechanism of external oversight and enforcement (an ‘AI in the Public Sector Authority’ (AIPSA)); (ii) a well-funded strategy to boost in-house public sector digital capabilities; and (iii) the introduction of a (temporary) mechanism of authorisation of AI deployment in the public sector. The Procurement Bill would not suffice to address the governance shortcomings identified in this submission.

B. ‘AI Regulation by Contract’ through Procurement

03. Unless the public sector develops AI solutions in-house, which is extremely rare, the adoption of AI technologies in the public sector requires a procurement procedure leading to their acquisition. This places procurement at the frontline of AI governance because the ‘rules governing the acquisition of algorithmic systems by governments and public agencies are an important point of intervention in ensuring their accountable use’.[2] In that vein, the Committee on Standards in Public Life stressed that the ‘Government should use its purchasing power in the market to set procurement requirements that ensure that private companies developing AI solutions for the public sector appropriately address public standards. This should be achieved by ensuring provisions for ethical standards are considered early in the procurement process and explicitly written into tenders and contractual arrangements’.[3] Procurement is thus erected as a public interest gatekeeper in the process of adoption of AI by the public sector.

04. However, to effectively regulate by contract, it is at least necessary to have (i) clarity on the content of the obligations to be imposed, (ii) effective enforcement mechanisms, and (iii) public sector capacity to establish, monitor, and enforce those obligations. Given that the aim of regulation by contract would be to ensure that the public sector only adopts trustworthy AI solutions and deploys them in a way that promotes the public interest in compliance with existing standards of protection of fundamental and individual rights, exercising the expected gatekeeping role in this context requires a level of legal, ethical, and digital capability well beyond the requirements of earlier instances of regulation by contract to eg enforce labour standards.

05. On a superficial reading, it could seem that the National AI Strategy tackled this by highlighting the importance of the public sector’s role as a buyer and stressing that the Government had already taken steps ‘to inform and empower buyers in the public sector, helping them to evaluate suppliers, then confidently and responsibly procure AI technologies for the benefit of citizens’.[4] The National AI Strategy referred, in particular, to the setting up of the Crown Commercial Service’s AI procurement framework (the ‘CCS AI Framework’),[5] and the adoption of the Guidelines for AI procurement (the ‘Guidelines’)[6] as enabling tools. However, a close look at these instruments will show their inadequacy to provide clarity on the content of procedural and contractual obligations aimed at ensuring the goals stated above (para 03), as well as their potential to widen the existing public sector digital capability gap. Ultimately, they do not enable procurement to carry out the expected gatekeeping role.

C. Guidelines and Framework for AI procurement

06. Despite setting out to ‘provide a set of guiding principles on how to buy AI technology, as well as insights on tackling challenges that may arise during procurement’, the Guidelines provide high-level recommendations that cannot be directly operationalised by inexperienced public buyers and/or those with limited digital capabilities. For example, the recommendation to ‘Try to address flaws and potential bias within your data before you go to market and/or have a plan for dealing with data issues if you cannot rectify them yourself’ (guideline 3) not only requires a thorough understanding of eg the Data Ethics Framework[7] and the Guide to using Artificial Intelligence in the public sector,[8] but also detailed insights on data hazards.[9] This leads the Guidelines to stress that it may be necessary ‘to seek out specific expertise to support this; data architects and data scientists should lead this process … to understand the complexities, completeness and limitations of the data … available’.

07. Relatedly, some of the recommendations are very open ended in areas without clear standards. For example, the effectiveness of the recommendation to ‘Conduct initial AI impact assessments at the start of the procurement process, and ensure that your interim findings inform the procurement. Be sure to revisit the assessments at key decision points’ (guideline 4) is dependent on the robustness of such impact assessments. However, the Guidelines provide no further detail on how to carry out such assessments, other than a list of some generic areas for consideration (eg ‘potential unintended consequences’) and a passing reference to emerging guidelines in other jurisdictions. This is problematic, as the development of algorithmic impact assessments is still at an experimental stage,[10] and emerging evidence shows vastly diverging approaches, eg to risk identification.[11] In the absence of clear standards, algorithmic impact assessments will lead to inconsistent approaches and varying levels of robustness. The absence of standards will also require access to specialist expertise to design and carry out the assessments.

08. Ultimately, understanding and operationalising the Guidelines requires advanced digital competency, including in areas where best practices and industry standards are still developing.[12] However, most procurement organisations lack such expertise, as a reflection of broader digital skills shortages across the public sector,[13] with recent reports placing civil service vacancies for data and tech roles throughout the civil service alone close to 4,000.[14] This not only reduces the practical value of the Guidelines to facilitate responsible AI procurement by inexperienced buyers with limited capabilities, but also highlights the role of the CCS AI Framework for AI adoption in the public sector.

09. The CCS AI Framework creates a procurement vehicle[15] to facilitate public buyers’ access to digital capabilities. CCS’ description for public buyers stresses that ‘If you are new to AI you will be able to procure services through a discovery phase, to get an understanding of AI and how it can benefit your organisation.’[16] The Framework thus seeks to enable contracting authorities, especially those lacking in-house expertise, to carry out AI procurement with the support of external providers. While this can foster the uptake of AI in the public sector in the short term, it is highly unlikely to result in adequate governance of AI procurement, as this approach focuses at most on the initial stages of AI adoption but can hardly be sustainable throughout the lifecycle of AI use in the public sector—and, crucially, would leave the enforcement of contractualised AI governance obligations in a particularly weak position (thus failing to meet the enforcement requirement at para 04). Moreover, it would generate a series of governance shortcomings which avoidance requires an alternative approach.

D. Governance Shortcomings

10. Despite claims to the contrary in the National AI Strategy (above para 05), the approach currently followed by the Government does not empower public buyers to responsibly procure AI. The Guidelines are not susceptible of operationalisation by inexperienced public buyers with limited digital capabilities (above paras 06-08). At the same time, the Guidelines are too generic to support sophisticated approaches by more advanced digital buyers. The Guidelines do not reduce the uncertainty and complexity of procuring AI and do not include any guidance on eg how to design public contracts to perform the regulatory functions expected under the ‘AI regulation by contract’ approach.[17] This is despite existing recommendations on eg the development of ‘model contracts and framework agreements for public sector procurement to incorporate a set of minimum standards around ethical use of AI, with particular focus on expected levels transparency and explainability, and ongoing testing for fairness’.[18] The guidelines thus fail to address the first requirement for effective regulation by contract in relation to clarifying the relevant obligations (para 04).

11. The CCS Framework would also fail to ensure the development of public sector capacity to establish, monitor, and enforce AI governance obligations (para 04). Perhaps counterintuitively, the CCS AI Framework can generate a further disempowerment of public buyers seeking to rely on external capabilities to support AI adoption. There is evidence that reliance on outside providers and consultants to cover immediate needs further erodes public sector capability in the long term,[19] as well as creating risks of technical and intellectual debt in the deployment of AI solutions as consultants come and go and there is no capture of institutional knowledge and memory.[20] This can also exacerbate current trends of pilot AI graveyard spirals, where most projects do not reach full deployment, at least in part due to insufficient digital capabilities beyond the (outsourced) pilot phase. This tends to result in self-reinforcing institutional weaknesses that can limit the public sector’s ability to drive digitalisation, not least because technical debt quickly becomes a significant barrier.[21] It also runs counter to best practices towards building public sector digital maturity,[22] and to the growing consensus that public sector digitalisation first and foremost requires a prioritised investment in building up in-house capabilities.[23] On this point, it is important to note the large size of the CCS AI Framework, which was initially pre-advertised with a £90 mn value,[24] but this was then revised to £200 mn over 42 months.[25] Procuring AI consultancy services under the Framework can thus facilitate the funnelling of significant amounts of public funds to the private sector, rather than using those funds to build in-house capabilities. It can result in multiple public buyers entering contracts for the same expertise, which thus duplicates costs, as well as in a cumulative lack of institutional learning by the public sector because of atomised and uncoordinated contractual relationships.

12. Beyond the issue of institutional dependency on external capabilities, the cumulative effect of the Guidelines and the Framework would be to outsource the role of ‘AI regulation by contract’ to unaccountable private providers that can then introduce their own biases on the substantive and procedural obligations to be embedded in the relevant contracts—which would ultimately negate the effectiveness of the regulatory approach as a public interest safeguard. The lack of accountability of external providers would not only result from the weakness (or absolute inability) of the public buyer to control their activities and challenge important decisions—eg on data governance, or algorithmic impact assessments, as above (paras 06-07)—but also from the potential absence of effective and timely external checks. Market mechanisms are unlikely to deliver adequate checks due market concentration and structural conflicts of interest affecting both providers that sometimes provide consultancy services and other times are involved in the development and deployment of AI solutions,[26] as well as a result of insufficiently effective safeguards on conflicts of interest resulting from quickly revolving doors. Equally, broader governance controls are unlikely to be facilitated by flanking initiatives, such as the pilot algorithmic transparency standard.

13. To try to foster accountability in the adoption of AI by the public sector, the UK is currently piloting an algorithmic transparency standard.[27] While the initial six examples of algorithmic disclosures published by the Government provide some details on emerging AI use cases and the data and types of algorithms used by publishing organisations, and while this information could in principle foster accountability, there are two primary shortcomings. First, completing the documentation requires resources and, in some respects, advanced digital capabilities. Organisations participating in the pilot are being supported by the Government, which makes it difficult to assess to what extent public buyers would generally be able to adequately prepare the documentation on their own. Moreover, the documentation also refers to some underlying requirements, such as algorithmic impact assessments, that are not yet standardised (para 07). In that, the pilot standard replicates the same shortcomings discussed above in relation to the Guidelines. Algorithmic disclosure will thus only be done by entities with high capabilities, or it will be outsourced to consultants (thus reducing the scope for the revelation of governance-relevant information).

14. Second, compliance with the standard is not mandatory—at least while the pilot is developed. If compliance with the algorithmic transparency standard remains voluntary, there are clear governance risks. It is easy to see how precisely the most problematic uses may not be the object of adequate disclosures under a voluntary self-reporting mechanism. More generally, even if the standard was made mandatory, it would be necessary to implement an external quality control mechanism to mitigate problems with the quality of self-reported disclosures that are pervasive in other areas of information-based governance.[28] Whether the Central Digital and Data Office (currently in charge of the pilot) would have capacity (and powers) to do so remains unclear, and it would in any case lack independence.

15. Finally, it should be stressed that the current approach to transparency disclosure following the adoption of AI (ex post) can be problematic where the implementation of the AI is difficult to undo and/or the effects of malicious or risky AI are high stakes or impossible to revert. It is also problematic in that the current approach places the burden of scrutiny and accountability outside the public sector, rather than establishing internal, preventative (ex ante) controls on the deployment of AI technologies that could potentially be very harmful for fundamental and individual socio-economic rights—as evidenced by the inclusion of some fields of application of AI in the public sector as ‘high risk’ in the EU’s proposed EU AI Act.[29] Given the particular risks that AI deployment in the public sector poses to fundamental and individual rights, the minimalistic and reactive approach outlined in the AI Regulation Policy Paper is inadequate.

E. Conclusion: An Alternative Approach

16. Ensuring that the adoption of AI in the public sector operates in the public interest and for the benefit of all citizens will require new legislation supported by a new mechanism of external oversight and enforcement. New legislation is required to impose specific minimum requirements of eg data governance and algorithmic impact assessment and related transparency across the public sector. Such legislation would then need to be developed in statutory guidance of a much more detailed and actionable nature than the current Guidelines. These developed requirements can then be embedded into public contracts by reference. Without such clarification of the relevant substantive obligations, the approach to ‘AI regulation by contract’ can hardly be effective other than in exceptional cases.

17. Legislation would also be necessary to create an independent authority—eg an ‘AI in the Public Sector Authority’ (AIPSA)—with powers to enforce those minimum requirements across the public sector. AIPSA is necessary, as oversight of the use of AI in the public sector does not currently fall within the scope of any specific sectoral regulator and the general regulators (such as the Information Commissioner’s Office) lack procurement-specific knowledge. Moreover, units within Cabinet Office (such as the Office for AI or the Central Digital and Data Office) lack the required independence.

18. It would also be necessary to develop a clear and sustainably funded strategy to build in-house capability in the public sector, including clear policies on the minimisation of expenditure directed at the engagement of external consultants and the development of guidance on how to ensure the capture and retention of the knowledge developed within outsourced projects (including, but not only, through detailed technical documentation).

19. Until sufficient in-house capability is built to ensure adequate understanding and ability to manage digital procurement governance requirements independently, the current reactive approach should be abandoned, and AIPSA should have to approve all projects to develop, procure and deploy AI in the public sector to ensure that they meet the required legislative safeguards in terms of data governance, impact assessment, etc. This approach could progressively be relaxed through eg block exemption mechanisms, once there is sufficiently detailed understanding and guidance on specific AI use cases and/or in relation to public sector entities that could demonstrate sufficient in-house capability, eg through a mechanism of independent certification.

20. The new legislation and statutory guidance would need to be self-standing, as the Procurement Bill would not provide the required governance improvements. First, the Procurement Bill pays limited to no attention to artificial intelligence and the digitalisation of procurement.[30] An amendment (46) that would have created minimum requirements on automated decision-making and data ethics was not moved at the Lords Committee stage, and it seems unlikely to be taken up again at later stages of the legislative process. Second, even if the Procurement Bill created minimum substantive requirements, it would lack adequate enforcement mechanisms, not least due to the limited powers and lack of independence of the foreseen Procurement Review Unit (to also sit within Cabinet Office).

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Note: all websites last accessed on 25 October 2022.

[1] Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, Establishing a pro-innovation approach to regulating AI. An overview of the UK’s emerging approach (CP 728, 2022).

[2] Ada Lovelace Institute, AI Now Institute and Open Government Partnership, Algorithmic Accountability for the Public Sector (August 2021) 33.

[3] Committee on Standards in Public Life, Intelligence and Public Standards (2020) 51.

[4] Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, National AI Strategy (CP 525, 2021) 47.

[5] AI Dynamic Purchasing System < https://www.crowncommercial.gov.uk/agreements/RM6200 >.

[6] Office for Artificial Intelligence, Guidelines for AI Procurement (2020) < https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidelines-for-ai-procurement/guidelines-for-ai-procurement >.

[7] Central Digital and Data Office, Data Ethics Framework (Guidance) (2020) < https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/data-ethics-framework >.

[8] Central Digital and Data Office, A guide to using artificial intelligence in the public sector (2019) < https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/a-guide-to-using-artificial-intelligence-in-the-public-sector >.

[9] See eg < https://datahazards.com/index.html >.

[10] Ada Lovelace Institute, Algorithmic impact assessment: a case study in healthcare (2022) < https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/algorithmic-impact-assessment-case-study-healthcare/ >.

[11] A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Algorithmic Transparency: Some Thoughts On UK's First Four Published Disclosures and the Standards’ Usability’ (2022) < https://www.howtocrackanut.com/blog/2022/7/11/algorithmic-transparency-some-thoughts-on-uk-first-disclosures-and-usability >.

[12] A Sanchez-Graells, ‘“Experimental” WEF/UK Guidelines for AI Procurement: Some Comments’ (2019) < https://www.howtocrackanut.com/blog/2019/9/25/wef-guidelines-for-ai-procurement-and-uk-pilot-some-comments >.

[13] See eg Public Accounts Committee, Challenges in implementing digital change (HC 2021-22, 637).

[14] S Klovig Skelton, ‘Public sector aims to close digital skills gap with private sector’ (Computer Weekly, 4 Oct 2022) < https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252525692/Public-sector-aims-to-close-digital-skills-gap-with-private-sector >.

[15] It is a dynamic purchasing system, or a list of pre-screened potential vendors public buyers can use to carry out their own simplified mini-competitions for the award of AI-related contracts.

[16] Above (n 5).

[17] This contrasts with eg the EU project to develop standard contractual clauses for the procurement of AI by public organisations. See < https://living-in.eu/groups/solutions/ai-procurement >.

[18] Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation, Review into bias in algorithmic decision-making (2020) < https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cdei-publishes-review-into-bias-in-algorithmic-decision-making/main-report-cdei-review-into-bias-in-algorithmic-decision-making >.

[19] V Weghmann and K Sankey, Hollowed out: The growing impact of consultancies in public administrations (2022) < https://www.epsu.org/sites/default/files/article/files/EPSU%20Report%20Outsourcing%20state_EN.pdf >.

[20] A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Identifying Emerging Risks in Digital Procurement Governance’ in idem, Digital Technologies and Public Procurement. Gatekeeping and experimentation in digital public governance (OUP, forthcoming) < https://ssrn.com/abstract=4254931 >.

[21] M E Nielsen and C Østergaard Madsen, ‘Stakeholder influence on technical debt management in the public sector: An embedded case study’ (2022) 39 Government Information Quarterly 101706.

[22] See eg Kevin C Desouza, ‘Artificial Intelligence in the Public Sector: A Maturity Model’ (2021) IBM Centre for the Business of Government < https://www.businessofgovernment.org/report/artificial-intelligence-public-sector-maturity-model >.

[23] A Clarke and S Boots, A Guide to Reforming Information Technology Procurement in the Government of Canada (2022) < https://govcanadacontracts.ca/it-procurement-guide/ >.

[24] < https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:600328-2019:HTML:EN:HTML&tabId=1&tabLang=en >.

[25] < https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:373610-2020:HTML:EN:HTML&tabId=1&tabLang=en >.

[26] See S Boots, ‘“Charbonneau Loops” and government IT contracting’ (2022) < https://sboots.ca/2022/10/12/charbonneau-loops-and-government-it-contracting/ >.

[27] Central Digital and Data Office, Algorithmic Transparency Standard (2022) < https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/algorithmic-transparency-standard >.

[28] Eg in the context of financial markets, there have been notorious ongoing problems with ensuring adequate quality in corporate and investor disclosures.

[29] < https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/ >.

[30] P Telles, ‘The lack of automation ideas in the UK Gov Green Paper on procurement reform’ (2021) < http://www.telles.eu/blog/2021/1/13/the-lack-of-automation-ideas-in-the-uk-gov-green-paper-on-procurement-reform >.

Transatlantic efforts against bid rigging in procurement [free webinar alert]

Prof Chris Yukins and Michael Bowsher QC have put together an excellent webinar on the current approaches to detect and sanction bid rigging in procurement in the US and the EU, as well as the possible future approach the UK may take post-Brexit.

Among other things, the webinar will include discussion of the European Commission’s recent bid rigging exclusion guidance (for initial comments see here).

The webinar will take place on 2 June 3pm CET / 2pm GMT. All welcome. Further details and free registration here.

Interesting proposals for post-Brexit strengthening of UK approach to corruption and collusion in procurement -- re Jones (2021)

Prof Alison Jones has recently published on early view an interesting paper on ‘Combatting Corruption and Collusion in UK Public Procurement: Proposal for Post‐Brexit Reform’ (2021) Modern Law Review, forthcoming.

The paper provides a very good, comprehensive overview of the current rules and enforcement practices in the UK, their more than likely shortcomings, and four groups of proposals to tighten up the rule book and enforcement approach to the prevention and repression of corruption and bid rigging post-Brexit.

Except for some proposals on the transparency of procurement data (at p 32) and Prof Jones’ faith in the potential of the (now abandoned) ‘Screening for Cartels’ tool — both of which deserve a more in-depth discussion (see eg here on procurement transparency, and here on the SfC tool) — the UK legislator would do well to take these proposals seriously as it progresses in its review of procurement and competition laws post-Brexit.

New paper on the need to review the Remedies Directive

I have uploaded a new paper on SSRN: ‘If it Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It’? EU Requirements of Administrative Oversight and Judicial Protection for Public Contracts, to be published in S Torricelli & F Folliot Lalliot (eds), Administrative oversight and judicial protection for public contracts (Larcier, 2017) forthcoming.

As detailed in the abstract: 

EU public procurement law relies on the specific enforcement mechanisms of the Remedies Directive, which sets out EU requirements of administrative oversight and judicial protection for public contracts. Recent developments in the case law of the CJEU and the substantive reform resulting from the 2014 Public Procurement Package may have created gaps in the Remedies Directive, which led the European Commission to publicly consult on its revision in 2015. One year after, the outcome of the consultation has not been published, but such revision now seems to have been shelved. This chapter takes issue with the shelving of the revision process and critically assesses whether the Remedies Directive is still fit for purpose. 

The chapter focuses on selected issues, such as the interplay between the Remedies Directive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and with the general administrative law of the Member States. It also assesses the difficulties of applying the Remedies Directive ‘as is’ to some of the new rules of the 2014 Public Procurement Package, which creates uncertainty as to its scope of application, and gives rise to particular challenges for the review of exclusion decisions involving the exercise of discretion. The chapter also raises some issues concerning the difficulties derived from the lack of coordination of different remedies available under the Remedies Directive and briefly considers the need to take the development of ADR mechanisms into account. Overall, the chapter concludes that there are important areas where the Remedies Directive requires a revision, and submits that the European Commission should relaunch the review process as a matter of high priority.

The paper is freely downloadable at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2821828. As always, comments welcome.

Brexit may have negative effects for the control of public expenditure, particularly regarding subsidies to large companies

In the current state of turmoil, it is difficult to speculate on the exact relationship between the EU and the UK that can result from the Brexit vote and the future negotiations to be held under Article 50 TEU, in case it gets triggered. However, in order to contribute to the debate of what that relationship should look like in the interest of taxpayers in the UK, it is important to consider the implications that a post-Brexit deal could have in terms of the potential disappearance of the EU rules applicable to the control of how public funds are spent. A reduction in the control mechanisms applicable to certain types of public expenditure could indeed diminish the effectiveness of policies funded by UK taxpayers and create shortcomings in public governance more generally.

This is particularly clear in the case of the EU State aid rules in Articles 107 to 109 TFEU and accompanying secondary legislation, which ultimately aim to avoid subsidy races, as well as the protectionist financing of national champions by Member States. Ultimately, these rules establish a set of controls over the selective channelling of public funds to companies, be it in the form of direct subsidies, or in more indirect ways such as tax exemptions, special contributions to pension plans, or the transmission of public assets (such as public land) in below-market conditions.

The European Commission has created a framework that allows Member States to use State aid for horizontal purposes (such as the support of environmental, innovation or employment-related activities), but also aims to prevent the use of public funds in order to benefit specific companies, in particular through a subsidisation of their operating costs. The European Commission enforces these rules and can bring Member States that breach them before the Court of Justice of the European Union. Additionally, competitors of the companies that receive State aid can challenge those decisions in their domestic courts.

Even if these rules are admittedly imperfect and their enforcement could be improved,* there is no question that the European Commission has been active and rather effective in combating the use of public funds to benefit specific large companies. Remarkably, Member States need to notify State aid measures to the European Commission and must not provide any aid until the Commission has authorised it. Overall, this means that in cases involving large companies, no State aid contrary to the EU rules is generally put in effect, as demonstrated by the discussions surrounding the Hinkley Point project. Where Member States infringe this standstill obligation, the Commission can force a recovery of the aid. The recent tax avoidance cases involving Starbucks or Fiat are a clear testimony of this important role in controlling the way public funds are spent in support of large companies.

The European Commission is thus heavily involved in the State aid measures aimed at specific large companies and acts as a filter to ensure that the expenditure of public funds pursues a legitimate objective in compliance with EU law. This was particularly the case of the State aid channelled to banks in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.

Overall, then, at least for cases of State aid involving large sums of money and large companies, the Commission acts as an important filter to prevent damaging economic interventions in the economy, which constitutes an important check on how public money is spent. Whether such a tight system could be relaxed in order to enable a more proactive EU-wide industrial policy is a subject of significant debate, but the constraints that EU State aid rules currently impose on the provision of direct and indirect financial support to large companies are certainly not perceived as minor.

The question is thus whether a post-Brexit deal could free the UK Government from such State aid control, at least in the medium to long-run, so that it could engage in largely unchecked public subsidy policies, such as creating particularly beneficial tax conditions in order to try to retain or attract large multinational companies considering relocating elsewhere in the EU, or channelling public funds to chosen companies, either in support of industrial policy goals or otherwise.

These would be policy interventions clearly tackled by the European Commission under existing rules, and they would also be caught by the EFTA Surveillance Authority in case the post-Brexit deal resulted in the UK joining the European Economic Area (the so-called ‘Norwegian option’), which would require compliance with the same rules. However, whether interventions aimed at subsidising large companies would be caught in case of a ‘WTO-based’ trade scenario is less clear because the WTO rules on subsidies are not as tight as the EU’s, and their enforcement ultimately relies on other WTO Members bringing a complaint against the UK to the dispute settlement board, which is a very political decision ultimately reliant on trade calculations. To be sure, the EU itself could bring cases against the UK, but this would be a highly contentious issue in the framework of a relationship already very strained by the UK’s exit from the EU and detachment from the EEA.

Should the UK not be a part of the internal market via membership of the EU or the EEA, and in the absence of effective WTO-based external checks on the use of public funds to provide financial support to large companies, the control of this form of public expenditure would fall solely to Parliament and the domestic UK institutions, such as the National Audit Office.

This can be seen as an advantage by those convinced by arguments of self-control and UK-centric governance, but economic regulatory capture theory, and public policy theory more generally, have repeatedly demonstrated that such a self-policing architecture is unlikely to prevent ‘politicised’ uses of public funds. It seems clear to me that, in that case, the possibilities for any given Government to engage in expenditures of this type would be greater than they currently are, which would not necessarily result in the pursuance of the best interests of taxpayers in the UK.

Therefore, if there is value in having an external control of subsidies to large companies in order to avoid anti-economical protectionist policies or redistributive policies that take money away from other pressing social priorities—and I would certainly argue that there is—it seems clear to me that any post-Brexit deal that does not include the application of EU/EEA State aid rules would imply a net loss in terms of public governance and, in particular, in terms of an effective control of public expenditure, particularly regarding subsidies to large companies. Ultimately, then, from this perspective, it seems to me to be in the interest of taxpayers in the UK to strongly support a post-Brexit arrangement that retains State aid control, either by the European Commission or the EFTA Surveillance Authority.

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* A Sanchez-Graells, “Digging itself out of the hole? A critical assessment of the Commission’s attempt to revitalise State aid enforcement after the crisis” (2016) 4(1) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 157-187.

Some thoughts on the principle of competition's direct and indirect effects in public procurement from 18 April 2016

It was a pleasure to speak at Upphandlings Dagarna 2016 in Stockholm on the principle of competition enacted in Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24 and Article 36(1) of Directive 2014/25 [for background reading, see here]. The recording of the livestreaming is available here (starts at 1:30, main remarks after 8:00).

One of the issues that featured prominently in the discussions with my panellists is the legal value of the principle under EU law, and how to make it effective in case Member States do not transpose it (or are late in the transposition, which will certainly be a common situation for a while). 

In my view, and in simplified terms, there are two main routes that EU law provides for the enforcement of the principle regardless of the transposition decisions the Member States adopt. Firstly, the principle can be given direct effect. And, secondly (and probably with greater practical relevance), the principle must be given indirect effect. I develop these ideas for the enforcement of the principle of competition, particularly through indirect effect or interpretation conforme, in Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 215-227, available here.

Direct effect can be given to the presumption in Art 18(1) Dir 2014/24 / Art 36(1) Dir 2014/25 that 'Competition shall be considered to be artificially narrowed where the design of the procurement is made with the intention of unduly favouring or disadvantaging certain economic operators'. In my view, this provision sets out a clear, precise and unconditional individual right for candidates and tenderers not to be unduly disadvantaged, which therefore meets the requirements for direct effect as per Van Duyn (C-41/74, EU:C:1974:133). It will be particularly relevant to coordinate any legal claims with the clear push for effectiveness of the EU public procurement rules in the Remedies Directive.

Indirect effect must be given to the broad principle of competition in Art 18(1) Dir 2014/24 / Art 36(1) Dir 2014/25 that 'The design of the procurement shall not be made with the intention ... of artificially narrowing competition.' This is not only a clear general principle of EU law (which could also engage Mangold, C-144/04, EU:C:2005:709), but a fundamental pillar of the procurement system and, in particular, of the system created by the 2014 new public procurement Directives. The Commission could not have stressed this more clearly in the recent strategy for the Upgrade of the Single Market, where it highlighted that 'In 2014, the EU adopted a major overhaul of the EU procurement framework .... This was aimed at making public procurement more efficient and strategic, fulfilling the principles of transparency and competition to the benefit of both public purchasers and economic operators, in particular SMEs' (emphasis added). Overall, the obvious and pervasive pro-competitive orientation of the 2014 Directives and the explicit consolidation of the principle of competition triggers an obligation to interpret any domestic procurement rules in light of the principle of competition under as per Von Colson (C-14/83, EU:C:1984:153).

In short, even if Member States did not transpose (in time, or at all) the principle of competition in Art 18(1) Dir 2014/24 / Art 36(1) Dir 2014/25, EU law requires national administrative bodies, review bodies and courts to give it full effectiveness, both under  the direct and indirect effect doctrines. This obligation kicks in on 18 April 2016 at the latest (although arguments for an already existing obligation to do so have been on the table since, at least, 2011). This is likely to spur an initial wave of litigation likely to result in references to the CJEU for clarification of the content, meaning and extent of the principle of competition. I for one will keep a close look at these developments.

New SSRN paper on State aid enforcement after the crisis

I have uploaded a new paper on the University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper SSRN Series. It is entitled "Digging Itself Out of the Hole? A Critical Assessment of the European Commission's Attempt to Revitalise State Aid Enforcement after the Crisis" and has the following abstract:

This paper aims to assess the likelihood that State aid enforcement can be revitalised in the post-crisis period as a result of the 2012-2014 State aid modernisation process (SAM). The paper takes the view that State aid enforcement was left in a difficult impasse as a result of the extraordinary measures the Commission implemented during and immediately after the 2008 economic breakdown, which left the Commission in a difficult position due to the unavoidable concessions and lowering of standards that dealing with the soaring volume of State aid required. The paper builds on this premise to critically assess whether a scenario of stronger enforcement can be foreseen under the modernised, post-2014 procedural framework of SAM. It pays particular attention to the need for the European Commission to (re)engage in a more substantive assessment of aid measures and to promote judicial (or private) enforcement of State aid rules in an effective manner. It concludes that revitalisation of State aid enforcement under SAM is highly unlikely.

I have attempted some statistical analysis to support my view that State aid enforcement is not being efficient. As a taster (full details in the paper), I argue that 'it seems conservative to estimate at around 100 billion Euros the amount of (non-investigated) illegally-granted State aid in the EU28 between 2008 and 2013' and that the Commission is accumulating a significant backlog of State aid cases (of around 500 in the same period), despite having expanded its State aid workforce by 53% between 2007 and 2011.

I also argue that the Commission's push for more transparency of the awards of State aid will not result in an actual involvement of private parties and society at large as stewards of EU State aid rules, in particular due to the restriction of the locus standi to submit (admissible) complaints to the Commission (following Sarc v Commission and the rules under the revised art 11a of reg 794/2004) and the compounded effect of the mandatory use of a standard form that requires significant information.

I will present a reworked version of this paper at the Antitrust Enforcement Symposium held by the Centre for Competition Law and Policy of the University of Oxford in June, where I am honoured to share a session on Competition and the State with such distinguished scholars and practitioners as Conor Quigley QC, Damien Geradin, James Cooper, David Szafram, Isabel Taylor, Angus Johnston and Ioannis Lianos. As you see, not the easiest audience. So all comments that can help me improve the paper are most welcome! I already thank my colleague Dr Paolo Vargiu for his first reactions.

The full citation for the paper is: A Sanchez Graells, "Digging Itself Out of the Hole? A Critical Assessment of the European Commission's Attempt to Revitalise State Aid Enforcement after the Crisis" (May 5, 2015) University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 15-15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602798.

"Monitor and the Competition and Markets Authority": My new paper on health care, procurement and competition in the UK

I have just uploaded my new piece "Monitor and the Competition and Markets Authority" as the University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 14-32. The paper looks at the institutional design for the enforcement of competition and public procurement rules in the health care sector in the UK and criticises the concurrency regime developed in 2013. It is linked to my previous paper on the substantive aspects of the NHS Competition, Choice and Procurement Regulations 2013 (about to be published in the Public Procurement Law Review and available here).

I will be presenting this new paper at the EUI (Florence), at a workshop on Antitrust Law in Healthcare organised by Prof Giorgio Monti. Comments welcome!

Abstract 

As part of its enforcement duties under the National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No. 2) Regulations 2013, and in exercise of the powers assigned to it by the Health and Social Care Act 2012, the health care sector regulator for England (Monitor) is co-competent with the competition watchdog (Competition and Markets Authority) to enforce competition law in health care markets. Oddly, though, unlike other sector regulators, Monitor does not have a duty to promote competition but ‘simply’ to prevent anti-competitive behaviour. Monitor is also competent to carry out reviews and to decide bid disputes concerning procurement carried out by health care bodies, provided there is no formal challenge under the Public Contracts Regulations 2006.

This paper contends that such a concentration of regulatory, competition enforcement and procurement review powers puts Monitor in a unique situation of (potential) structural conflict of interest that can diminish significantly its ability to act as an effective (co-competent) competition authority. This paper focusses on this difficult structure for the enforcement of competition law in the health care sector in England, in particular due to the asymmetrical, sui generis concurrency regime created by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 and the Concurrency Regulations 2014. As examples of such conflict of interest and its implications, the paper assesses Monitor’s incentives to bend the interpretation of both art.101(3) TFEU and the new special regime on procurement of social services (arts.72-77 dir 2014/24). The paper concludes that this situation requires regulatory reform to devolve powers to the Competition and Markets Authority.

A Sánchez Graells, 'Monitor and the Competition and Markets Authority' (November 20, 2014). University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 14-32. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2528569.

Coauthored paper with @pacomarcos: “Human Rights” Protection for Corporate Antitrust Defendants: Are We Not Going Overboard?

There seems to be a clear trend of increased protection of ‘corporate human rights’ and, more specifically, due process rights (or procedural fairness) in the field of enforcement of competition law. To a large extent, that trend is based on the uncritical extension of human rights protection to corporate defendants by a process of simple assimilation of corporate and individual defendants.

 

This new coauthored paper briefly explores the rationale behind the creation of due process rights when the individual is the beneficiary of such protection. It then goes on to critically assess if the same need exists for the extension of those protections to corporate defendants, particularly in the field of competition law or antitrust enforcement. It concludes with some warnings concerning the diminishing effectiveness of competition law prohibitions and of human law protection that can result from an overstretched conception of due process protection in this area of EU economic law.

From a substantive perspective, this paper submits that the extension of human rights to corporations cannot be uncritical and should not be completely symmetrical to that for human beings; but that it rather needs to be necessarily adapted to their circumstances. To put it more bluntly, it is suggested that in the field of the enforcement of economic law, administrative law procedures should be sound and there should clearly be a strong system of judicial review in place, but corporations should not have access to broader constitutional or human rights protections and any perceived shortcomings in the design and application of those procedures should remain within the sphere of regulatory reform.

 

Sánchez Graells, Albert and Marcos, Francisco, “Human Rights” Protection for Corporate Antitrust Defendants: Are We Not Going Overboard? (February 2, 2014). University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 14-04. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2389715.

(Non)disclosure of leniency applications in the proposed 'Damages Directive': Commission v CJEU?

The European Commission has finally published its Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union [COM(2013) 404] (the proposed 'Damages Directive'). 

Amongst many other interesting (and controversial rules), the proposed Damages Directive tackles the issue of the disclosability of leniency materials, which has been recently analysed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Donau Chemie and had been previously analysed in Pfleiderer (which were discussed here).

The proposed 'Damages Directive' follows the prior Resolution of the Meeting of the Heads of the European Competition Authorities of 23 May 2012, on the protection of leniency material in the context of civil damages actions and is based on the argument that

In the absence of legally binding action at the EU level, the effectiveness of the leniency programmes — which constitute a very important instrument in the public enforcement of the EU competition rules — could thus be seriously undermined by the risk of disclosure of certain documents in damages actions before national courts.

Remarkably, this argument was adopted by Advocate General Jääskinen in his Donau Chemie Opinion (para 56), but was later rejected in very clear terms by the CJEU in the Donau Chemie Judgment, where it very clearly emphasised that:

as regards the public interest of having effective leniency programmes [...] it should be observed that, given the importance of actions for damages brought before national courts in ensuring the maintenance of effective competition in the European Union (see C‑453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I‑6297, paragraph 27), the argument that there is a risk that access to evidence contained in a file in competition proceedings which is necessary as a basis for those actions may undermine the effectiveness of a leniency programme in which those documents were disclosed to the competent competition authority cannot justify a refusal to grant access to that evidence (C-536/11 at para 46, emphasis added).

Consequently,  the CJEU restricted the possibility to reject the disclosure of leniency documents to very specific and narrow circumstances by stressing that

The mere risk that a given document may actually undermine the public interest relating to the effectiveness of the national leniency programme is liable to justify the non-disclosure of that document (C-536/11 at paras 48, emphasis added).

This is in clear contrast with the Commission's policy-based approach in the proposed 'Damages Directive', where specific rules against the disclosure of leniency documents are established in Article 6 on the limits on the disclosure of evidence from the file of a competition authority:

1. Member States shall ensure that, for the purpose of actions for damages, national courts cannot at any time order a party or a third party to disclose any of the following categories of evidence:

(a) leniency corporate statements; and

(b) settlement submissions.

2. Member States shall ensure that, for the purpose of actions for damages, national courts can order the disclosure of the following categories of evidence only after a competition authority has closed its proceedings or taken a decision referred to in Article 5 of Regulation No 1/2003 or in Chapter III of Regulation No 1/2003:

(a) information that was prepared by a natural or legal person specifically for the proceedings of a competition authority;

(b) information that was drawn up by a competition authority in the course of its proceedings.

3. Disclosure of evidence in the file of a competition authority that does not fall into any of the categories listed in paragraphs 1 or 2 of this Article may be ordered in actions for damages at any time.

As the explanatory memorandum clarifies, the rules have the following aims:

To prevent that the disclosure of evidence jeopardises the public enforcement of the competition rules by a competition authority, the proposed Directive also establishes common EU-wide limits to disclosure of evidence held in the file of a competition authority:

(a) First, it provides for absolute protection for two types of documents which are considered to be crucial for the effectiveness of public enforcement tools. The documents referred to are the leniency corporate statements and settlement submissions. The disclosure of these documents risks seriously affecting the effectiveness of the leniency programme and of settlements procedures. Under the proposed Directive, a national court can never order disclosure of such documents in an action for damages.

(b) Second, it provides for temporary protection for documents that the parties have specifically prepared for the purpose of public enforcement proceedings (e.g. the party’s replies to the authority’s request for information) or that the competition authority has drawn up in the course of its proceedings (e.g. a statement of objections). Those documents can be disclosed for the purpose of an antitrust damages action only after the competition authority has closed its proceedings.

(c) Apart from limiting the national court’s ability to order disclosure, the above protective measures should also come into play if and when the protected documents have been obtained in the context of public enforcement proceedings (e.g. in the exercise of one of the parties’ right of defence). Therefore, where one of the parties in the action for damages had obtained those documents from the file of a competition authority, such documents are not admissible as evidence in an action for damages (documents of category (a) above) or are admissible only when the authority has closed its proceedings (documents of category (b) above).

(d) Documents which fall outside the above categories can be disclosed by court order at any moment in time. However, when doing so, national courts should refrain from ordering the disclosure of evidence by reference to information supplied to a competition authority for the purpose of its proceedings. While the investigation is on-going, such disclosure could hinder public enforcement proceedings, since it would reveal what information is in the file of a competition authority and could thus be used to unravel the authority’s investigation strategy. However, the selection of pre-existing documents that are submitted to a competition authority for the purposes of the proceedings is in itself relevant, as undertakings are invited to supply targeted evidence in view of their cooperation. The willingness of undertakings to supply such evidence exhaustively or selectively when cooperating with competition authorities may be hindered by disclosure requests that identify a category of documents by reference to their presence in the file of a competition authority rather than their type, nature or object (e.g. requests for all documents in the file of a competition authority or all documents submitted thereto by a party). Therefore, such global disclosure requests for documents should normally be deemed by the court as disproportionate and not complying with the requesting party's duty to specify categories of evidence as precisely and narrowly as possible.

(e) Finally, to prevent documents obtained through access to a competition authority’s file becoming an object of trade, only the person who obtained access to the file (or his legal successor in the rights related to the claim) should be able to use those documents as evidence in an action for damages.

In my view, the rules that support points (a) to (d) are in contrast with the Donau Chemie Judgment and are bound to clash with existing EU Law in two respects: firstly, they can be disproportionately limiting the possibilities to obtain effective redress and, consequently, limiting the effectiveness of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU as interpreted by the CJEU in Courage. And, secondly, they can be disproportionately restricting the procedural autonomy of Member States by excluding the ability of domestic courts to conduct the balancing of interests between leniency defendants and damages claimants that the CJEU has stressed both in Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie. 

Hence, in my opinion, the rules in the Commission's proposed 'Damages Directive' are inadequate and should be revised, particularly as the absolute protection of  leniency corporate statements and settlement submissions are concerned, which are based on a policy option that has been disapproved by the CJEU very recently. 

The rest of the rules on temporary protection of evidence and preemption of discovery-like requests of evidence should also be revised, since they may make it very burdensome for potential claimants to actually have access to the requested evidence (for alternative proposals discussed in view of the 2005 Green Paper on Damages, see Sanchez Graells, 'Discovery, Confidentiality and Disclosure of Evidence Under the Private Enforcement of EU Antitrust Rules'). Otherwise, there will be very significant difficulties for the claim of damages in private actions due to infringements of the EU's and Member States' competition rules.

A missed opportunity to analyse a potential #abuse of a #dominantposition created by #publicprocurement (T-74/11)

In its Judgment in case T-74/11 Omnis Group v Commission (and Microsoft), the General Court of the European Union (GC) dismissed the appeal against the Decision of the European Commission (COMP/39.784 – Omnis/Microsoft) not to open a full investigation and rejecting the complaint submitted by Omnis  against Microsoft for the alleged abuse of its dominant position in certain software markets (in the EU and in Romania more specifically).

The appeal has several grounds and GC analyses in detail whether the Commission manifestly erred in its assessment of the facts or abused its discretion not to conduct a full investigation against Microsoft. The case is interesting to read (in French or Romanian only, unfortunately) for the detailed description of the elements and criteria the Commission must take into account before dismissing a complaint.

However, in connection with public procurement, it is interesting to note that, due to the poor information apparently submitted by the complainant, an important legal point was not explored by the Commission. To be fair, the arguments as presented by the Complainant are slightly far fetched, as they are based on the conclusion of a cartel-type agreement between Microsoft and the Romanian Government. As the Commission summarised it, 'Omnis Group [alleged] that Microsoft has entered into an illegal strategic partnership in contravention of Articles 101 and 106 TFEU with the Romanian Government which conferred an illegal monopoly on Microsoft in Romania and that such agreements amount to an illegal cartel or "cartel-type" behaviour' (COMP/39.784, para 16). 

In any case, the allegation that an exclusive right granted through public procurement (or in violation of the applicable rules) actually allowed Microsoft to distort competition (abusing a dominant position, or otherwise) seemed to require detailed scrutiny. DG COMP nevertheless brushed it aside: 'the complaint has been forwarded to the unit in charge of public procurement issues in the Commission's Internal Market Directorate General and to the European Anti-Fraud Office ("OLAF") in order to investigate the allegations which do not directly concern competition law. This decision will therefore solely address the competition law concerns raised in the complaint' (COMP/39.784, para 12).

Moreover, the Commission considered (maybe lightly) that the 'allegations that these mere procurement contracts would instate a monopoly of Microsoft in the relevant market or a cartel between the Romanian Government and Microsoft remain unsubstantiated by any reference to concrete provisions of these contracts and/or their anticompetitive implementation on the relevant market. It is therefore highly unlikely that an infringement of Articles 101 and Art 106 TFEU could be established on the basis of the information provided by the complainant' (COMP/39.784, para 44). In my view, the Commission could have done more to access those contracts, which are bound to remain confidential and, consequently, out of reach for an independent complainant.

In that regard, I find it remarkable that the GC finds no fault in that approach:

98 The applicant maintains that Microsoft's dominant position on the Romanian market and its agreements with the Romanian State have the effect of requiring third parties to use Microsoft programs for compatibility reasons. This position on the Romanian [markets for certain business software products] prevents the existence and development of competitors. By ignoring the existence of such a dominant position, the Commission wrongly refused to consider this complaint.

99 On the one hand, to the extent that this argument is concerned with Article 102 TFEU, it should be noted that the reasons put forward are similar to those rejected in the context of the first plea [where the GC has backed the European Commission's view that Microsoft was not dominant in the relevant markets]. It is therefore necessary to reject this plea for the same reasons as those set out [...] above.

100 On the other hand, given that this plea aims to challenge the assessment carried out by the Commission under Articles 101 TFEU and 106 TFEU, this argument must also be rejected.

101 Indeed, in the contested decision, the Commission found that the allegations of strategic partnership with the Romanian government fell within the scope of the rules on public procurement and that the claims regarding Microsoft's monopoly or the existence of an agreement Microsoft and the Romanian government were not supported (see paragraph 15 above). The Commission has therefore concluded that it was highly unlikely that can be established a violation of Articles 101 TFEU and 106 TFEU on the basis of information provided by the complainant (T-74/11, paras 98-101, own translation from French and emphasis added).

In my view, and with the disadvantage of not having access to the file or the arguments presented by the complainant, this seems like a missed opportunity to further the joint enforcement of EU public procurement and competition rules and to assess whether public procurement rules (or agreements entered into in compliance, or not, with them) generated a negative market impact equivalent to the abuse of a dominant position. It seems to respond to a 'compartmentalised' or 'silo-based' enforcement structure by the European Commission (DG COMP seems to have brushed the procurement argument aside as if it was not relevant, at least within its sphere of action), which may need revision if public procurement and competition concerns are to be truly integrated and jointly enforced--which would bring about significant potential improvements.

How forcefully can the @OFTgov reign in #NHS anti-competitive procurement?

In his speech about Competition in Public Services, the Chief Executive of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has expressly mentioned the need to address market design issues in the current reform of the provision of public services and, more specifically, healthcare services. It is worth noting that the OFT considers that:

Market design needs to flow from the public policy objectives intended from opening up a market.

For example, in health it has been considered necessary to fix price tariffs and allow competition to focus on quality to avoid competition focusing on price at the expense of quality. In this context, quality is partly about clinical outcomes, partly about other things like access and service.

But articulating clear objectives can be difficult when the purpose of introducing choice and competition itself varies: sometimes to address concerns about quality, choice or innovation; in others to reduce costs. Weighing up these points is an important first step in market design (emphasis added),

As should be expected, it looks like the OFT's approach to the reform of healthcare provision is based on the premise that competition is still the best mechanism to achieve the desirable levels of quality. And this seems difficult to reconcile with the provisions of the National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No. 2) Regulations 2013, which (as briefly discussed here) precisely allow NHS commissioners to engage in anti-competitive behaviour (ie in distortions or restrictions of competition) in order to achieve desired quality improvements.

With this in mind, it looks difficult to reconcile the substantive guidance given by the sectoral regulator Monitor--which has advanced that qualitative assessment is not a mathematical exercise and that quality improvements can justify reductions in competition (although some marginal competition is expected to be protected)--with the warning issued by the OFT, which Chief Executive has stressed that it will seek direct enforcement of the competition provisions in the healthcare sector where appropriate, as its recent enforcement track record shows, since:

For example, last summer we secured voluntary assurances from eight NHS Hospital Trusts that they will no longer exchange commercially sensitive information about their Private Patient Unit (PPU) prices, to ensure they comply with competition law. We have urged all Trusts to take steps to ensure compliance with competition law when engaging in commercial activity.

One can wonder whether this type of enforcement activities will still be possible when NHS commissioners argue that their anti-competitive behaviour is justified on the basis of Regulation 10(1) of the 2013 Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition (No. 2) Regulations, since it was carried out in the patients' interest, measured in qualitative terms.

Enforcement of competition law in this area is growing more and more complicated precisely at a moment where the reform of the provision of public services may have a significant impact on market structure and competitive dynamics. Therefore, it is to be welcome that the OFT has prioritised this area in its strategic plan for 2013-14 and that this focus is likely to gain equally important strategic relevance for the future Competition and Markets Authority. 

However, closer coordination with the sectoral regulator Monitor may be necessary at this point in order to prevent sending mixed messages to the actors in the field and, more importantly, to prevent situations where an excessively broad interpretation of regulatory exclusions of competition could take place. The market structure resulting from the current wave of public sector reform is likely to influence market dynamics for a relatively long time in the future and, consequently, getting the process right is of utmost importance.

Stock manipulation via twitter: The new frontier of securities regulation?

What happened yesterday with the US stocks should be more than a wake up call to what may be an unmanageable problem--which was anticipated some 4 years ago by @jonathanfields (and probably others, but which has not yet received serious attention).

The fact that anyone can attempt to manipulate stock prices by publishing false information on twitter definitely makes it a dangerous outlet. As useful as it is a tool to get real time information, it is also too good a platform to broadcast fake market intelligence. The fact that well-reputed twitter accounts can be hacked and used as a loud speaker for the fake news just complicates the scenario.

As a matter of principle, at least in the EU and the US, there are regulatory instruments in place to prohibit this manipulative type of conduct and to prevent the dissemination of false information with the purpose (or the foreseeable effect) of altering stock prices (hacking being dealt with by the criminal law of the relevant jurisdiction) [for general discussion, see R Söderström, Regulating Market Manipulation. An Approach to designing Regulatory Principles, Uppsala Faculty of Law Working Paper 2011:1]. 

In the US, the issue is dealt with in SEA section 9(a)(4) (with a requirement for the false information to be disclosed by a trading party (or a dealer or broker) that may limit its application to a case like yesterday's). In the EU, a 2003 Directive on insider dealing and market manipulation (reformed in 2008 and 2010) addresses this issue more broadly (and a proposal for stronger, criminal sanctions has been on the table since December 2012) and sets a mandate for EU Member States to prohibit any person from engaging in market manipulation (art 5), which under the relevant definition (art 2) includes

(c) dissemination of information through the media, including the Internet, or by any other means, which gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading signals as to financial instruments, including the dissemination of rumours and false or misleading news, where the person who made the dissemination knew, or ought to have known, that the information was false or misleading.

Notwithstanding the (theoretical) sufficiency of this regulatory framework (ie the law on the books, at least in the EU), it is just too obvious to point out that the enforcement problems are almost intractable when market manipulation takes place in social media--despite the recent efforts of financial authorities to provide updated guidance on these delicate issues (for instance, see the US SEC's guidance on the use of social media by issuers). Maybe it is time to set up a new task force (unless it is already in place, but I am not aware of it) to update the findings of IOSCO's 2000 Report on Investigating and Prosecuting Market Manipulation and adapt it to the very different social conditions that exist 13 years after its initial publication.

An interesting assessment of the enforcement of EU procurement rules: Pelkmans & Correia De Brito (2012) Enforcement in the EU Single Market

In their forthcoming book Enforcement in the EU Single Market (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2160236) Jacques Pelkmans and Anabela Correia De Brito provide an interesting overview of the laws and regulations of the single market of the European Union, the current EU enforcement landscape and its functioning, with a particular focus on compliance with public procurement rules. This is a very topical and relevant field of inquiry and their book sheds some interesting insights into the actual level of compliance with EU public procurement rules and the potential gains to be obtained if the current modernization process is correctly driven towards simplifying and promoting compliance.

As the authors rightly indicate,

Among all types of EU single market legislation, the problems with public procurement are undoubtedly the harder ones. The potential market is huge: there is still an enormous potential of cross-border competition for contracts and the economic welfare gains can be very substantial. The European Commission’s proposals of December 2011 should be of some help. There should be more harmonization, including in the national review and remedies systems.

In their book, Pelkmans and Correia De Brito offer a short but useful typology of enforcement barriers that stress some of the main areas of difficulty, such as administrative barriers [which include include "the incorrect application of EU directives, conformity assessment barriers and enforcement issues in (intra-EU) public procurement, especially non-publication (when above the value thresholds in EU law)] or the maybe more implicit restrictions derived from gold plating and an improper application of the rules controlling technical requirements in public procurement procedures.

Further than that qualitative analysis of the enforcement landscape, some of the data provided by Pelkmans and Correia De Brito is also worth highlighting. They provide a statistic of the cases handled by the Commission concerning the enforcement of public procurement rules (p. 89, please note that the most recent year is to the left, which makes the reading of the table slightly counter intuitive): 

As the authors derive from those numbers:

[...] the number of public procurement infringement files handled by the European Commission each year has progressively decreased in the period 2007-10 (155 in 2010, 258 in 2009, 333 in 2008 and 344 in 2007). Most of the files opened by the Commission were closed during the pre-administrative/administrative phase of the infringement procedure (76, 127, 163 and 142, respectively). However, in comparative terms, the number of cases referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union increased slightly in 2010 (7.5% of the cases in 2010 had been reported to the CJEU, compared with 2.3% of the cases in 2009, 2.4% in 2008 and 3.5% in 2007).

Even if the number of infringement procedures opened by the Commission in the reported period had decreased in relation to previous years, the case load of public procurement infringement complaints still remains high and indicates that compliance levels should be improved in a number of member states.

In my opinion, the analysis of the data also offers other  interesting hints, since it shows that there seems to be a significant amount of backlog piling up in the Commission's docket (ie the number of cases closed is less than 50% of those open for any year in the 2007-10 period) and that only a small fraction of those cases are referred to the CJEU (which means that political negotiation remains the paramount enforcement tool in the public procurement field).

I also find it interesting to compare the relatively low number of public procurement cases based on Article 258 TFEU and the increasing number of Judgments of the CJEU and the GC in the field of public procurement. A quick search for the words "public procurement" with the case-law search engine of the curia webpage retrieves over 730 documents, most of which were produced after the adoption of the current 2004 Directives. Such a contrast in numbers indicates that public procurement enforcement is running trough two very different roads when one compares its enforcement based on the "law in the books" (Commission enforcement) and the "law in action" (references for preliminary rulings and challenges to procurement decisions of the European Institutions). This seems, then, a worthy area were to focus future research efforts.

In their conclusions, Pelkmans and Correia De Brito find that the source of the massive litigation in public procurement is basically the heterogeneity of the rules. They submit that:

There are still numerous ‘barriers’, real and perceived, in the internal public procurement market. Member states have (too) much regulatory discretion because the procurement directives are ‘coordination’ directives, with insufficient harmonization. The ‘regulatory heterogeneity’ in the area is far too costly for the businesses interested in cross-border or even EU-wide operation. More harmonization and/or disciplines of national ‘special or extra’ rules and requirements should urgently be pursued. Also, the national review and remedies systems are vastly different in terms of rules, procedures, ease-of-access and effectiveness. Such complications go squarely against the justified desire of business to have prior confidence in cross-border tenders. Quick access to national reviews of public procurement is an asset, but its utility is dramatically diminished by the overly fragmented arrangements that confuse business and undermine a level playing field. Harmonization here is tough given the incorporation in national legal systems, but EU-wide performance criteria might be introduced to enhance confidence for cross-border entrepreneurs (pp. 130-131).

This may be a call for a shift from having public procurement Directives to the adoption of proper public procurement Regulations (although many scholars, such as Arrowsmith or Treumer, have already indicated that the EU public procurement directives just fall shy from being disguised regulations due to their high degree of prescriptiveness). 

Be it as it may, the findings of the authors may be worth taking into consideration in the last steps of the modernization process of EU public procurement rules, which still seems to be scheduled for completion before Summer of 2013. Having enforcement considerations in the back of the policymakers' heads when finalizing the drafting of the new rules seems definitely desirable.

Public buyers will self-protect against bid rigging

Another of the interesting developments included in the compromise text that reflects the current status of negotiations for the modernisation of  EU public procurement rules (http://tinyurl.com/modernisationcompromise) is the inclusion of a new Article 54(3) that clarifies that tenderers affected by any grounds for exclusion can be disqualified by contracting authorities at any time:

Contracting authorities may at any moment during the procedure exclude an economic operator where it turns out that the economic operator in question is, in view of acts committed either before or during procedure, in one of the situations referred to in Article 55(1) to (3).

This is a relevant clarification that prevents a rigid interpretation that would have limited the possibility to exclude tenderers at the beginning of the procurement process (ie only at selection stage).

Notwithstanding the above, and maybe most interestingly, this provision is coupled with a new Article 55(3)(d) in virtue of which a tenderer can be excluded

where the contracting authority can demonstrate that the economic operator has entered into agreements with other economic operators aimed at distorting competition.

This is an important development in terms of reducing the impact of bid rigging on procurement, which stresses the need for contracting authorities to cooperate closely with competition watchdogs (both at regional and national levels, and with the European Commission's Directorate General for Competition) and that opens the door to potential difficulties in terms of due process (eg what is the burden of proof to be discharged by contracting authorities?) and an eventual conflict of enforcement competences (both by administrative bodies and in terms of judicial review, particularly where competition matters are assigned to specialised courts).

Therefore, when the time to transpose Articles 54 and 55 of the new Directive (if adopted in the terms of the compromise text) comes, it will be interesting to revisit the institutional architecture of procurement authorities to ensure the appropriate collaboration channels with antitrust authorities (on this, see A Sanchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules [2011] Hart Publishing 381-389).